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1INTRODUCTIONl
This thesis is an attempt at combining the economics of information with the
theory of industrial organization, by drawing on, respectively, the theory of com-
petition in markets with asymmetric information, and the theory of consumer
lock-in. In this way, we get a theory of consumer lock-in in markets with asym-
metric information.
The motivation is the following: Suppose you observe in real life a par-
ticular market showing signs of firms fighting for market shares. A leading ex-
planation for such fierce competition is that consumers, once they get attached to
a particular supplier, are locked in. One reason for such lock-in is consumer
switching costs, l.e., that direct costs are involved when a consumer switches
from one supplier to another. Consumer switching costs may thus explain the
market performance you observe. Suppose, however, that the market in question
is a very special one: There is asymmetric information between suppliers and con-
sumers, in the sense that consumers have private information that is vital to the
profitability of selling to them. Could it be that asymmetric information alone,
without the presence of consumer switching costs or any other lock-in mechan-
ism, is sufficient to create consumer lock-in?
This question is addressed in Chapter 2 below, which is the key chapter of
the thesis. There, the starting point is the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model of an
insurance market with asymmetric information, with consumers having private
information on accident probabilities. It is necessary to extend their one-period
model to a two-period framework. Only then are we able to understand how con-
siderations about the future will affect today's competition and, hence, how con-
sumer lock-in may arise in such a market.
How, then, could a consumer be locked in in a multi-period insurance mar-
ket? It must be because his current insurer has learnt something about him that
lThanks to Tertit Hammer for comments that have greatly improved the exposition.
2rival insurers do not know. This piece of information we take to be the consum-
er's accident experience: Each insurer is the only one having observed whether
its old customers have had any accidents in the past or not. In plain language, it
is argued that an insurance company's customer files, containing information
that the company has on customers' previous accidents, are of value.
Public information on consumers' previous contract choices creates an obsta-
cle to the potential benefit of an insurer's customer files: Suppose that high-risk
consumers buy a contract today that differs from the one purchased by low-risk
consumers; this is called self-selection. Such self-selection, however, has the con-
sequence that any insurer, merely by observing a consumer's contract choice, can
determine whether he is a high-risk or a low-risk. Any additional information
about accident experience is of no value.2
Thus, for customer files to be of value in the second period, there cannot be
self-selection in the first period. An equilibrium without initial self-selection is
called a pooling equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, all consumers are offered
the same first-period contract. Moreover, an insurer that has observed his cus-
tomers' accident experience is able, later on, to adjust his subjective probability
that any given old customer is a low-risk; this is because a low-risk consumer has
a higher probability of having a good accident experience than a high-risk. The
insurer is also able to discriminate among customers according their accident
histories. Consider customers with, say, a good accident history. The insurer may
find it profitable to cross-subsidize among them in such a way that expected loss-
es on the relatively few high-risks in this group are more than compensated by
expected profits on the relatively many low-risks. The reason why it is possible to
lock in old customers and earn an expected profit on them is the informational
advantage stemming from the customer files.
The existence of a pooling equilibrium (i.e., no initial self-selection) with
consumer lock-in is the main result in Chapter 2. We are, thus, able to answer
the question we started with in the affirmative: Customer files may have a value
2There are indeed good reasons to argue that previous contract choices, in contrast to the con-
tent of the customer files, belongs to the public domain. Suppose that a consumer would be able to
switch insurer if only the new insurer knew which insurance contracts he has bought in the past.
Then, it is in the interest of the consumer to disclose this information by producing his own copies of
previous contracts. In light of this, it is only reasonable to assume contract choices being directly
observable byeverybody at any time.
3in themselves and may create consumer lock-in even when no other lock-in
mechanism is present.
The research on consumer lock-in with asymmetric information invites fur-
ther work to be done in many directions. Chapters 3 and 4 explore two ideas that
may seem very different from eachother. Each of them has, however, a firm con-
nection to the analysis of Chapter 2.
InChapter 3, which is co-authored by Geir B.Asheim, the possibility of rene-
gotiation is studied. Like in Chapter 2, we are within the framework of the Roth-
schild-Stiglitz insurance model, and again, we analyse one particular conse-
quence of making insurers able to take advantage of information received on
consumers.
The idea is the following: In a set of contracts eliciting self-selection, the con-
tract intended for low-risks is a partial-insurance contract in order to make it
unattractive to high-risks. After contract choices are made, an insurer will have
incentives to approach the consumers that have chosen the partial-insurance
contract, inviting them to renegotiate, i.e., to replace their initial contract with a
full-insurance contract which is at least as good for them and more profitable for
the insurer. The high-risk consumers will, however, anticipate all this when
they make their contract choices and will therefore find it beneficial to simulate
low-risk by also choosing the partial-insurance contract. Thus, with renegotia-
tion, it seems difficult to get high-risks and low-risks to buy different contracts.
Having solved the problem of how to introduce renegotiation in a meaning-
ful way into a one-period insurance model, we are able to report quite remark-
able results from our exercise of comparing the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance
model with and without renegotiation. We find, in contrast to the original mod-
el, that, with renegotiation, there always exists an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Moreover, for a considerable part of the parameter space, including all parameter
combinations leading to non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in the origi-
nal model, there is pooling (i.e., no self-selection) in equilibrium. For the rest of
the parameter space, there is incomplete self-selection in the sense that one of the
two offered contracts is chosen by all the low-risks and some of the high-risks,
while the other contract is chosen by the rest of the high-risks. This contrasts
with the original model, in which there is always complete self-selection. In fact,
the result contrasts with all previous models following Rothschild and Stiglitz
4(1976).Even though previous attempts have succeeded in obtaining existence of a
pure-strategy equilibrium by some respecification of the original model, this is
the first variation, to our knowledge, that reports pooling even for some cases
where the original model features a pure-strategy self-selection equilibrium.
Working on consumer lock-in, one might soon come to the idea that the
extent to which a consumer is locked in may depend in a very particular way on
what his alternatives to staying with the current supplier are. Take the insurance
market as an example, and suppose there are three different insurers in the mar-
ket. When a certain consumer considers leaving firm A, his current insurer, he
may have to take into account the fact that firm B is an insurer he has never been
attached to before, while firm C, on the other hand, was his insurer until last
year, when he switched to firm A. Clearly, if customer files have any value, firm
C, with its file on our consumer, is able to offer him an insurance contract that
the uninformed firm B is unable to match. In fact, with all its information on
this consumer, firm C may be a serious threat to his current insurer, firm A. It
seems, therefore, that a consumer who switches between suppliers of insurance
over time has something to gain by a reduction of the lock-in effect. On the other
hand, the fact that a consumer that comes switching from another insurer is
more difficult to lock in than a completely fresh one should make firms hesitant
to compete fiercely for such a consumer.
Unfortunately, Chapter 2 shows us that even a two-period model of the
insurance market is very difficult to work with. And to make the point we out-
lined in the previous paragraph, we would need at least three periods. However,
the problem is of interest also outside the insurance market. In Chapter 4, there-
fore, a multi-period duopoly market with homogeneous products, with complete
information, and with consumer switching costs is analysed. In fact, we are able
to contribute to the theory of consumer switching costs by insisting on a differ-
ence between two kinds of such switching costs: One is called transaction costs,
and it is incurred every time a consumer switches between suppliers. The other
is called learning costs and is incurred only when a consumer switches to a sup-
plier he has never been in contact with before. Thus, the higher is the fraction of
learning costs out of total switching costs, the higher is the reduction in lock-in
the consumer obtains by making one switch and, therefore, the less profit there
is to be earned on a consumer that has switched from another firm. A high frac-
5tion of learning costs seems to be a good parallel to a high value of customer files
in the insurance market context of the previous paragraph.
In analysing this model, we find that, subject to a restriction on the demand
function, an increase in the fraction of learning costs out of total consumer
switching costs leads to an increase in welfare. We also find that such an increase
lowers firms' introductory (first-period) price.
One should be careful with applying this insight in the insurance market,
though. It seems tempting, based on Chapter 4 and the analogy noted above, to
argue that valuable customer files are beneficial to society. Such a conclusion is,
however, premature. One should wait until a proper analysis of the three-period
insurance market has been carried out. Considering the complexity of Chapter 2,
such an analysis may prove to be far more than a straightforward exercise.
A key ingredient of the results in Chapters 2 and 3 was the phenomenon of
pooling: privately informed, heterogeneous agents behaving identically, in the
sense that they all buy the same insurance contract. A natural question to ask,
then, is: When, except in these two instances, will a model with asymmetric
information feature pooling? There does not seem to be any readily available
survey of the literature strictly directed at this question. Chapter 1, therefore, is
written to fill this gap. A reader with a textbook knowledge of the economics of
asymmetric information may want to answer the question straightforwardly as
follows: Pooling occurs when the single-crossing condition on the informed
agents' preferences does not hold. In my view, there is more to it than that. It is
to be hoped that, by the end of that chapter, the readers will agree.
Reference
Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph Stiglitz (1976), "Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information",
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4), 629-649.

7CHAPTlER ONlE:
WHEN POOLING IS THE RULE:
ASYMMETRIC-INFORMATION MODELS
WITH INCOMPLETE SEPARATIONl
Abstract This chapter contains an extensive survey of the literature on
models of asymmetric information, exploring reasons for there being
less than complete revelation of information in the equilibria of some
of these models. Starting with one-period models, we find such reasons
pertaining either to the incentives of the informed agent, to the incen-
tives of the uninformed principal, or to the medium through which
the parties communicate. We then move on to multi-period models
and cover reasons pertaining to renegotiation and to lack of commit-
ment.
1. INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric information is a characteristic of many instances of interacting indi-
viduals or firms. Prominent examples are the labour market, where a worker
may be thought to have superior information on his own abilities; the credit
market, with borrowers knowing more about characteristics of their projects than
lenders do; and the insurance market, where a consumer is considered to know
privately his or her inherent risk. Other examples include product markets
where producers have superior knowledge on the quality of their products; bar-
gaining situations with the adversaries not knowing each other's reservation
prices; and elections, with the electorate having incomplete knowledge about the
candidates' abilities and intentions.
Problems of asymmetric information may be solved by noting that, in many
lA first version of this chapter was completed in July 1991. I am indebted to a number of people
for discussing with me topics related to the occurrence of pooling in asymmetric-information models
of various kinds; among them are: Geir Asheim, Georg Noldeke, Joseph Stiglitz, and Gaute Torsvik.
I would also like to thank Jon Vislie for his comments on the first version, and Greg LeBlanc for his
written correspondence.
8situations, the uninformed parties may draw inferences from the informed par-
ties' actions, leading the good types among the informed to seek actions to take
that would be unprofitable for the bad types to mimic. This idea of self-selection
dates back to the work of Mirrlees (1971) and Spence (1973).As a solution to the
problem of asymmetric information, it is partial in (at least) two ways. First, self-
selection is obtained only at the cost of leaving the first-best outcome. Second,
and the object of our present concerns, it does not always work. Often, agents of
different types mimic eachother, a phenomenon regularly known as pooling.
This chapter is not an introduction to the economics of asymmetric informa-
tion; rather, some basic knowledge will be assumed. For introductory material,
the reader is referred to the recent microeconomics textbook by Kreps (1990a) or
surveys on optimum regulatory policy under asymmetric information by Besan-
ko and Sappington (1987),Caillaud et al. (1988),and Baron (1989).
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, some prelimi-
naries, such as notation and terminology, are collected. We describe a general set-
up, the principal-agent model, together with two important variations, the mar-
ket screening model and the signalling model. Sections 3 through 6 constitute
the main body of the chapter. In these Sections, we go through a number of rea-
sons for the occurrence of pooling. In Section 3, we have collected reasons related
to the agent's incentives, while we follow up in Section 4 with the principal's
incentives. In Section 5, we are concerned with the medium through which
messages are sent from the agent to the principal. In Section 6, finally, we treat
multi-period situations. Section 7 concludes with some reasons for pooling that
do not fit elsewhere and with some final words on both theory and empiricism.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Consider an economy consisting of a set A ("Agents") of informed agents and a
set P ("Principals") of uninformed agents. Each member of A has information
about one or more of his characteristics, information that is not available ex ante
to the members of P. An informed agent's private information is an element in a
set T ("Types"). These characteristics are such that they cannot be changed. The
uninformed agents share beliefs about the informed agents' private information,
9represented by a probability distribution function p defined over T.
The members of the economy interact with eachother, and this interaction
has interesting properties arising from the asymmetry of information. In this
interaction, each informed agent in A has available actions from the set M ("Mes-
sages"), and each uninformed agent in P has available actions from the set C
("Contracts"). Out of the interaction, informed and uninformed agents earn pay-
offs represented by a mapping II from TxMxC to JR #A+#P, where JR is the real line
and "#" denotes cardinality.
Below, we present the three main variations analysed in the literature. They
are, respectively, the principal-agent model, the market screening model, and the
signalling mode1.2
2.1 The principal-agent model: a single uninformed moving first
The three variations have many properties in common. We start with describing
the principal-agent model, which constitutes our basic set-up.3 This set-up is as
follows:
(i) The sets P and A are singletons, with a single principal facing a single
agent.4
(ii) At the outset, the agent A gets to know whether he is "Bad" or "Good": T
= {B,G}. The principal P's ex ante subjective probability that A is good is Pc E (O,
1).
(iii) The message set M is the interval [m, m] on the real line.
(iv) The principal P makes the first move, specifying the payment to the
2Given the abundancy of fascinating examples of all three models that is found later on in this
chapter, the following three subsections are presented without any illustrative examples at all.
Readers are asked to be patient.
3Early work on this kind of model is by Stiglitz (1977) on an insurance monopolyand Baron and
Myerson (1982) on regulation. More by way of introduction can be found in Kreps (1990a, ch. 18).
4With no expression of prejudice intended, we let principals and agents belong to different
genders in this paper, with principals being females and agents males throughout. Thus, we sub-
scribe in a way to what may be called the "Osborne-Rubinstein compromise", see Osborne and Rubin-
stein (1990, p. x).
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agent contingent on the message, i.e., C consists of mappings s:M~1R.
(v) The agent A moves second, incurring a cost c when sending his message
m e M; this cost depends on the message and the agent's private information, or
type, t e T, i.e., c = enn, t), such that, for all m, t: (a) c z O,(b) ac/am > O,(c) cCm,G)
< ctm, B), (d) ac(m, G)/am < ac(m, B)/am, and (e) a2c/am2;::: O.
(vi) The principal P's gross payoff r depends on the agent's message and type:
r = rem, t), such that, for all m, t: (a) rem, G) > rem, B), (b) r~ B) > c~ B), (c)
ar(m, B)/am;::: ac(m, B)/am, (d) ar(m, B)/am < ar(m, G)/am, and (e) a2r/am2 < O.
(vii) Both P and A are risk neutral, and (net) payoffs TI are given by: TI = (TIP,
TIA) = (r - s, s - c).5
(viii) Both P and A have outside options, normalized to O.
The crucial element in this set-up is property (d) of the informed agent's
message cost function, implying that the cost difference between any two mes-
sages is lower for the good type than for the bad type. It goes under various
names in the literature, like the single-crossing property, the sorting condition,
or the Spence-Mirrlees condition.e
Note also property (a) of the principal's gross payoff function, giving the
precise sense in which an agent of type G is good: rem, G) > rem, B); there is more
for the principal to gain if the agent is good than if he is bad.7
We are looking for an equilibrium of this model. By equilibrium, we will in
general mean a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE is a collection of strate-
gies and beliefs such that, (i) given the beliefs, no player wants at any point to
change strategy, and (ii) given the strategies, beliefs are given by subjective proba-
bilities that are defined by Bayes' rule whenever it applies. For more on PBEa, see
Tirole (1988, Sec. 11.5).
Let met) be the message chosen by an agent of type t. The principal seeks to
5More generally, we could assume that there exists a transferable utility, i.e., some good, such
as money, which is evaluated equivalently by A and P. We then have, for i e {A, P}, a utility func-
tion Ui(x, x') over a good x, the transferable utility, and a composite of other good, x', such that:
Ui(x, x') = x + Vi(xl). For more on this, consult, e.g., Kaneko (1976).
6See, e.g., Cooper (1984) for a discussion of the importance of this condition.
'lIn an insurance context, a good agent is a low-risk consumer; in a labour market context, he is a
high-productivity worker.
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construct a payment function stm) that maximises her net expected payoff
IF = (1 - PG)[r(m(B), B) - s(m(B»] + PG[r(m(G), G) - s(m(G»],
subject to two sets of conditions: First, the participation constraints stipulate that
no-one is left with less than the outside optionf
TIP, TIA ~ o.
Second, the incentive constraints stipulate that an agent of type t does not profit
from mimicking type t':
stmtt) - c(m(t), t) ~ slmtt') - c(m(t'), t), (t, t') e {(G, B), (B, G)}.
In solving this problem, the principal indirectly determines m(B) and meG)
through her choice of stm). Let a star (*) denote equilibrium actions. To simplify
notation, we introduce, for each t: m, æ m*(t), and St æ s*(mt). It turns out that, in
the optimum solution, (a) the bad type sends his (first-best) efficient message:
dr(ms, B)/dm = dc(ms, B)/dm;
(b) the bad type's incentives to mimic the good type are exactly balanced:
SG- Ss = c(mG, B) - c(ms, B);
and (c) the good type's payoff is kept down to his outside option:
SG- c(mG, G) = O.
When the principal maximises TIP using properties (b) and (c) above, we find that
the good type's message mG solves:
dc(mG, G)/dm = PGdr(mG, G)/dm + (1- pc)dc(mG, B)/dm.
Thus, the principal must weigh the efficiency of the good type's message against
the bad type's incentives to mimic, with weights given by PG, the probability that
the agent is good. The higher probability that the agent is good, the less weight is
put on the bad type's incentives. Since dc(m, G)/dm < dc(m, B)/dm by (v)(d)
above, our condition on mG implies that dr(mG, G)/dm < dc(mG, G)/dm; thus,
the good type sends a message that is too high, compared to the first best. The two
8The participation constraint for the agent, nA ;;::O,must, of course, hold for each type. In a
variation of the present set-up, denoted the case of ex-ante contracting, the agent obtains his pri-
vate information only after the contract with the principal is written.There is now a single partici-
pation constraint for the agent, stating that his expected profit should be non-negative. With a risk-
neutral agent, the principal's optimum solution is to design a two-part tariff that extracts all
economic rent from the agent and leaves him with all the risk. This variation has been studied by
Baron (1981) and Rey and Tirole (1986), among others. When necessary to keep the two regimes
apart, the standard case will be denoted interim contracting.
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types send different messages; i.e., separation occurs. In fact, me > ms, which is
seen from noting that the first-best message is higher for the good type than for
the bad type by our assumptions on r and c; the second-best solution places a
further wedge between the two messages.
2.2. The market screening model: competing uninformeds moving first
One important twist to the basic set-up is to let there be multiple principals com-
peting with eachother. Thus, P is no more a singleton. The seminal work on
market screening is by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Competition in this model
has a Bertrand-like feature driving profits to zero. Moreover, if the agent is sepa-
rated, then it is not possible for a principal to cross-subsidize between types with a
non-random payment function. For if she did so, then such a principal would be
vulnerable to cream-skimming by other principals, being left with the loss-
bringing type. Thus, the solution to the problem with separation and principals
competing in non-random payment functions has the property that, for each t:
St = r(mb t),
As in the single-principal case, the bad type sends the first-best efficient message,
i.e., ms satisfies:
ar(ms, B)/am = ac(ms, B)/am.
The last condition on equilibrium actions is that the bad type's incentives to
mimic the good type is exactly balanced:
Sc - Ss = c(mc, B) - c(ms, B),
which, given the zero-profit constraints above, is equivalent to:
r(mc, G) - r(ms, B) = c(mc, B) - c(ms, B).
These conditions do not, however, ensure equilibrium in all circumstances.
Specifically, suppose that all principals, except one, offer a function s according to
the above. Would it now pay the last principal to deviate from this equilibrium
and offer a cross-subsidizing payoff function? In an optimum deviation (s', m'),
the deviator would receive the first-best message from the bad type, so that: ms' =
ms. Moreover, she would exactly balance the bad type's incentives to mimic the
good type, so that: sc' - ss' = c(mc', B) - c(ms', B). Finally, she would exactly
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balance the good type's incentives to stay with one of the otherprincipals, so that:
se' - sc = c(mc', G) - c(mc, G). If we differentiate her profit function subject to
these conditions and evaluate at (s', m') = (s, m), we find that it is optimum also
for the last principal to offer (s, m) if and only if:
ac(mc, G)/am ~ Pcar(mc, G)/am + (1 - Pc)ac(mc, B)/am.
When the above condition does not hold, there exists an equilibrium in
mixed strategies, i.e., where principals offer random payment functions. In this
equilibrium, agent types are still separated. The proof of the existence of such a
mixed-strategy equilibrium is provided by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) in the
general case and by Rosenthal and Weiss (1984) in an instructive special case (see
also Asheim and Nilssen, 1991, Sec. 3).
The condition for existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium can be interpreted
as an upper bound on Pc, i.e., this equilibrium exists if the probability that the
agent is of the good type is not too high, in particular if:
ac(mc, B) ac(mc, G)
am am
Pc ~---------,
ac(mc, B) ar(mc, G)
am am
2.3 The signalling model: informed moving first
A second important twist to the basic set-up is a change in the move sequence.
Let us go back to the case of one principal and one agent. Suppose now that the
agent moves first, sending a message m subject to the same cost function as be-
fore. The principal moves second, specifying the payment s(m) given the agent's
message. A game with such a move sequence is called a signalling game, while a
game with the original sequence, i.e., with the uninformed moving first, is called
a screening game; the terminology is due to Stiglitz and Weiss (1985). The semi-
nal work on signalling is by Spence (1973).
A's optimum message depends on what he thinks about the inferences P
will make from her observation of m. Suppose, in equilibrium, an agent of type t
sends the message m(t). Let P's revised beliefs, after observing m, be given by the
14
updated probability that the agent is good: Pc' = pc'(m). If we restrict the agent to
using pure strategies, then, either:
(i) m(B) = m(G) and pc'(m(B» = pc'(m(G» = Pc, or:
(ii) m(B) "* m(G), pc'(m(B» = O, and pc'(m(G» = 1.
Thus, (i) is a case of pooling, with both types sending the same message, while (ii)
is one of separation. Contrary to the models we have dicussed so far, there typical-
ly exist multiple Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the signalling game, both pooling
and separating ones. If we allow the agent to use mixed strategies, there would
potentially exist equilibria of a hybrid character.
One great task in the signalling literature has been to reduce the number of
equilibria in reasonable ways. This has lead to various refinements of the PBE
concept. These refinements try to put restrictions on the uninformed agent's
beliefs in case a message off the equilibrium path is observed. In such a case, the
PBE concept has no bite, since Bayes' rule is inapplicable when the observed
event happens with probability zero in equilibrium. For a review of the literature
on equilibrium refinements in signalling games, see Kreps (1989).
To develop in detail the many equilibria of the present signalling game and
how most of them could be eliminated through the use of equilibrium refine-
ments would be a space-demanding task. It suffices here to recognize the exist-
ence of refinements that would eliminate any pooling or hybrid equilibrium.
One such refinement is equilibrium dominance, due to Cho and Kreps (1987),
and the argument is the following: In an equilibrium stipulating that the bad-
type A sends the message m, he will not be believed by the principal to have sent
an off-the-equilibrium-path message m' "* m if the best response by P that could
reasonably be expected from sending m' makes him worse off than if he sends
the message m.
This implies restrictions on the principal' s beliefs: Messages having the
property of message m' above are now restricted to giving rise to beliefs putting
probability 1 on the agent being good. This eliminates any pooling equilibrium;
see Kreps (1989,Sec. 7) for details. Cho and Sobel (1990)show that a class of signal-
ling games, to which ours belongs, has a unique equilibrium satisfying a refine-
ment similar to the above one; this equilibrium is separating.
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2.4. Concluding remarks on preliminaries
In this Section, we have presented the standard principal-agent model with ad-
verse selection, together with two important twists: one with competing princi-
pals (i.e., market screening), and one with signalling. We saw that all these mod-
els have the property that (resonable) equilibria are separating. Before finalizing
this preliminary Section, we would like to offer two remarks, one on cases of
continuous type spaces, the other on the concept of pooling.
Throughout the Section, we have maintained the assumption that the type
space is finite; in fact, we have dealt with the two-type case only. With a continu-
ous type space, our conditions on c and r above would have to be reformulated;
in particular, the Spence-Mirrlees condition in (v)(d) above would now read:
a2c(m, t)/amat < O, for all m, t.
Moreover, with a continuum of types, P'S prior beliefs are represented by a proba-
bility distribution defined over T = [1, tJ. Let p:T~JR+, with iT pet) = 1, be the densi-
ty function of this distribution; here, JR+ is the positive part of the real line JR.
Equilibria are separating also with a continuous type space, with two caveats:
First, restrictions on prior beliefs are sometimes necessary to ensure separation.
One such restriction, following from Baron and Myerson's (1982) analysis of a
principal-agent model, is the following monotonicity condition on p:
It p('t)d't
a( - pet) )/at> O, for all t.
This condition is sometimes called the monotonic hazard rate property.
Second, theory is thin on market screening with a continuum of types. It is
well-known that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist with a continuous
type space; see Riley (1979). Whether a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists is an
unresolved issue.
Regarding the concept of pooling, we can use the apparatus of this section to
be more specific on its definition. In the case of a continuous type space T, we say
that an equilibrium features pooling if there exists a subset TP c T, where TP is
not a singleton, such that the message sent by the agent is the same whenever he
is of a type in this subset: met) = met'), 'V t, t' e TP. In the case of a finite type space,
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this definition is extended to include cases where the agent, if he is of a type on
the boundary of TP, sends the pooling message with positive probability.
This is a very broad definition of pooling, in at least two senses. First, it cov-
ers everything except complete separation; i.e., it encompasses what some other
authors would denote partial pooling, semi-pooling, or semi-separation. These
authors would restrict pooling to cover only cases where TP = T, with no random-
ising on the boundary if T is finite.
Second, it does not necessarily imply that the agent may be lying. Some au-
thors would restrict pooling to cover situations where the agent, when he is of
one type, chooses to send the same message as that of another type, in order not
to reveal to the principal(s) his true identity. But with our definition, in addition
to such cases, pooling occurs also when the agent would like to completely reveal
his identity but is unable to do so because of various circumstances.?
Even with this broad concept, we are not able to cover all interesting cases
where an informed agent chooses to hold back his information. This is particular-
ly so when it comes to our discussion of imperfect media in section 5.2 below.
There, we have included cases of incomplete revelation of information that do
not fit our definition of pooling but which nevertheless are so intriguing that
they deserve mentioning.
With this as a background, we start analysing the key question in this chap-
ter: In what instances will there be pooling in equilibrium? A quick answer to
this question is: when the single-crossing property does not hold. As will be clear
over the following pages, there is much more to say on the subject than that.
3. THE AGENT'S INCENTIVES
We start out with the broadest issue, pertaining to the incentives of the agent. In
fact, this is the largest Section of the chapter. We begin with analysing the mes-
sage cost function, discussing those deficiencies it may have that give rise to pool-
ing. Second, we discuss cases where the agent has countervailing incentives, i.e.,
he has reasons both to send a low message and to send a high message. Then, in
90ne instance where this is at work, is when there are restrictions on the message space; see
subsection 3.3.1 below.
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subsection 3.3., we collect a miscellany of other factors that may be behind an
occurrence of pooling, each pertaining in some way or another to the agent's
incentives.
3.1. The message costs
In this subsection, we record some arguments for pooling that can be directly
related to properties of the message cost function. The first instance is that of
costless messages, or cheap talk. The next one is a natural generalization to coinci-
dent message costs. Third, we explore the effects of discontinuities in the message
cost function.
3.1.1. Cheap talk
The simplest case to consider is that of costless messages, or cheap talk. This is the
case where, for all m, t:
c(m, t) = o.
One usually combines this with the message being unproductive, i.e., for all m, t:
dr(m, t) / dm = o.
With no message costs, it seems hard for the good type to distinguish himself
from the bad type. And indeed, with cheap talk, there is always an equilibrium
with complete pooling. In fact, the extraordinary with many cheap-talk models is
that there still is room for some transmission of information, i.e., there exist
equilibria with semi-pooling.
The scope for less than complete pooling is due to the interplay of two as-
sumptions: First, the principal still has preferences over the type space of the
agent:
r(m, G) > r(m, B).
Second, the payment from the principal to the agent is no longer done with a
transferable utility. Rather, the principal takes an action y having the property
that its effect on the agent depends on the latter's type: The agent has a utility
function UA(y, t) depending on his type t and the principal's action y. This utility
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function is assumed to satisfy:
aUA(y,G)/ay > aUA(y,B)/ay,
i.e., the marginal benefit of an increase in y is stronger for a good agent than for a
bad one. These two assumptions create a kind of endogenous message costs suffi-
cient to create less than complete pooling.
The seminal paper on cheap talk is by Crawford and Sobel (1982). They con-
sider a signalling game with costless messages; a continuum of types, T = li, t];
and a message space equal to the type space: M = T. Their main result is the fol-
lowing: In any equilibrium, there is a partition of the type space splitting T into N
subsets delineated by elements of a vector a = (aa, ... , aN),where! = ao < ... < aN = t'
such that, for each n e {l, ... ,N}, an agent of type t e (an-l, an) chooses any message
in (an-l, an) with equal probability, and the principal takes the same action follow-
ing any message in (an-l, an)' This kind of pooling equilibrium Crawford and
Sobel call a partition equilibrium. They characterize an integer NOlo such that, for
any N e [l, NOlo], an equilibrium like this exists.
Work on models with costless messages has continued in many directions
since the Crawford-Sobel 1982 article. Matthews (1989) extends their model by
adding a last stage where the agent makes a choice. The model, as Matthews sets
it up, is now akin to one of ultimate bargaining:10 First, the agent talks; second,
the principal makes an offer; third, the agent comes back and either accepts or
rejects. Matthews argues that this story fits well with U.S. politics, with the Presi-
dent as the agent and the Congress as the principal: The agent's cheap talk is now
Presidential rhetorics and the agent's rejection is a Presidential veto.
Sobel (1985a) introduces a multi-period version of the original model in
which the agent sends messages repeatedly to the principal. Sobel's model has
been used by Benabou and Laroque (1989) to analyze the effects of the presence of
financial analysts in stock markets.
Farrell and Gibbons (1989a) consider the case where the agent sends his mes-
sage to multiple principals; this case becomes interesting when the agent is al-
lowed to choose whether to send his message to one principal in private or to
send the message publicly.
lOUltimate bargaining means that one party makes a take-it-or-Ieave-it offer to the other
party who then either accepts or rejects.
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Myerson (1988, 1989) considers cases where the agent and the principal are
allowed to make use of a mediator or a noisy channel through which the mes-
sage from the agent is sent. If the mediator is properly instructed, or the channel
properly constructed, Pareto-improvements may be obtainable compared to the
case of direct communication. A repeated version of this kind of model is ana-
lysed by Forges (1990). It should be noted that some authors, like Farrell and Gib-
bons (1989b), want to draw a line, among games with costless messages, between
those with and without a mediator; only the latter is cheap talk, while the for-
mer, studied by Myerson, is a mechanism.
Given the multiplicity of equilibria in games with costless messages, as wit-
nessed already in the work of Crawford and Sobel (1982), it seems only natural
that there have been attempts to develop equilibrium refinements particularly
taylored to apply to cheap-talk situations. Farrell (1988) requires that an equilibri-
um be neologism-proof; Rabin (1990) discusses credible message equilibria; Aus-
ten-Smith (1990a) argues in favour of credible debate equilibria; and Matthews,
Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1990) define announcement-proof equilibria.
One area of research in which the idea of cheap talk has proved powerful is
that of preplay communication. Take a game, and extend it by creating a stage in
the beginning where the players of the game can communicate before the start of
the original game. They may interchange messages on their intentions, what we
may call endogenous information, or on their respective types, what we may call
exogenous information.
Although the transmission of endogenous information is without effect in
the original Crawford-Sobel model [see De Groote (1990»), there are instances
where it helps. This is particularly so when the original game has multiple equi-
libria and a need for coordination arises. In Farrell (1987), two firms contemplate
entering a new market and they would both prefer that only one of them enters;
cheap talk in the beginning reduces inefficiency. In Farrell and Saloner (1988),
firms in an industry face the problem of reaching agreement on compatibility
standards for their products; cheap talk in the beginning, in the form of an indus-
try committee, again reduces inefficiency. In both these papers, the authors allow
for multiple rounds of cheap talk.
Preplay communication of players' types has been analysed in several con-
texts. Farrell and Gibbons (1989b) explore the force of cheap talk at the start of a
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bargaining game, while Gibbons (1988) discusses cheap talk in the related issue of
arbitration. In Farrell and Saloner (1985), like in their 1988 paper, the issue is
compatibility standards, and the authors study the effect of preplay communica-
tion of private information. Austen-Smith (1990b) analyses cheap talk viewed as
a debate in a legislature. The election models of Chilton (1990) and Harrington
(1990) seem to have elements of both endogenous and exogenous information;
however, there are one-to-one correspondences between types and intentions, so
that the endogeneity is more apparent than real. Chilton analyses cheap talk
among the electorate in the form of a pre-election poll, whereas Harrington ana-
lyses cheap talk among candidates during their campaigns)1
One interesting application of the Crawford-Sobel model is Stein's (1989)
analysis of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board ("the Fed") and its problem in credibly
announcing its preferences for its own future policies)2 Quite in line with the
predictions from Crawford and Sobel's analysis, Stein suggests that the Fed, in
order to avoid problems of time inconsistency, makes imprecise announcements
and only indicates in which range its true preferences are.
3.1.2. Coincident message costs
Suppose, contrary to the previous subsection, that a message is costly, but that
c(m, G) = c(m, B) = c, for all m; we might call it the case of "flat message costs".
More generally, suppose that c(m, G) = c(m, B) = c(m), for all m; we call it the case
of coincident message costs. The latter obviously generalizes the former, which
itself generalizes cheap talk. Such models should be expected to give predictions
similar to a cheap-talk model, since the single-crossing property is broken in the
same fashion.
One instance of coincident message costs studied in the literature is in Meur-
er (1989).Meurer considers the case of a patent holder whose patent mayor may
not be valid according to the law, and who has private information on the validi-
ty issue. The patent holder's message in this context is an offer to a potential
llCheap talk in elections is also considered by Ledyard (1989).
12See also Oh and Garfinkel (1990) and Garfinkel and Oh (1991) on this issue.
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licensee about a particular sharing of industry profits among the two. The licen-
see responds by accepting or litigating. The patent holder' s offer is a binding one
and thus not an instance of cheap talk. However, as Meurer argues, the offer has
the same impact on the patent holder's future profits whether his patent turns
out to be a valid one or not. Thus, we have coincident message costs. The equilib-
rium in this model is either one of complete pooling or one of partial pooling, in
which the bad type (the holder of an invalid patent) randomizes; Meurer calls the
latter a bluffing equilibrium.
There are also cases of partial coincidence of message costs. This implies that
the message space can be split into two subsets: M = Ml UM2, with Ml = [m, m']
and M2 = (m', m], for some m' in the interior of M. For m e Ml, message costs are
coincident: ctm, G) = c(m, B). For m e M2, message costs have the standard prop-
erties of Section 2, including the single-crossing property. Moreover, the message
cost function c is continuous at m' for each type.
Mester (1988) presents a market screening model with partially coincident
message costs. She studies a two-period credit market where consumers may
borrow in period 1 from banks that offer combinations of interest rate and collat-
eral requirement. Consumers differ in the probability of a high period-2 income
making them able to repay the loan; each consumer knows his probability, but
banks do not. A collateral requirement means that the consumer has to keep a
corresponding part of his period-l income as escrow. There is thus a natural
upper limit on a consumer's borrowing: He cannot collateralize more than his
period-1 income. For combinations of interest rate and collateral requirement for
which this collateral restriction is not binding, message costs are coincident: Inter-
est rate and collateral requirement are perfect substitutes and a small change in a
bank's contract affects a consumer's expected utility independently of his type.
When the collateral restriction is binding, the consumer uses all his period-I
income as collateral and consumes in that period out of the borrowed amount. In
this case, interest rate and collateral requirement are imperfect substitutes and a
consumer' s preference for the two depends on his type; the single-crossing proper-
ty holds. Mester (1988) finds, for the two-type case, that the equilibrium is a pool-
ing one if Pc is sufficiently high and B is close to G. In a typical pooling equilibri-
um, all consumers borrow without any collateral requirements, a situation Mes-
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ter interprets as credit-card borrowing.
In the market for term-insured annuities, consumers are offered combina-
tions of annuity payment and the term (or length) of the annuity. If the term is
short, then a consumer will save part of the payment, implying that term and
annuity payment are perfect substitutes. However, when the term is above some
criticallength, then all of the payment is consumed and a consumer's preferences
across payment and term depend on the probability distribution of his possible
lifespan. Thus, if consumers differ in life-expectancy, there is a partial coinci-
dence of message costs. Townley and Boadway (1988) consider the case where
consumers have private information on this probability distribution: Some con-
sumers are long-lived and some are short-lived; in the eyes of the insurers, it is
the long-lived ones that constitute the high risks and thus are bad. In a market
screening model, Townley and Boadway find that a pooling equilibrium may
exist in which an annuity is offered with a term such that the long-lived are
exactly indifferent between saving and consuming the last dollar of the first annu-
ity installment.tå
3.1.3. Discontinuous message costs
Suppose that there exists some message m' in the interior of M such that, for
each t, either:
c(m', t) * limm Tm' c(m, t), or
c(m', t) * limm Lm' c(m, t).
I.e., the message cost function is discontinuous at m'. This will potentially create
problems for self-selection, in particular with a continuous type space.
To be specific, suppose that we can write c(m, t) as the sum of two compo-
nents:
c(m, t) = Cl(m, t) + c2(m),
where cl(m, t) satisfies all conditions outlined in Section 2, while c2(m) is given
by:
13Strictly speaking, what we have here is partially coincident indifference curves only,
implying that {)c(m,G)/am = ac(m, B)/{)m for m e MI. This, thus, further generalizes the specifica-
tion given above.
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c2(m) = {O, ifm < m'
C, ifm ;?! m'
for some m'. Suppose first that C = O, and let m(t) be the equilibrium message
sent by a type-t agent. Suppose, furthermore, that there exists a type t' such that
m(t') = m'.
If now C is increased, so that C > O, then an agent of type t', or even higher
than that, might not want to pay the price necessary to be distinguished from an
agent sending a lower message. We may get an equilibrium where agent types
between tI and t2 all send the same message mil,with tI < t' < t2, and mil < m'.
One model where message costs are discontinuous in this way is the entry
deterrence model of Harrington (1986). Here, A is an incumbent firm that has
private information on production costs in the industry. By its production deci-
sion today, the incumbent sends a message to a potential entrant (outsider) about
costs. Let now T = Lt tl be the the type space, with t = l/c, where c is marginal
production costs. There is a critical t' e T such that the outsider, in case of com-
plete information, would want to enter if and only if t > t'. Thus, there is a discon-
tinuity in the incumbent's profit; this discontinuity occurs at the production
level m' that is the equilibrium production level under complete information
when t = t'. Harrington shows that we indeed get the equilibrium suggested
above: Whenever the true type is between some tI and t2 (i.e., true costs are be-
tween 1/t2 and l/tl), the incumbent produces the same output level mil, with tI <
t' < t2, and mil < m'.
Harrington (1987) extends his 1986 analysis to the case of multiple incum-
bents, with the restriction that the outsider only observes the aggregate message,
i.e., the incumbents' total production. He gets basically the same result as before.
It should, however, be noted that the potential entrant's inability to observe each
incumbent's choice is crucial for this result. According to Bagwell and Ramey
(1989), if the outsider can observe each incumbent's action, then the scope for
existence of pooling equilibria is reduced.14
14Bagwell and Ramey prove the existence of separating equilibria without distortions, rela-
tive to the complete-information case. This is because the incumbent firms are unable to coordinate
deception: If one incumbent deviates while the others play separating strategies, the outsider
nevertheless makes the correct inference. Therefore, it does not pay to deviate from a non-distortive
separating equilibrium.
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An entry-deterrence model similar to Harrington (1986) is studied by Green
and Laffont (1990) and they find an equilibrium with the same features. But the
main concern of Green and Laffont is to consider the effect of extending this
model to the case where entry by the outsider is to be deterred simultaneously on
many fronts, where one front may be a particular product or location. Each
front' s type is known to the incumbent but not to his rival. When the outsider
now takes her decision on whether to enter at a particular front, she may base
this decision on the incumbent's behaviour on all fronts. This creates a change in
the equilibrium, although still a pooling one. Let, as before, t' denote the critical
type. Now there are some tf and t~, not necessarily equal to ti and t2 above, but
with tf < t' < t~, such that each te (tf, t') is pooled with ate (t', t~), in the sense
,.. -
that m(t) = m(t).
Another version of discontinuous message costs would have the above
message cost function be multiplicative rather than additive, i.e.:
c(m, t) = cl (m, t)c2(m),
with cl and c2 each having properties as above. With C > O, we might now expect
that, in equilibrium, all agent types below some t' > !send the same message.
One signalling model featuring something like the multiplicative version of
discontinuous message costs is provided by Banks (1990a). There, two candidates
compete to win an election, and each candidate has private information on his
true preferred policy, which belongs to a continuum from the left to the right.
The electorate constitutes the uninformed parties, the principals. A candidate
may, in his pre-election campaign, announce a policy that differs from his true
preferred policy, but only at a cost. The larger the distance between announced
and true policies, the higher is this costs, and the cost function also satisfies the
Spence-Mirrlees condition. However, these costs will only be suffered in office,
i.e., in case the candidate wins the election. Given the action of the other candi-
date, a candidate's probability of winning depends on his announced policy, his
message. It turns out that, in equilibrium, there is a band of moderate candidate
types that all announces the same ("average") policy, whereas extremist types on
the left and on the right are separated out. The higher is C, the wider is the band
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of pooled types.lS
3.2. Countervailing incentives
Suppose that the agent has incentives both to send a high message and to send a
low message. He may have one reason for creating the impression that he is good
and another reason for creating the opposite impression. These two reasons obvi-
ously are in conflict, a conflict that invariably makes it impossible to sustain
complete separation, and pooling occurs. In this Section, we record some results
on situations featuring this phenomenon. To start with, we consider cases where
the conflict stems from characteristics of the message cost function. Thereafter,
we consider cases where the conflict arises due to multiple audiences. Finally,
other reasons for the conflict are collected.
3.2.1.A decomposed message cost function
Let the message cost function c(m, t) be split into two elements:
c(m, t) = cl (m, t) + c2(m, t),
such that the two elements have conflicting properties: The first element, et,
behaves like a standard message cost function; in particular: (kl (m, t)/am > Oand
acl(m, G)/ am < acl(m, B)/am. The second element, c2, has the opposite proper-
ties, in the sense that the above inequalities are changed: ac2(m, t)/am < Oand
dc2(m, G)/dm > dc2(m, B)/dm).16 With such a message cost function, it may be
impossible to obtain self-selection, so that pooling entails.
The theory of principal-agent models featuring such a decomposed message
cost function, instead of the standard one, is developed by Tracy Lewis and David
15Models related to Banks (1990a) are found in Reed (1989) and Hess (1991). They, too, discuss
elections under asymmetric information about candidate preferences. Reed's model is very similar to
that of Banks, while Hess presents a somewhat richer model which still shares the basic feature:
Your pre-election message expenditures matter only if you win the election.
16The other three properties of a message cost function, listed in item (v) in section 2.1 above,
are the same for cl and c2•
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Sappington in a series of papers. In fact, they are the ones thathave coined the
term "countervailing incentives". They use it, however, to cover only cases relat-
ing to the message cost function. Here, we would like to make the point that
countervailing incentives, understood as the phenomenon that an agent may
have one reason for wanting to be perceived as good and another reason for
wanting to be perceived as bad, are of a more general nature than a reading of
Lewis and Sappington's work suggests.
Lewis and Sappington, in their papers, assume a continuum of types, T = Lt
tJ. Their general finding is that, in equilibrium, there are tl, t2 e T,! < tl < t2 < t,
such that agent types between tl and t2 are pooled. For types above t2, the first
element of the cost function dominates and higher types send higher messages.
For types below tl, the second element dominates and lower types send lower
messages.
In Lewis and Sappington (1989a), they reconsider, for the case of countervail-
ing incentives, the problem of optimal regulatory policy formulated by Baron
and Myerson (1982).Here, the message is the regulated firm's report on its produc-
tion costs, and the principal's action is, for each reported cost level, a combination
of price and quantity. The countervailing incentives occur because of a negative
relation between a regulated firm's marginal costs and its fixed costs. The authors
find that agent types in a medium range are treated identically.
The same happens in the variation reported in Lewis and Sappington
(1989b, 1989c), where the principal, in addition to the price and quantity func-
tions, specifies the regulated firm's production capacity and allows the firm to sell
unrestrictedly its production in excess of what the principal demands. The regu-
lated firm may increase its outside earnings by increasing its outside price. But
this reduces the compensation it receives from the regulator. Thus, countervail-
ing incentives occur.
In Lewis, Perry, and Sappington (1989), the setting is a supplier and a buyer
who earlier have gone into a contractual relationship. Today, when the supplier
has obtained private knowledge of his opportunity cost c, i.e., the price he gets for
sales elsewhere, the parties renegotiate the contract. In this renegotiation, the
buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the supplier, in the form of a price-
quantity combination conditioned on the supplier's report of his c. If the supplier
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rejects this offer, the old contract prevails. Again, the supplier has countervailing
incentives for the same reasons as in the previous paragraph: When c is low,
outside earnings are low and it is more profitable for the supplier to engage in a
continuing relationship with the buyer. On the other hand, when c is high, the
buyer must increase its compensation to the supplier to get him to supply. The
buyer's optimum offer has the following properties: In a medium range of report-
ed c, the initial contract is continued. Outside this range, the supplier is offered
an increased price. For low values of reported c, this is accompanied with an
increase in contracted quantity; for high values, there is a reduction in quantity.
Lewis, Feenstra, and Ware (1989) study a situation where a government
wants to eliminate price support from an industry in which the workers have
private information on their skills and income opportunities in other industries.
The government offers a combination of transfer and required output condi-
tioned on a worker's report of skill level. Upon the problem is imposed a politi-
cal-feasibility restriction that the new scheme gain support from a given fraction
of the workers. This creates countervailing incentives: A worker would like to
report low skills in order to be "bribed" to give his support; he would like to
report high skills in order to receive the government's compensations necessary
to retain high-skilled workers. In the optimum solution, there is a medium
range of worker skills that are pooled.
In line with the political-economy theme of the previous paragraph, Feen-
stra and Lewis (1987) consider two countries, Home and Foreign, renegotiating a
trade agreement between them. The Home economy is a two-good one with the
importable good being labour intensive. A trade agreement is a pair of exchanged
quantities of importables and exportables. The capital endowment of Home's
median voter is known to the Home government but not to the Foreign one.
There are countervailing incentives here, since, in addition to the standard wel-
fare gains from trade, there are political costs for the Home government of agree-
ing on a particular trade level. These political costs depend on the capital endow-
ment of Home's median voter. The less capital this voter is endowed with, the
higher are the political costs. This is so because there is a component of welfare
loss attached to imports: An increase in imports lowers the price of the labour-
intensive importable and shifts income from labour to capital; thus, a voter low
on capital does not like high imports. Therefore, Home would like to report a
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low capital endowment of its median voter to protect itself from these political
costs, and to report a high endowment to reap the gains from trade. The negotia-
tions are handled by a third party putting weights on both countries' welfare. It
turns out that, if the weight put on Home is the smaller of the two, then there is
a medium range of values of Home's reported capital endowment all leading to
the status quo agreement being upheld. Outside this range, an increase in report-
ed endowment implies increased trade. For low values, trade decreases, while for
high values, trade increases, relative to the status quo agreement.
In concluding this subsection, consider the extreme case where the decom-
posed message cost function is degenerate, in the sense that cl, the element in the
cost function behaving normally, equals zero. Thus, the total message cost func-
tion has opposite properties, compared to the standard case, throughout the
whole type space. A case in point is the regulation of a labour-managed firm; see
Thomson (1982) and Guesnerie and Laffont (1984a, 1984b).17A well-known result
from the theory of labour-managed firms is that such a firm, by maximising per-
capita value-added rather than profit, responds to a decrease in price by expand-
ing, rather than contracting, output. This pathological behaviour creates counter-
vailing incentives in the present degenerate sense: The regulator wants the firm
to send a high message, but the labour-managed firm has inherent incentives to
send a low message. Applying the principal-agent model of Baron and Myerson
(1982) to the regulation of such a labour-managed firm, Guesnerie and Laffont
(1984a, 1984b) find that the optimum contract involves complete pooling.ts
3.2.2. Multiple audiences
Suppose that the set of principals can be partitioned into two subsets that do not
interact with eachother; however, they do, of course, all interact with the agent
17The result of Guesnerie and Laffont is nicely reviewed in Caillaud et al. (1988, Sec. 5).
18Interestingly, this does not carry over to other specifications of the regulation problem.
Laffont and Tirole (1986) suggest a model of regulation that differs from Baron and Myerson (1982)
mainly by the inclusion of moral hazard. This moral hazard is, however, analytically trivial in
the sense that it can be handled through the agent's first-order condition. Askildsen (1990) shows
that applying a model of the Laffont-Tirole kind, instead of the Baron-Myerson one, to the regula-
tion of a labour-managed firm makes complete separation feasible.
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A. Thus, we write P = PI UP2. Now, A may want members of Pi to believe that he
is a bad type at the same time as he would like members in P2 to believe that he is
a good type. If this is the case, we have an instance of countervailing incentives,
and there will be some pooling in equilibrium.
There are some nice examples in the literature of models where an agent
sends his message to more than one audience.19 One particularly convincing case
is discussed by Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988).They study a firm which
has private information on its profitability and whose choice of debt-equity struc-
ture is observed by both investors in the capital market and a potential entrant
into the firm's product market. The firm would like to pretend being a high-
profit firm in order to attract investors but would, at the same time, like to pre-
tend being a low-profit firm in order to discourage the outsider from entering.
Thus, the firm has countervailing incentives. It turns out that the form of equilib-
rium (pooling or separating) is the one that maximises the firm's ex ante expect-
ed profit in the product market; thus, conditions in the product market are deci-
sive in shaping the firm's financing decisions.
Caillaud (1990) is very much related to the previous one, since, again, the
"second audience" is potential entrants. But instead of a firm signalling to finan-
cial investors, Caillaud discusses a version of Baron and Myerson's (1982) princi-
pal-agent model in which the agent is not a regulated monopoly, but rather a
regulated incumbent who is threatened by entry from firms that are beyond the
reach of the regulating body. Again, countervailing incentives arise: The firm
gets compensated by the principal for reporting low costs. At the same time, it
wants the outsiders to believe that its industry is a high-cost one.20 In equilibri-
um, there may be several non-empty intervals of types that are pooled within
each such interval.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1991) consider an oral contract auction in
which the winning bidder proceeds to negotiate with its employees on wage
terms during work on the contract. Of course, bidders would want to bid high in
19Inaddition to the ones mentioned here, we also discuss one such model, by Farrell and Gib-
bons (1989a), in subsection 3.1.1 on cheap talk, and also two models, by Darrough and Stoughton
(1990)and Wagenhofer (1990),in subsection 3.3.4on verifiable disclosure.
2O'fhus,CaiIlaud's model may also be considered a two-audience extension of Harrington's
(1986)entry-deterrence model, with the additional audience being the regulator.
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order to win the contract. On the other hand, since the oral auction reveals infor-
mation about the winner that is of value to its employees in the following negoti-
ations, bidders have countervailing incentives as long as the winning bid is ob-
served by employees. The outcome of this oral auction is, therefore, an equilibri-
um which may be pooling, partially pooling, or separating, depending on parame-
ter values. On the other hand, in a sealed-bid second-price auction, although the
identity of the winner is known, the winning bid is not. Therefore, such an auc-
tion, by protecting the winner from exploitation by third parties, reduces the
scope for pooling relative to an oral auction.
3.2.3. Conflicting roles - and more
Consider an agent who owns an asset and has private information on the asset's
quality. He may sell some of it on the market at a price and keep the rest for his
own consumption. If the price on the market increases with the quality he re-
ports, he may want to report a higher quality than the true one. On the other
hand, if the true quality is high, he wants to keep most of the asset for himself,
which makes him want to report a low quality in order to keep the demand
down. Thus, the agent's role as a seller of the asset conflicts with his role as a
consumer of the same asset. The outcome of this conflict is that the equilibrium
will be a pooling one.
The situation described above has been analysed by Jean-Jacques Laffont and
Eric Maskin in a series of papers.21 In Laffont and Maskin (1987, 1989a), the agent
is a monopoly seller of a good. In Laffont and Maskin (1989b), the case is compli-
cated by introducing several firms selling a product whose quality all firms know,
but not the consumers. In Laffont and Maskin (1990), there is again only one in-
formed agent, but this time he is an insider trader on the stock market and thus a
would-be buyer rather than seller. Related to these papers is Kumar (1988), who
study the relation between an inside entrepreneur and his outside shareholders.
When the entrepreneur decides on his message, how much dividends to pay the
outsiders, his desires to provide the latter with incentives to reinvest are in con-
21See also Stiglitz (1982) and Noldeke (1991).
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flict with his desires to be left with as much as possible when the firm is liqui-
dated. The pooling equilibrium in Kumar's model is of the partition kind de-
scribed in subsection 3.1.1 when discussing the Crawford-Sobel cheap-talk model.
Two other papers exist in which this conflict of roles is described but where
the authors discuss how to implement the first-best rather then whether the
game typically features a pooling equilibrium or not.22 Cramton and Palfrey
(1990) analyze a problem of explicit collusion with side payments in which each
firm has private cost information. In this case, firms may wish to overstate or
understate their costs, depending on whether they are asked by the cartel organiz-
ers to expand or contract output. Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) study a
situation where a partnership is to be dissolved among associates with different,
privately known valuations of an indivisible asset. A partner would like to over-
state or understate his own valuation depending on whether he is going to sell
or buy stakes in the asset.
We conclude the discussion of countervailing incentives with two pieces of
literature serving to illustrate the diversity of situation in which the phenome-
non arises. Consider first Hendricks and Kovenock (1989). They discuss ultimate
bargaining between two oil companies on the transfer of drilling leases in the
case where the firms have private information on the amount of oil in the area.
Firm 1 has a longer lease than firm 2 and makes an ali-or-nothing offer to it. If
firm 2 accepts, it gets the appropriate amount from firm 1, transfers the lease, and
reveals its private information. If firm 2 rejects, it decides whether to drill or not
and firm 1 acts optimally to this decision. Before its offer, firm 1 is allowed to
report a subset of T in which its true type belongs.23 Models with this kind of
message space go in the literature under the name of games of persuasion. Such
games are also studied by Milgrom (1981), S. Grossman (1981), and Milgrom and
22The fact that these two papers are cited by Lewis and Sappington (1989a, 1989b) as exam-
ples, outside their own work, of countervailing incentives, indicates that Lewis and Sappington
themselves perceive this phenomenon as one not necessarily relating to the message cost function.
23An agent of type tET is allowed to report any set m C T such that te m; thus, the message
space is a subset of the power set of T. The interpretation is that the agent cannot lie about his type,
but he does not have to tell the whole truth.
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Roberts (1986).24These authors find equilibria to be fully separating. Hendricks
and Kovenock (1989), on the other hand, find that there is some degree of pool-
ing in any equilibrium, including one with complete pooling. This is because a
low-type firm l, i.e., one with little oil, would want firm 2 to reject and drill,
while a high-type firm 1 would want firm 2 to accept its offer. This lack of una-
nimity among types creates pooling.
Finally, Poitevin (1989) analyzes an entrepreneur who needs outside capital
and who must decide on how much of this capital to raise through debt and how
much through equity. After the financial structure is determined, the success of
his project depends on his effort, unobservable to investors. This ex-post moral
hazard problem makes the entrepreneur want ex ante to issue debt, since debt
provides him with more discipline than does equity. At the same time, however,
the entrepreneur has private information on the productivity of his project. He
may indicate high productivity by issuing so much equity that a bad type would
not want to mimic. It turns out that, in equilibrium, there is pooling; moreover,
the ex-post moral hazard effect dominates, so that both types choose full debt
financing.
3.3. Agent's incentives: other factors
The four issues we treat in this subsection all pertain, in some sense or another,
to the agent's incentives, without being directly connected to the previous issues.
First, we discuss fallacies of the message space. Second, we discuss risk aversion
in the case of ex-ante contracting. Third, moral-hazard issues are briefly consid-
ered. And finally, we discuss the case of verifiable disclosure of information.
3.3.1.The message space
Restrictions on the message space may cause pooling to occur in equilibrium.
The basic reason for this is that such restrictions may make it difficult for the
24Leland (1981) explains how games of persuasion may be viewed as a special class of signal-
linggames.
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good type to distinguish himself from the bad type. These restrictions are of two
kinds in which the message space is finite or bounded. We treat these in turn.
Then, we remark on the related issue of models with non-contingent contracts.
A finite message space. Suppose the message space now consists of two dis-
tinct messages only: M = {m, m}. Whether a pooling equilibrium exists or not
depends on the types' costs and benefits of mimicking rather than self-selecting.
And in the principal-agent model, the principal's payoff from pooling versus
separation also matters. The reason pooling may be the outcome is the inflexibili-
ty created by the finite message space. Obviously, if the number of types is greater
than the number of messages, there will always be some pooling.
In a sense, a finite message space is a rather trivial cause for pooling. Never-
theless, instances of this is reported in the literature. Flannery (1986) analyzes 1
whether a firm with private information about its quality can signal this informa-
tion to investors through its choice of debt maturity.25 Bad firms prefer long-term
debt, and thus a good firm may signal its type by issuing short-term debt. Howev-
er, with only two maturity levels to choose from (short and long), there exist
pooling equilibria for large ranges of the parameters. The pooling may be at ei-
ther a short-term or a long-term debt structure.
Hughes and Schwartz (1988) analyze whether a firm can signal its quality by
its choice of method for inventory valuation. Bad firms prefer the LIFO method,
so that a good firm may signal its type by sticking to the FIFO method. Again,
pooling equilibria are shown to exist and may be at either LIFO or FIFO.
Of the two papers discussed above, the latter by Hughes and Schwartz (1988)
seems to have the greater appeal, since their restriction of the message space is a
naturalone: There are indeed only two methods of valuing inventory. Their
prediction of pooling should nevertheless be interpreted with care: As Felling-
ham (1988), in discussing this paper, remarks, the scope for pooling is reduced if
the model is enriched by, e.g., allowing firms additional ways of signalling quali-
ty.
A variation of the theme of finite message space is found in papers on mac-
roeconomic policy games by Backus and Driffill (1985) and Barro (1986). They
model privately informed governments such that the good type has only one
25See also Diamond (1991).
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message to send: The "dry" government is restricted to a zero-inflation policy.26
Thus, the only question is whether the bad type (the "wet" government) will
mimic this policy or not. A comparison of these papers with Vickers (1986), in
which the message space is more standard, makes it clear that restricting the dry
government this way increases the scope for pooling considerably.27
A bounded message space. Several authors impose upper bounds on the
message space with the effect that the good type, even if he sends the highest
feasible message m, is unable to distinguish himself from the bad type, with the
result that they both send the message m in equilibrium.
Kennedy (1989), for example, analyses a product market where consumers
are uncertain about product quality and where high-quality producers may signal
their type by a high first-period quantity, entailing a low introductory price. The
scope for signalling is limited by the non-negative price constraint. Thus, there
may exist cases with several types pooling at price zero. Note, though, that for
this to occur, consumer preferences must feature satiation, such that demand is
finite at price zero. Otherwise, with infinite demand at price zero, profits will
tend to minus infinity at this price, thus making signalling prohibitively costly
for firms of any type. Thus, non-satiation restores complete separation.
In analyzing a macroeconomic policy game like the ones discussed above,
Hoshi (1988) argues that there is a lowest conceivable inflation rate: If low infla-
tion is obtained by a low money supply, there is a limit on how little money
there can be in circulation in the economy. On the other hand, many macroeco-
nomists would argue that there are other ways of obtaining a low inflation, such
as by regulating the central bank's lending rate.
Giammarino and Lewis (1989) present a model in which a firm negotiates
equity financing with an underwriter. The firm gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer of
the number of new shares issued. The firm, which has private information on its
value, may want to offer many shares in order to prove itself of high value. How-
ever, there is a certain number of new shares, call it m', beyond which the under-
writer will accept the offer with probability 1 because, with that many shares, her
26This is also how Milgrom and Roberts (1982) treat the strong monopolist in their incomplete-
information analysis of the chain-store paradox.
27The crucial difference between Vickers and the others is also noted by Driffill (1989).
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payoff will be non-negative irrespective of the firm's type.' Giammarino and
Lewis choose to restrict the message space at m', thus making it impossible for
the good firm to distance itself from the bad type. This, apparently, is the main
reason for pooling, in their paper, for a huge range of parameter values.
But there are also models which provide definitive bounds on the message--
space. Consider, for example, Boyer et al. (1990).They study two firms sequential-
lyentering a spatial market, with the first firm having private information on its
costs. While a high-cost firm would like a peripheral location, thus serving only
a small part of the total market, a low-cost firm would like to locate in the centre.
The scope for the low-cost firm to signal by exaggerating its message is nil: Which-
ever direction it moves away from the preferred central location, it moves to-
wards the periphery. The implication is that, for a huge range of parameters, the
two types are pooled at the centre: The high-cost firm mimics the low-cost firm,
which has nowhere else to go. Thus, Boyer et al. (1990) have provided us with a
model with a very natural constraint on the message space.
So, too, has Reinganum (1988), analysing a particular model of ultimate
bargaining with private information on both sides. The case she considers is that
of plea bargaining, with the prosecutor having private information on the
strength of her case, and the defendant having private information on whether
he is guilty or not. Based on the strength of her case, measured by the probability t
e T = [O,1] that the defendant will be found guilty at trial, the prosecutor offers
him a sentence m(t). li this offer is rejected, the case goes to court. In this model,
there is a critical t' such that, if t < t', then m(t) = O; i.e., if the case is sufficiently
weak, then it is dismissed. Thus, pooling occurs because a prosecutor with a weak
case (a good type in the eyes of the defendant) can go no further than to a com-
plete dismissal.28
Finally, we should mention that bounds on the message space may be im-
28Threethings should be noted here. First, dismissals are not done to save costs of trial in this
model, since t' is independent of such costs. Second, not all systems of criminal justice work like
Reinganum's model, which is probably meant to model the U.S. system. In Norway, although it is
at the prosecutor's discretion to dismiss a case on grounds that it is too weak, she is not allowed to
negotiate by guaranteeing a lighter sentence if the defendant pleads guilty. Third, with private
information on both sides, Reinganum's model can be viewed as exhibiting an informed principal
(the prosecutor). Although information on the part of the principal may lead to pooling, see subsec-
tion 4.2, this is, however, not the reason for pooling in the present model, as Reinganum's model
satifies Maskin and Tirole's (1990b)common-value condition for separation.
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posed by the principal for reasons of fairness. One case in point is income mainte-
nance programmes, where the government (the principal) self-imposes the re-
striction that no individual shall be left with income below some minimum.
When designing its welfare policy under such a constraint, it leaves individuals
in the poor end of the type space with no possibilities to accept lower income
than others in return for higher contributions from the government. Thus, mini-
mum income levels create pooling. Besley and Coate (1991) is a recent contribu-
tion to this literature.
Non-contingent contracts. There is a class of asymmetric-information mod-
els, not otherwise considered in this survey, in which principals are not allowed
to offer contingent contracts. When left with non-contingent contracts, one can-
not obtain any screening. Thus, even though these models depict situations of
asymmetric information, they are designed so as to make the pooling question
irrelevant, in the sense that pooling is assumed, rather than derived, in these
models. Prominent papers are in this category, including Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) on credit rationing. Authors introducing contingent contracts into the
Stiglitz-Weiss model have found that this may eliminate credit rationing, be-
cause now self-selection can be upheld; see, e.g., Bester (1985),whose contracts are
contingent on collateral, and Terlizzese (1989),who avoids the use of collateral by
employing more complex contracts.
Related to this is the issue of whether self-selection may deteriorate welfare.
If this is the case, then society prefers pooling and the optimum public policy is to
make contingent contracts illegal. For example, in the market screening model,
restricting the competing principals to offering pooling contracts is welfare en-
hancing if and only if a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. The principals
earn zero expected profit in any case, and the bad type always prefers pooling to
separation, so the question boils down to when the good type prefers pooling,
which is exactly when a pure-strategy equilibrium cannot be upheld. The welfare
effects of this kind of restrictions in a signalling model are discussed by Aghion
and Hermalin (1990),while Fishman and Hagerty (1990) show that a related kind
of restriction may be welfare-enhancing in a game of persuasion. Reinganum
(1988), in her model of plea bargaining discussed above, finds that, if the fraction
of guilty among all arrested is sufficiently high, then one increases welfare by
limiting the prosecutor to giving pooling sentence offers.
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3.3.2. Risk aversion and ex-ante contracting
The agent's attitute towards risk is generally not of particular concern, apart from
the fact that risk aversion may be necessary in order to make a model interest-
ing.29 Whether the agent is risk neutral or risk averse does not affect the scope for
pooling, except in one case. This is the case of ex-ante contracting, i.e., the varia-
tion of the principal-agent model in which the contract between the principal
and the agent is signed before the agent gets to know his type.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, ex-ante contracting implies that there is only
one participation constraint for the agent, based on his expected payoff from enter-
ing into the contract, where the expectation is taken with regard to the probability
distribution p over agent types. Suppose that there is a continuum of types: T = Lt
t]. Intuitively, when the agent is risk averse, he will have problems ex ante with
entering into a contract implying that bad types are severly punished when send-
ing low messages, since there is a probability that he will turn out to be such a bad
type. The optimum contract for the principal is one where, for some t' e (1, t),
depending on the degree of risk aversion, agent types in the lower range li, t'] are
pooled. By thus cutting the lower tail for the agent, the principal obtains a con-
tract that is an improvement for her in case of a good type. However, when the
agent is very risk averse, his only concern is with the lower tail, and the scope is
reduced for the principal to obtain any benefits from higher types through an ex-
ante contract with pooling in the lower tail. In the limit, when the agent is infi-
nitely risk averse, thus caring only for his payoff in the worst outcome, the princi-
pal can do no trade-off like this, and there is again complete separation.30 The
results in this paragraph are due to Salanie (1988, 1990).
29For example, when either the principal-agent model or the market screening model is ap-
plied to insurance.
30It may be worthwhile to note that the participation constraint in case of ex-ante contracting
with an infinitely risk averse agent, written:
mint nA(m(t), t) ;?; O,
is formally equivalent to the participation constraint in the standard principal-agent model:
nA(m(t), t) ;?; O,"i/ t.
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A situation related to the above one is the following, studied by Holmstrom
and Ricart i Costa (1986). Suppose that, at the time of contracting, the principal
and the agent are symmetrically informed. Suppose, furthermore, that the deci-
sion on whether to improve the parties' information about the agent's type is left
to the discretion of the agent. If now the latter is risk averse, he may prefer not to
take any action at all, out of fear that he thus would disclose that he is a bad type.
In the paper by Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa, the two parties are a risk averse
manager and his superior, and the action is an investment decision. They find
the second-best contract in this case, exhibiting under-investment compared to
the first-best. This under-investment may be suitably interpreted as pooling
caused by the combination of a risk averse agent and ex-ante contracting.
3.3.3. Moral hazard
Moral hazard is the term used in the literature to describe situations where the
agent, by some action, may affect his type, and where this action is unobservable
to the principal. Although an important topic, and a major one in the literature,
we will only touch upon it here, since we are concentrating in this survey on
adverse-selection type phenomena.
Some authors have analysed models with both moral hazard and adverse
selection. The basic complication created by the introduction of moral hazard is
that the agent's indifference curves typically are no longer convex, thus making
the single-crossing condition fail to hold.31 Stiglitz and Weiss (1986) consider
market screening in the credit market with the above set-up and find that, even
though contracts are contingent on collateral, there may exist a pooling equilibri-
um and, thus, credit rationing. A similar result is obtained by Aron (1987), study-
ing market screening in a labour market where both adverse selection and moral
3IOn the non-convexity of indifference curves under moral hazard, see Arnott and Stiglitz
(1988).
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hazard are present.32
3.3.4. Verifiable, but costly, disclosure
A particular branch of the literature studies situations in which the agent does
not communicate by sending some message; rather, he is able to state his type
and verify that he is telling the truth.33 Then, of course, it pays for everybody,
except the worst, to report his type. However, this is not so if there are some costs
associated with stating one's type. Typically, with a continuous type space T = [!, 'it
there exists some t' e (1, 'i) such that an agent of a type in the lower range [1, t']
does not disclose his type, and thus agent types in this range are pooled. The
higher are the disclosure costs, the higher is the critical type t'.
An early statement of the above result is in Jovanovic (1982). In Sobel
(1985b), the model is enriched by assuming there are two agents and a principal;
the two agents are two bargainers who each decides whether or not to report his
claim to a disputed item to a judge, the principal, who is to decide who shall
have the right to the item.
One case where the assumption of verifiable, but costly, disclosure seems
particularly appropriate is that of financial statements. Information may be with-
held, but whenever it is included in the financial statement, the fact that the
statement is audited makes the information verifiable. This case was first studied
by Verrecchia (1983).Dye (1986) goes on to assume that the private information of
the reporting firm is multi-dimensional. He is thus able to consider cases of parti-
al disclosure, in which the firm reports its type along some, but not all, dimen-
sions.
In many of the models discussed above, the agent's private information is,
320n the other hand, if contracts are non-contingent but ex-post testing is feasible, then the
addition of moral hazard may create scope for self-selection, with an equilibrium in which a bad
agent shirks while a good one does not, and the principal monitoring ex post and not paying an agent
that has been found shirking; see Bar-Ilan (1991). Pooling may recur, however, if the principal is
unable to precommit to performing the test; more on this is in subsection 6.2.
33This situation differs from a game of persuasion, a concept due to Milgrom (1981) and intro-
duced in Sec. 3.2 above. Here, truth-telling implies reporting one's type, whereas in a game of
persuasion, truth-telling implies reporting any subset of the type space that includes one's type.
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in fact, some signal that is only imperfectly correlated with his true type. Our
discussion simplifies by making the correlation perfect. This simplification does
not affect the intuition. In Verrecchia (1990a), however, the discussion centres
around this imperfect correlation between the agent's information and his true
type. Verrecchia shows that an increase in the precision of the agent's informa-
tion decreases the range of pooling types. He also finds that, if the agent can him-
self choose the correlation ex ante, he would prefer that his information is com-
pletely uncorrelated with his true type, so that this information is never dis-
closed, disclosure costs are saved, and complete pooling results.
Two papers on verifiable disclosure towards multiple audiences relate to our
discussion in subsection 3.2.2 on this topic. Quite in line with the discussion
there, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) and Wagenhofer (1990) find that the pres-
ence of a potential entrant, in addition to the investors, makes a firm more will-
ing to disclose bad news, thus reducing the scope for pooling.34
In a variation on the theme of verifiable disclosure, there is no disclosure
costs, but there is a positive probability that the agent does not have any private
information at all. In this case, an agent of a bad type may hide behind this uncer-
tainty and, by not disclosing his type, pretend to be without private information;
see Farrell (1986) and Shavell (1989a). As Farrell shows, even a small such proba-
bility produces a lot of pooling in the lower type range. See also Dye (1985) and
Jung and Kwon (1988), discussing the contents of firms' financial statements
under such circumstances.
4. THE PRINCIPAL'S INCENTIVES
This section complements the previous Section, in that we here treat reasons for
pooling that are found on the principal's side of the table. First, we consider the
34Verrecchia (1990b) provides a discussion of Darrough and Stoughton (1990). In Bernhardt
and LeBlanc (1991), the firm's message is again observed by both competitors and investors. The
firm can choose between (a) costless, verifiable information and (b) costly signals. The reason for
considering a type (b) message is that it merely contains some summary information, like profitabili-
ty, which is useful for investors but on which competitors are unable to base an entry decision. The
type (a) message, on the other hand, contains technical production information that is vital to
competitors. In equilibrium, good types either disclose more verifiable information than bad types
or disclose nothing at all.
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gross payoff function, an issue that parallels our discussions of various aspects of
the message cost function in subsections 3.1 and 3.2.1 above. Second, we discuss
the case where the principal herself has incentives to hide information. Third,
we look at the case where the principal may audit the agent to find out about his
type, but only at some cost; this complements the case of agents' disclosure costs
discussed in subsection 3.3.4. And finally, we look at restrictions on the princi-
pal's actions, in parallel to the discussion of restrictions on the agent's message
space in subsection 3.3.1 above.
4.1. The gross payoffs
The principal's gross payoff function r measures her benefit, gross of the payment
to the agent, from an agent of type t sending the message m: r = r(m, t). We have
assumed so far that ar(m, G)/am > ar(m, B)/am for every m, or, in the case of a
continuous type space: a2r(m, t)/amat > O, for every m and t; in words, the princi-
pal benefits more from a marginal increase in the agent's message, the higher is
the type of the agent. Suppose now that this is no longer true. In particular, sup-
pose that, with a continuous type space, there exists some t' e (t t) such that:
a2r(m, t)/amat < O, for t < t', and
a2r(m, t)/amat > O, for t > t'.
One might say that, with this gross payoff function, it is the principal, rather than
the agent (see subsection 3.2), that has countervailing incentives.3S
A useful discussion of this case is provided by Greenwood and McAfee
(1991). They argue that type-dependent externalities may cause society, the princi-
pal, to have countervailing incentives, and they quote several examples. To con-
sider just one of these, take the classical case of education. It may be true that the
marginal social benefit from an increase in a child's education is higher, the
brighter the child is. However, it may also be true that less intelligent people
need to be taught things that are automatically understood by others, so that
there may also be reasons for society to intensivate education among low-ability
350ne may even formulate the present case through a decomposed gross payoff function, to
further emphasize the connection to subsection 3.2.1.
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children, and increasingly so the lower the ability is.
Referring to the above modified gross payoff function, Greenwood and Me-
Afee (1991) find that the optimum contract in circumstances like this implies
\
pooling all agent types below some t", where t" > t'; i.e., the range of pooling is
broader than the range of "perverse" gross payoffs.
A special case occurs if the principal's incentives are of the opposite kind
throughout the whole type space, i.e.: d2r(m, t)/dmdt < O, 'ti teT. Situations
where this is the case are also discussed by Greenwood and McAfee (1991).36The
solution for society in such a situation is pooling across all types, and Greenwood
and McAfee show that regulation by a quantity limit now performs just as well as
price regulation.37
A signalling model with countervailing principal incentives is analysed by
Banks (1990b).38He considers a situation where the agent has the power to give
the principal a take-it-or-leave-it offer; this offer serves thus as the message. More-
over, the agent has private information on the outcome in case the principal
rejects; the type space is a subset of the message space. While the agent has prefer-
ences represented by a utility function that is monotonic across the message space
(and the type space), the principal has single-peaked preferences with a perferred
outcome, t', in the interior of the type space. In Banks's interpretation, the agent
is a monopoly agenda setter and the principal is a (median) voter. Like in the
corresponding principal-agent set-up, we obtain a pooling equilibrium in which
an agent of any type below some t" > t' gives the same offer.
36In their own words, "the individuals most desiring the commodity are the ones society ieast
wants to have it" [Greenwood and McAfee (1991, p. 114)].
37Compare this with the case of degenerate countervailing incentives, such as the regulation
of a labour-managed firm; see Guesnerie and Laffont (1984a, 1984b) and our discussion at the end of
subsection 3.2.1. The two cases share the feature that the gross payoff and message cost functions are
in conflict throughout the type space. Moreover, they also have in common a solution with complete
pooling. It may be a matter of convention under which heading to put any given example. (It may,
for instance, not always be so clear on which side the "pathology" is.)
38A related, although more complex, model is analysed by Ferejohn (1990).
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4.2. The information-protecting principal
The information that the principal elicits from the agent through a carefully
chosen contract proposal may be observable to outside parties with whom the
principal interacts. In such a case, the principal must weigh the benefit of becom-
ing informed about the agent's type against the benefit of keeping the outsiders
uninformed about it. This case is discussed by Caillaud and Hermalin (1989) and
is shown to entail extensive pooling. These authors also consider the case where
the outside parties can observe the contract chosen by the agent only, rather than
the whole menu. Even in this case, there is pooling.39
A related case of an information-protecting principal occurs when the princi-
pal herself has private information that may be revealed to the agent through
her contract proposal. The general treatment of this case is by Maskin and Tirole
(1990a, 1990b). They find that the principal herself having private information
has no effect on the possibility of obtaining self-selection from the agent. Howev-
er, they delineate a particular case in which the principal chooses not to disclose
her information. Thus, we get some pooling regarding the principal's (contract
proposer's) private information but separation regarding that of the agent. The
case in point is when the agent's payoff depends only on the contract the princi-
pal offers and not on the information she has; this is what Maskin and Tirole call
the private-value case.40
Maskin and Tirole, in their papers, do not consider moral hazard. Suppose
now that the principal has private information on the agent's quality, or will
obtain so in the future. The agent does not have any private information but is
able to keep secret his choice of effort. In order to encourage the agent to put in
the right amount of effort, the principal mayor may not want to reveal her infor-
39This theme is related to the multiple-audience literature discussed in subsection 3.2.2 above.
The important difference is that the decision whether to reveal information to the second audience
now is with the first audience, the principal, rather than with the agent.
40There is a considerable literature, apart from the Maskin-Tirole papers, on the informed
principal, starting with Myerson (1983). Note also that, by appropriately renaming the players,
we may regard the informed-principal case as a particular signalling game: First, the "agent" sends
his message, which is a possibly complex contract proposal. Second, the "principal" observes this
message and takes some action, such as accepting or rejecting one of the contracts proposed. The
private-value case is when the "principal"'s payoff does not depend on the "agent"'s private
information, which amounts to assuming, in our notation, that ar(m, t)/at = Ofor all m and t.
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mation to the agent. Thus, moral hazard with an informed principal may lead to
pooling in the sense that the principal holds back her information; see Prender-
gast (1991). But this seems to hold only when skills cannot be contracted upon;
compare Prendergast's analysis with that of Beaudry (1989), where no pooling
equilibria survive a standard refinement argument.
4.3. Disclosure through costly auditing
Suppose that the agent first decides which message to send to the principal, and
that there are coincident message costs (see subsction 3.1.2). The principal next
decides whether or not to audit the agent. During an audit, the agent's type is
disclosed with certainty to the principal. However, the principal incurs a cost of
auditing. Therefore, if the value of information is too small, the principal will
prefer not to audit. Realizing this, the agent, when taking his decision on which
message to send, will not have incentives to separate himself from bad types if
knowledge of his type is of sufficiently small value to the principal. Thus, we
might expect that, with a continuous type space T = [!, 'iL there exists some type t'
>! such that any type t e [1, t') sends the same message m(t) = mtj), and that the
equilibrium message makes a jump at t': mtt') > m(!), and øm(t)/øt > O,for t > r.
Models with this feature is found in the literature on strategic auditing, see Chat-
terjee and Morton (1989).41
A similar model is discussed by Shavell (1989b).He models litigation, where
the agent is the plaintiff and the principal is the defendant. The plaintiff's mes-
41SUppose that an audit will disclose the agent's type only with some probability less than 1.
Suppose, furthermore, that the quality of the audit, as measured by this probability, is at the
discretion of the principal, with the cost of an audit being a function of its quality. Now, the princi-
pal's decision is no longer a binary one of whether or not to audit. Thus, when the agent's message
indicates a low value of information for the principal, she may choose to respond with a low-
quality, cheap audit rather than none at all. This reduces the scope for pooling, as seen from compar-
ing the Chatterjee-Morton paper with Reinganum and Wilde (1986), where only complete separa-
tion is reported. This is, in effect, a demonstration of pooling caused by restrictions on the princi-
pal's response, a subject treated in subsection 4.4 below.
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sage is a verifiable statement about his true claim,42while auditing in this case is
tantamount to taking the dispute to court. Both parties incur costs of trial, and
the scope for pooling therefore depends on both these cost elements.
4.4A restricted response
Consider a signalling model where the principal's response is one of two, say Yes
or No. ff the principal is restricted to playing a pure strategy when responding,
this greatly affects the equilibrium of the game and may lead to pooling. This is
most clearly demonstrated in a paper by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) on corporate
takeovers. Here, the informed A is a large minority shareholder of a firm who
has private information on the firm' s true value and who is facing a fringe of
small, uninformed shareholders, P. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find conditions
under which the large shareholder offers to buy shares in order to bring him in a
majority position. The equilibrium in their model is a complete pooling one.
However, as Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) subsequently have pointed out, this
pooling result is due to the seemingly innocuous assumption made by Shleifer
and Vishny, that a small shareholder, when indifferent between tendering and
not tendering her shares in response to the large shareholder's offer, always
chooses to tender. Hirshleifer and Titman find that, by allowing an indifferent
small shareholder to randomize, the equilibrium becomes completely separating.
The intuition is basically that forcing the small shareholders to play pure strate-
gies creates a discontinuity in A's payoff.43 This discontinuity is smoothed by
allowing mixed strategies.
42Thus, Shavell's analysis fits in with the models of verifiable disclosure discussed in subsec-
tion 3.3.4. But here, pooling occurs because of costs of auditing, rather than costs of disclosure. Audit-
ing costs are, however, shared between the parties in this case.
43The story here is thus related to the one in subsection 3.1.3 on discontinuous message cost
functions.
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5. THE MEDIUM
So far, we have not had much to say about how the agent's message is sent. We
have implicitly assumed that the medium that the agent uses is neutral.44 We
now turn to cases in which this is not the case. We consider in particular two
instances of non-neutrality. The first is when the medium, or rather the media-
tor, is itself a strategic party with its own interests to cater for. The second is when
the medium does not transmit the agent's message perfectly, with the agent hav-
ing better access to the medium than does the principal, either in terms of observ-
ing how it works or in terms of having controlover it.
5.1. The strategic mediator
Suppose that the agent, in addition to giving an unverifiable statement about his
type, may at a fixed fee hire an auditor that with probability z detects any discrep-
ancy between the agent's statement and his true type. The auditor, on the other
hand, may choose to shirk, in which case it never finds any discrepancy. The
principal may bring the auditor to court if she believes that it has shirked. The
court finds with probability y any discrepancy between the auditor's report and
the agent's true type, but cannot tell if it is due to shirking or bad luck; if a discrep-
ancy is detected, the auditor must pay damage awards to the principal. Such a
model has been analysed by Melumad and Thoman (1990).
There cannot by complete separation in this model, because, in such a case,
the principal will never sue the auditor which then would not have any incen-
tives to work hard, thus making the incentives to hire an auditor the same for
both bad and good agents. Therefore, allowing the auditor to behave strategically,
in the sense that he is allowed to shirk, creates a scope for pooling. Melumad and
440ne exception is in subsection 3.1.1, where we briefly mention the work by Myerson (1988)
and others on mechanism design. There, the issue is how the agent and principal together can
optimally construct a medium. This relates particularly to the case of an imperfect medium (subsec-
tion 5.2 below), since the question is to find the ideal imperfection for the medium.
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Thoman find that, when the auditor fee is low and damage' awards are high,
there is an equilibrium with complete pooling in which both agent types hire an
auditor and claim to be good and the principal sues the auditor whenever the
latter agrees with the agent's claim.
5.2. An imperfect medium
The two cases to be considered here relate to situations where the agent's message
is received imperfectly by the principal. To be specific, suppose that, if the agent
sends the message m, the principal receives Il, where:
Il = m + Tl·
Here, Tl is a random variable, called the noise parameter, typically with mean O
and variance a2 > 0.45 The two cases differ in the following way. In the first case,
the agent observes the realization of Tl before he decides which message m to
send. In the second case, the realization of Tlis unobservable to the agent; instead,
he is given the power to influence the precision of the medium through the
choice of a2• As will be clear immediately, we are now in the catchy-phrase depart-
ment.
5.2.1. Signal-jamming
Consider first the case where the agent observes ex ante the outcome of the noise
parameter Tl.A model with this feature was first analysed by Holmstrom (1982),
while the term "signal-jamming" seems to appear for the first time with Fuden-
berg and Tirole (1986). Neither of these two models exhibit pooling equilibria,
4SRelating to the previous footnote, mechanism design in this set-up implies that the agent
and the principal are allowed to come together before the real game starts and determine the
probability distribution of the random variable 11in the optimum way. In this subsection, however,
we consider cases only where the principal has no access whatsoever to the noise parameter. The
interest stems from the assumption that the agent, on the other hand, does have such access.
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though.46 Rather than delineate exactly under what conditions pooling does and
does not occur, we report on some models of signal-jamming that do exhibit
pooling and try to track down the reasons for pooling in these models.
One instance of signal-jamming with pooling is found in models of stock
markets with noise trading. Suppose there is one big trader who privately ob-
serves the amount of noise trading, the latter being trading for liquidity or life-
cycle motives rather than for speculative reasons. The big trader may want all the
small speculative traders not to know how much he has traded. For example, he
may have information to the effect that a currently low-priced firm is under-
priced and is worth a take-over if sufficiently many shares can be bought at the
current market price. In order not to disclose his intentions, the big trader may
want to hide behind the noise trading. That is, he takes advantage of situations
where noise traders sell out so that he can buy large quantities without being
detected. This situation is analysed by Kyle and Vila (1989). The related case of a
futures market, where the noise traders are hedgers with an inelastic demand for
insurance, is discussed by Vila (1988).A simple variant is analysed in Vila (1989),
in which there mayor may not be a noise trader present (i.e., the noise parameter
is, in a sense, binary), and the big trader - the "manipulator" - is the only one to
know whether it is there or not; his decision is whether to enter the market him-
self. In equilibrium, there is partial pooling: The big trader plays a mixed strategy
to keep the other speculative traders - who are unable to distinguish a manipula-
tor from a noise trader - from gaining complete information on the presence of
the noise trader.
One feature of the pooling equilibria in the situations described in the previ-
ous paragraph should be noted: Pooling occurs in the sense that the received
message is constant across types. Formally, if the agent observing the realisation
h of Tlsends the message m(h), then there is some set H of realisations of Tlsuch
that Jl(h) = m(h) + h is constant across H. Of course, to obtain pooling in this
sense, sent messages differ within the set H.
An example of signal-jamming with pooling in the standard sense, i.e. such
that different agent types send the same message, is found in an analysis of herd
46Berlin and Calem (1987) present a pooling equilibrium in a signal-jamming model similar to
the one in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). However, their result is probably due to very special assump-
tions regarding the noise parameter.
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behaviour among managers by Scharfstein and Stein (1990).There are two types
of managers in their model: "Smart" ones receive informative signals about the
value of an investment, while "dumb" ones receive uninformative signals. A
manager does not himself know whether he is smart or dumb. However, he may
use the signal he receives, which is his private information, to make an infer-
ence about his own smartness. There are two managers making investment
decisions in sequence. The interest centres around the second one, called Mr. 2.
Scharfstein and Stein find that the only equilibria in their model are such that
Mr. 2 makes his decision, not according to the signal he receives but according to
what Mr. 1 did before him. Thus, there is pooling, in that Mr. 2's message is con-
stant across his set of private information.
5.2.2. Ambiguity
The second case of an imperfect medium is when the agent has controlover how
noisy the medium is. Recall the characterization of an imperfect medium:
Il = m + 11,
where the random variable 11has a variance (J2. Suppose that there is a mini-
mum feasible variance ~2 > O,but that the agent, before he learns his type, is al-
lowed to set the variance higher than this. This may be interpreted as pooling, in
the sense that, by making the received message noisier, the a~_!_~duces the
~.2!mi!tiQ:t}~l_y~ly_eof the II\~~~~g~ll~~~I!gsJthus creating an effect similar to
mimicking. An election model with this feature is studied by Alesina and Cukier-
man (1990).It is from them we have taken the term "ambiguity" to describe this
case. A politician, they find, may choose to be ambiguous in his first term in
office because ambiguity affects voters' expectations about his second-term policy
in a way that increases his chancesof being reelected.
If the principal can observe the agent's choice of precision, and if, further-
more, precision is costly, then, not surprisingly, pooling may disappear. See, e.g.,
Titman and Trueman (1986) on this in the context of a firm choosing among
auditors with known quality whose reports, therefore, have known precision.
Another way to look at the issue of producing precision is found in the elec-
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tion model of Harrington (1991). Here, voters (the principals), in addition to not
knowing the preferences of the incumbent politician (the agent), are uncertain ex
ante about which of two feasible policies they prefer. The incumbent first chooses
his policy. Then the voters, observing his policy and learning how it performs,
decide whether to re-elect him. Harrington finds that a range of types for the
incumbent exists such that he chooses his less preferred policy today in order to
confound the voters in their learning, thus securing his own re-election.
6. THE FUTURE
When an agent and a principal are involved in an enduring relationship, prob-
lems may arise for the achievement of self-selection at the very start of it. In
particular, the agent may ask himself whether it may cost him dearly in the fu-
ture if he reveals himself today, or whether it may benefit him in the future to
take the cost of mimicking another type today. Concerns for the future among
informed parties is a very important reason for the occurence of pooling at early
stages.
If the principal and the agent are allowed to agree, at the start of the game, to
a contract to which they both are committed, then, in the principal-agent model,
it is possible for the principal to design a menu of multi-period contracts such
that self-selection is obtained at the initial, contract-offer stage. Baron and Besan-
ko (1984), e.g., study the multi-period extension of Baron and Myerson's (1982)
model. Basically, they find that the offered multi-period contract consists of the
single-period one being repeated in each period in the case when the agent's type
does not change over time. Below, we limit ourselves to this constant-type case.
Moreover, we let time develop in discrete steps, with stages indexed by 't e {l,2,
...,t}.
There are basically two reasons why Baron-Besanko style results of initial
complete separation may not hold. These are, first, that the contract may be rene-
gotiable at a later stage and, second, that the two parties, particularly the principal,
may not be able to commit to future behaviour through a long-term contract. We
treat these in turn. The Section is concluded with a discussion of sequential bar-
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gaining under asymmetric information.
6.1. Renegotiation
Suppose that the parties are able to commit to a long-term contract. There may
still be problems, though, if they are allowed, at some future date, to replace the
initial contract with a newone that they both prefer. The latter act is what goes
under the name of renegotiation.
The literature on renegotiation has grown vastly in recent years. The idea
has been applied to complete-information situations for purposes of equilibrium
refinement in repeated games; it has been applied to symmetric-information
situations to study contract incompleteness due to unforeseen contingencies; and
it has been applied to asymmetric-information situations, which we discuss pres-
ently.47
In a multi-period asymmetric-information model with interim contracting,
the basic reason for there being scope for renegotiation at some future date is that
the principal, in the meantime, has received some information that she did not
have at the time the initial contract was signed. If the initial contract is separat-
ing, then the agent's initial choice of contract is, in itself, information that places
the principal in a new position and that may prompt her to offer the agent a new
contract that they both prefer to the initial one. The incentive for the principal to
renegotiate is stronger, the better the agent, through the initial self-selection,
proves himself to be. This, on the other hand, provides an agent of a bad type
with incentives to mimic a good type at the initial stage, so that he can harvest
the benefit of the future renegotiation. To counter these latter incentives, the
initial contract will, in general, feature some pooling.
In the case of ex-ante contracting, it is the agent who receives new informa-
tion after the initial contract is signed. Even if the principal does not now the
character of this information, she knows that it has arrived, and there is thus a
possible scope for renegotiation. For a survey of the literature on renegotiation
with asymmetric information, see Dewatripont and Maskin (1990).
47Examples from the first two branches of the renegotiation literature are Farrell and Maskin
(1989) and Hart and Moore (1988), respectively.
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The seminal article is by Dewatripont (1989).48He considers 'a multi-period (t
> 2) model with a finite set of types, T = li, ... , t}, where the agent is a risk-averse
firm and the principal is a risk-neutral worker. Since the two are symmetrically
informed when signing the initial contract at t = 1, this is a model of ex-ante con-
tracting. Between 't = 1 and 't = 2, the firm (the agent) privately observes the price
of its product. Dewatripont assumes that the initial contract offer (at stage 't = 1) is
made by the agent but that any renegotiating offer (at a stage r > 1) is made by the
principal. He finds that there is never complete pooling, that lower types pool
initially, and that this pooled set is peeled off from the top over time: If t' is the
top type in the pooled set in period r', then an agent of type t' is fully separated
from time 't' + Ion. Thus, there is always at least one type that is revealed at any
time, so that it takes at most #T - 1 periods until there is complete separation.
In discussing a bargaining situation with renegotiation, Hart and Tirole
(1988) allow for mixed strategies, in contrast to Dewatripont. On the other hand,
they restrict themselves to the two-type case. They consider both interim and ex-
ante contracting. Their results are generally comparable to those of Dewatripont.
Laffont and Tirole (1990) present a very nice treatment of a two-type, two-
period principal-agent model with long-term contracts that are renegotiable, and
with interim contracting. The principal makes the offers in both periods. In equi-
librium, the principal offers the agent two contracts to choose from. One contract
is for the good type; if the agent chooses this one, he reveals his good type and
first-best is obtained in both periods. The other contract is a pooling contract
which is followed in the next period by the principal's optimum contract condi-
tional on her revised beliefs. Laffont and Tirole find that, as the discount factor
increases, the good type chooses the pooling contract with non-decreasing probabi-
lity. In the case of a continuous type space, they find that, although a complete-
separation contract is feasible for the principal, it is not the optimum one.
Two papers with close relations to those discussed so far are the following:
48"Seminal" may be a somewhat too strong characterization, given the apparent simultaneity
in the work in this area, and the actual preemption of Dewatripont's paper by at least one other
article. However, there seems to be some consensus that he pioneered this literature. His work was
part of a Ph.D. dissertation submitted in 1986. It should be added, though, that a predecessor to the
renegotiation literature is found in Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), discussing contract durability
much in the same spirit as this more recent literature.
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First, Bester (1990) considers debt renegotiation. Like Dewatripont (1989), he as-
sumes ex-ante, contracting. But the contract he consider has some idiosyncratic
features, most important of which is that it is incomplete. Therefore, he finds,
contary to the above papers, that allowing renegotiation increases the agent's ex-
ante expected utility. Second, Lewis and Sappington (1990) study renegotiation in
a long-term relationship between a regulatory agency and a regulated firm. Their
analysis follows closely Laffont and Tirole (1990).
Motivated by the slow revelation of information caused by renegotiation, as
discussed above, Dewatripont and Maskin (1989) ask whether it might be prefera-
ble for the two parties to restrict P'S ability to receive any new information after
the initial contract has been signed. They consider the case of ex-ante contracting
when the message space is two-dimensional and A sends his two messages in
sequence. Thus, M = M IxM2; after the initial contract is signed, A learns his type;
then he chooses some ml e Ml, followed by some m2 e M2. If P observes m}, she
may want to renegotiate before A chooses m2. Dewatripont and Maskin discuss
whether the two parties would be better off if P could observe only one of m I and
m2. They also discuss criteria for choosing which message to make unobservable.
Hosios and Peters (1989a) distinguish themselves from the authors men-
tioned so far by introducing renegotiation in a one-period principal-agent model,
i.e., a model where contracts first are signed and then are executed. They show
that renegotiation-proofness, in the sense of robustness with regard to the intro-
duction of a bargaining game after the signing of the contract, can be represented
as an extra constraint, in addition to participation and incentive-compatibility
constraints, to the original problem. Like in the other models, this extra con-
straint entails a pooling equilibrium.
Seidmann (1990) is also related to this literature. He presents a multi-period
monopoly pricing problem that is very close in structure to renegotiation with ex-
ante contracting. The setting is the following: A is an upstream firm that is the
monopoly supplier to a downstream industry. At time I, when no-one knows
A's costs of production, A writes a contract stating the price of his product condi-
tioned on the (as yet unknown) production costs: pet), teT = [t 'il, t = l/c, where c
= production costs. At time 2, the firms in the downstream industry make rela-
tionship-specific investments that enable them to make use of A's product. At
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the same time, A gets to know his true costs. At time 3, A announces his type and
sets a price p $ p(t). Finally, the downstream firms report their demand to A at
this price. The crucial feature of this model, making it one of renegotiation, is
that A is allowed to change his price after he has learnt his type, as long as he
does not make the downstream firms worse off.49l.e., he must either stick to his
"list price" or introduce a discount. Seidmann finds that the optimal contract for
the upstream firm is one where, for some t' > t, p(t) = p, V teLt t'l, while for t e
[t', 'it A sets, for each type t, his preferred price given the amount of investment
among buyers that this contract p(.) induces. Thus, we get pooling among bad
(high-cost) types.
Dewatripont and Roland (1990, 1991) apply the ideas of renegotiation to the
topical question of whether reforms in Eastern Europe should be full or gradual.
The government tries to restructure the industrial sector, in which each worker
has private information on his productivity. The notion of renegotiation appears
in this framework by the government's ability to implement its policy at any
time only with unanimous approval from the workers affected by the reform;
thus, the policy may change over time, but only such that no worker type is hurt.
Dewatripont and Roland find conditions under which gradual reform is prefera-
ble. A gradual reform implies gradual revelation of workers' productivity, i.e.,
pooling.SO
Market screening with renegotiation has been considered, for the two-type
case, by Asheim and Nilssen (1991). The equilibrium is never completely separat-
ing and is completely pooling for a sufficiently high prior Pc that A is good. They
also find that, contrary to (most) principal-agent models, allowing renegotiation
in market screening may leave all agent types better off in equilibrium; this hap-
49Use of the term "renegotiation" may seem somewhat misplaced. Perhaps it is better to use
the term reseleciion to cover instances like this one. This would also be consistent with language
used elsewhere; see Dekel and Farrell (1990).
SODewatripont and Roland also discuss the effects of weakening the political constraint so
that the government may change its policy as long as it has majority approval, as opposed to una-
nimity. This variation may be considered a case intermediate between renegotiation and no long-
term commitment (see the next subsection); The government may now adjust its policy when new
information arrives, as long as the workers that are hurt by the new policy constitute a minority.
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pens only if the equilibrium is a completely pooling one.51
We conclude this subsection by recording three interesting variations on the
theme of renegotiation. The first variation features ex-ante contracting and, after
the initial contract is signed, A's type being determined endogenously, rather
than exogenously as above. Specifically, A makes a decision that is unobservable
to P and that determines his type. Consider the two-type case and, to save on
notation, suppose A can choose t e {B,G} after the initial contract is signed. In
deciding his type, A makes a commitment that creates incentives for P to renego-
tiate, even if she does not know the agent's choice. In equilibrium, A plays a non-
degenerate mixed strategy when choosing type, i.e., he chooses G with probability
pc e (O,1). This equilibrium may be suitably interpreted as one of pooling, since
the principal is incompletely informed when renegotiation starts. In fact, the
renegotiation stage is equal to a single-period standard principal-agent model
where Pc, as usual, is P's subjective probability that A is good. For analyses of this
case, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1990)and, especially, Ma (1991).52
The second variation is the case of recontracting. Now, there are multiple
principals: P = {Pl, ... }. The agent, rather than returning to the first principal for
renegotiations, turns to others to sign additional contracts. If each principal can at
any time observe the contracts already signed by the agent with other principals,
problems of information revelation, similar to those of renegotiation, occur. A
thorough analysis of this case is done by Beaudry and Poitevin (1990). Gale (1989)
and Gale and Stiglitz (1989), in discussing multi-period trading on a stock market,
consider problems with a similar structure: A privately informed shareholder,
when selling some of his shares, may be unable to commit not to sell more
shares in the future.53
51Market screening with renegotiation is also considered by Hillas (1987), Mori (1989), and
Dionne and Doherty (1991).
52Since they include unobservable actions, these models feature moral hazard and are thus
related to those cited in subsection 3.3.3, particular to Aron (1987), who also considers a multi-
period model.
53Branco and Mello (1991) present a variation on this theme, wherein the seller is the govern-
ment privatising a firm and the uncertainty is not on whether also the remaining part will be
privatized but on whether the government will interfer with the firm's business after privatisa-
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In the third variation, the novelty is the importance of multiple agents.
Suppose there are several agents with whom the principal signs an ex-ante long-
term contract. The agents receive new private information in each period. Any
communication among the agents and the principal is publicly observable. Rath-
er than the potential use by the principal of information sent by the agents, the
problem now is that one agent may take advantage of information sent by other
agents. This complicates the contract design problem of the principal. Even
though she herself may be able to commit to the contract, she cannot prevent any
misuse of information among agents. Thus, the revelation principle does not
hold; see Burguet (1990a).54Burguet (1990b) studies a model involving an owner
of a durable good designing a contract to lease the good to a set of potential users,
each of whom privately learns his valuation of the good only after leasing it for a
period.
6.2. No long-term contracts
Suppose that the principal and the agent are involved in a relationship stretch-
ing over two periods, but that the principal at the start is unable to commit her-
self to any restrictions on her second-period action. In such a case, the agent must
presume that any information revealed in the first period will be fully exploited
by the principal in the second one. Thus, the good type, instead of being exploit-
ed, may choose to mimic the bad type during the first period. This leads inevita-
bly to pooling, since a good agent, rather than sending a message that distances
himself from the bad type, has incentives to send the same message as the latter.
Thorough analyses of a two-period principal-agent model without long-
tion.
54The revelation principle says that, when the principal can commit to her contract, she may
restrict attentions to payoff functions s(·) such that an agent of type teT finds it optimum to send
m(t), thus receiving s(m(t»; see, e.g. Myerson (1979). This does not exclude pooling, since the same
message may be optimum for several types for a given payoff function s(·). In the present case, the
principle is weakened, so that the principal restricts attention to payoff functions s(·) such that an
agent of type teT finds it optimum to send m(S), where t e S, Ser, and r is some partition of the
type space T.
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term contracts are provided by Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988).55Their first paper
considers the two-type case, while the second one considers the case of a continu-
ous type space. They find that, if the discount factor is high enough, so that suffi-
cient weight is put on the future, then there cannot be complete separation in
equilibrium. They find that, in the two-type case, the incentive-compatibility
constraint, which is binding only for the bad type in the one-period model, may
be binding for either type, or for both types.56
An early treatment of this problem is by K. Roberts (1984), who considers
optimum taxation when the government is unable to commit to future tax rates.
In his model, there is an infinite time horizon and no discounting, and the equi-
librium features complete pooling. J. Roberts (1987) shows that an iterative plan-
ning procedure developed in the earlier literature, called the MDP procedure, is
infeasible when the central planner is unable to commit herself, unless the
agents are myopic. Milgrom (1987) treats, for the case of no long-term contracting,
a situation where the agent, by some action after the first period, determines his
type;57 Milgrom finds that the agent will never choose type with a pure strategy,
so that the principal will never be fully informed at the start of the second period.
Baron and Besanko (1987) extend the principal-agent model of Baron and
Myerson (1982) to the case of multiple periods with no long-term contracts. They
restrict, however, the principal to offering linear contracts, i.e., payment is restrict-
ed to be an affine function of the message. Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985)
preempt the Laffont-Tirole papers with a two-period model similar to theirs, but
they, too, consider linear contracts only. Skillman (1986) extends Freixas-
Guesnerie-Tirole to a general finite-horizon model; however, he restricts the
agent to using pure strategies, thus excluding any gradual revelation of informa-
tion.
Gradual revelation through the agent's play of a mixed strategy is, on the
other hand, a regular phenomenon in the socalled reputation models; see, e.g.,
55The results in these papers are reviewed in Laffont (1987, Sec. IV).
56Comparisons of the present case of no long-term contracting with the case above of renegotia-
tion are found in Laffont and Tirole (1990) and Lewis and Sappington (1990).
57'fhus, Milgrom's analysis complements those of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Ma (1991)
for the renegotiation case; see the previous subsection.
58
the seminal contributions by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1982). These models are, however, special in other respects, notably in that the
good type is typically "stupid" and often modelled with a degenerate message
space.58 Reputation models consider how a smart informed agent, when playing
against uninformed parties that are either myopic or non-strategic, can hold back
his true identity over a long period by mimicking stupidity, i.e., keeping a reputa-
tion for being weird. An account of theoretical results in this literature is includ-
ed in Fudenberg (1990).
Multi-period market screening without long-term contracts has been consid-
ered by Nilssen (1991). He finds that the introduction of competing principals,
compared to the case of a single principal, has two effects. First, one principal's
offer of a pooling contract can be exploited by other principals to obtain a cheap
separation. This greatly reduces the scope for pooling. Second, competition drives
profits to zero. This creates limits on the possibilities for such a cheap separation.
Pooling may still occur, then, but is not as prevalent as in the single-principal
case.
Dynamic models without long-term contracting have been applied in a
variety of contexts. Hosios and Peters (1989b), for example, discuss the case of an
insurance monopoly. In the labour-market area, Gibbons (1987) explains why
piece-rate compensation schemes for workers are no longer optimum when
there is no commitment to future action. In this model, it is the workers that are
privately informed. On the other hand, Giammarino and Nosal (1990), in a mod-
el where a firm has private information on the quality of its management, consid-
er a situation where it pays bad firms to mimic good firms during an economic
downturn. This pooling equilibrium thus explains wage smoothing over the
business cycle, the authors argue.
Hillas (1987) and [ost (1988) consider models with testing. Suppose the princi-
pal may offer to inspect the agent by performing a specified test. If the principal
can commit to the test specifications and offers a range of different tests, the agent
reveals his type through the choice of test. However, now the test has served its
purpose and it is no longer necessary. Therefore, if the principal is not committed
to performing the test, it will not be done. Realising this, the agent will not self-
S8Thishas already been commented on in subsection 3.3.1 when discussing finite message
spaces in general.
59
select. In this case, therefore, there will be pooling.
Several papers discuss cases within industrial organization. LeBlanc (1991)
considers entry deterrence when the incumbent may choose between limit pric-
ing, which is signalling its costs before the rival's entry decision in order to pre-
vent entry, and predatory pricing, which is signalling its costs after the rival has
entered in order to induce exit. LeBlanc finds that the incumbent may choose to
abstain from limit pricing and rather go for predatory pricing if entry occurs.
With this strategy, the incumbent leaves the entrant with no information on its
costs at the time of the entry decision. Thus, no limit pricing is tantamount to
first-period pooling. Sharpe (1986), Bagwell (1990), and Kennedy (1990) consider
multi-period models where the quality of a firm's product is initially unknown
to consumers; these authors find conditions under which firms of different types
set the same price in the first period. Finally, Blume and Easley (1987) consider a
two-period Cournot model where only a subset of the firms in the industry know
the production costs. They find that, if the number of informed firms is small
enough, there will be pooling in equilibrium. In particular, if there is only one
informed firm, an equilibrium with complete pooling always exists.
In Tauman and Weiss (1990), P is an innovator who possesses some technol-
ogy that willlower fixed costs of production in an industry where there at present
is one incumbent producer. The incumbent, A, has private information on its
variable production costs. P makes an offer to A of licensing the new technology.
However, P cannot commit herself from thereafter licensing the same technolo-
gy to potential entrants to the industry, thereby lowering the value of the license
to the incumbent. With this lack of commitment, it is not possible for P, through
her initial licensing offer, to elicit information from A on the true variable pro-
duction costs, and pooling entails.
In government procurement, there are often problems of cost overruns.
When the government and the contracting firm cannot write contracts on how
to react to future instances of cost overrun, it is difficult for the government to
get the firm to reveal at the outset private information that is relevant to the
probability that cost overruns will occur in the future. Two models which are
quite different but which nevertheless share this view of cost overruns are pre-
sented by Lewis (1986) and Spulber (1990). Lewis emphasizes that high-cost firms
may work hard early on to keep cost overruns from occurring until the govern-
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ment is so locked in with the project that it want it completed even with high
costs. Spulber argues that a contract auction will not elicit any information on
firms' costs when firms are allowed to breach in the event of a cost overrun. If
firms are allowed to breach only when paying a compensation to the govern-
ment, then, with a continuous type space, there exists some critical type t' e T
such that, in the contract auction, firm types below t' are pooled.
With pooling following from the parties being unable to commit to any
future action at all, one may ask how much commitment power is sufficient to
obtain separation. We conclude this subsection by reporting on two papers with
answers to this. Baron and Besanko (1987), in their analysis of the two-period
Baron-Myerson model, find that, if the principal is restricted to offering fair con-
tracts in period 2 and the agent has to participate in that period if he participated
in the first, then there is complete separation in period 1. Their notion of fairness
implies that an agent is not exploited in period 2 if he reports truthfully his type
in period 1. Fairness thus gives the principal a limited amount of commitment
power that turns out to be sufficient to obtain separation. The other paper is by
Anton and Yao (1987). They consider a two-period procurement situation where
period I is the development phase and period 2 the production phase for some
governmental equipment. They avoid pooling in the development contract of
period I because the principal, although she cannot commit exactly to future
behaviour, is able to commit to the production contract in period 2 being auc-
tioned out. This bit of commitment turns out to be sufficient to obtain first-
period separation.
6.3. Sequential bargaining
Consider a seller and a buyer who are bargaining over the price of an asset, with
the buyer having private information about his valuation of the asset. Thus, the
seller is P and the buyer is A. To be specific, we let the bargaining proceed in the
following fashion: Time develops in discrete steps, 't e {I, ... }.At 't odd, P offers a
price. At r even, A decides whether to accept or reject this price. In case of accep-
tance, the asset is transferred at this price, and the game ends. In case of rejection,
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the game proceeds to P's next offer.
This is admittedly a very special structure, chosen to serve our limited ambi-
tions in this subsection.59 In particular, this is a game where the uninformed
seller is the only one making offers. Thus, the game has the flavour of a repeated
principal-agent model. There are two important differences, though. First, the
end of the game is here determined endogenously, at A's discretion. Second, P
has no contingent contracts at her disposal during the bargaining, only a single-
valued price.
The present bargaining situation has been analysed, among others, by Fuden-
berg, Levine, and Tirole (1985). They find an equilibrium of a character close to
what we have recorded earlier in this Section. Let s be seller P's valuation of the
asset, and let buyer A's valuation equal his type tET = [1, t]. If !> s, then the equi-
librium is described by a list lao, ... , aN},with t = ao> ... > aN = 1, such that A accepts
at time t = 2n if he is of type t E [an, an -1] and rejects if he is of type t E [aN,an). P'S
price offers decline over time: At times t = 2n - 1 and t = 2n + 1, they are such
that type an is indifferent between accepting and rejecting at t = 2n; at t = 2N -1,
the price offer equals 1- Thus, there is pooling at the start of the bargaining, with
types being peeled off from the top of the pooled set over time.
Note that P will never want to offer a price (less than or) equal to her valua-
tion s. Thus, if !~s, then bargaining may go on for an infinitely long time, with
the price offer approaching s asymptotically. Correspondingly, A's acceptance is
delayed for low types, with the integer N above no longer finite, and an approach-
ing s as n goes to infinity.
The greatest impact of this particular bargaining model came through the
work of Gul and Sonnenschein (1988), who showed that, as the time between
offers goes to zero, the time until the lowest-type buyer accepts also goes to zero
in the above described equilibrium. Thus, the pooling interpretation of the above
equilibrium hinges on there being discrete time. Because this model in its struc-
ture is similar to one of intertemporaI price discrimination by a durable-goods
monopolist, the Gul-Sonnenschein result implies that such a monopolist is
59Those who are interested in the theory of sequential bargaining in general or bargaining
under asymmetric information in particular, are wise to consult Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and
Kennan and Wilson (1990), respectively.
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unable to set prices above the lowest valuation among consumers; i.e., if!~s, we
have that price equals marginal costs. This proposition, known as the Coase con-
jecture, received its formal vindication from Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson
(1986). However, the story does not stop here. The above equilibrium is the
unique one only if we impose upon A's acceptance decision at any time the condi-
tion that it depend solelyon P's beliefs and current offer.60 If this condition is
lifted, and if !~s, we will find equilibria with pooling, even if the time between
offers approaches zero. In the durable-goods interpretation, this implies that the
Coase conjecture is reversed. See Ausubel and Deneckere (1989).
The market-screening parallel to the above story has several sellers confront-
ing a privately informed buyer, with the sellers making simultaneous offers at
each t odd. This case is discussed by Vincent (1990), who calls it a dynamic auc-
tion. Related is also the durable-goods oligopoly models of Ausubel and Deneck-
ere (1987) and Gul (1987). The general report from these papers is that pooling
results are strengthened by the introduction of multiple principals.61 Phrased
within the durable-goods analogy, the introduction of competing producers
raises price above marginal costs, even if we restrict the informed buyer's strategy
in the above described manner. However, a comparison of Vincent's paper with
Noldeke and van Damme (1990a) suggests that the result may hinge on the
choice of equilibrium refinement.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Section starts out with a discussion of two items of pooling occurrence that
seem to fail to be naturally fitted in with any of the above. These are the type
space and the organization of market screening. We continue with two items
that may have bearing on the importance of our writings above. The first, on
equilibrium refinements, is a theoretical point mostly concerned with signalling
6OConditions like this one are known as Markov conditions, and the idea is that a strategy
should be conditioned only on that part of the history that is in some sense relevant.
61Compare this with market screening without long-term contracting, studied by Nilssen
(1991) and discussed in the previous subsection. In that case, the introduction of multiple principals
reduces the scope for pooling.
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models. The second one addresses empirical work on the incidence of pooling.
7.1. The type space
In subsection 3.3.1 above, we found that restrictions on the message space may
lead to the existence of pooling in equilibrium. With regard to the type space,
quite on the contrary, a lack of restrictions may give the same effect. Whereas we
with the message space were concerned with the good types' end of the space, the
concern here is with the bad types' end.
Hellwig (1990) has shown that, if the type space is unbounded in the lower
end, then it may be impossible to separate among lower types. In particular, he
constructs an example in which T = (- 00, tl and finds that a critical type t' > - 00
exists such that all types t < t' are pooled. This holds in both the signalling model
and the market screening model. The basic reason for this result is that, with no
limit on t this lowest type cannot serve as a starting point from which to con-
struct a separating equilibrium from incentive-compatibility considerations.
As an example from the literature, Hellwig cites Glosten (1989), where the
uninformed parties' prior beliefs are represented by the normal distribution.
Thus, since this distribution has support on the whole real line, there is no lower
bound on the worst type, and a separating equilibrium fails to exist.
7.2. The organization of market screening
As noted in subsection 2.2, the market screening model may fail to exhibit a pure-
strategy equilibrium. This was the basis, in the literature following Rothschild
and Stiglitz's (1976) seminal piece, for exploring the effects of other ways of orga-
nizing a market with asymmetric information. These efforts aimed at construc-
tions such that an equilibrium in pure strategies always exists. Below, we will try
to give a brief account of these developments. Every suggestion has an equilibri-
um that coincides with the pure-strategy separating equilibrium, described in
subsection 2.2, when the latter exists. The interest, therefore, centres on the equi-
librium features in case there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in the base model.
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Reference is made to this case only in the following.
Wilson (1977) suggests that the competing principals interact in sequence
such that, after the initial contract offers, each principal is allowed to react by
withdrawing any offer that is unprofitable in light of rivals' initial offers; see
Fernandez and Rasmusen (1989) for a game-theoretic formulation of this sugges-
tion. The outcome of this market organization is a pooling equilibrium in which
the good type's utility is maximized subject to the zero-profit constraint (on a
pooling offer) on principals; call this the Wilson outcome. It turns out that Wil-
son's result is sensitive to his provision that each principal offers one contract
only. If this is relaxed, so that each principal may offer contracts to more than one
type, then the equilibrium is separating and may entail cross-subsidization from
the good type to the bad; see Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978). However, in
order to avoid a chain of reactions, Mattesini (1990) argues, the case of multiple
contracts per principal requires the specification, by each principal, of a fall-back
contract to which he returns at a withdrawal; introduction of such a fall-back
contract partly restores Wilson's pooling result.62
Another variation is suggested by H. Grossman (1979). Here, the principals'
initial contract offers are followed by the agent applying for a contract. Confront-
ed with an applicant, a principal has then the right to accept or reject. This twist
leads again to the Wilson outcome with pooling. Game-theoretic formulations
are suggested by Hellwig (1987)and Desruelle (1989).
7.3. More on equilibrium refinements
As we saw in subsection 2.3. above, standard refinements leave us with a separat-
ing equilibrium in the signalling model. However, it is fair to say that the refine-
ment literature in general is not met with equal enthusiasm in all quarters, not
62Reactions of the opposite kind of those suggested by Wilson, i.e., where each principal is
allowed to react to current offers on the market by adding new offers to its portfolio (rather than
withdrawing current ones), is showed by Riley (1979) to lead to separation. Game-theoretic formula-
tions of the Riley outcome seem, however, hard to obtain without running into problems of multiple
equilibria; see, e.g., Kreps (1990a, p. 650).
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even within the game-theorist profession.63 And more to thepoint, refinements
on which the conclusion is based that the signalling equilibrium is separating
have received particular criticism. The so-called "Stiglitz critique", for example,
questions the way pooling equilibra are deleted by these refinements.64 Some
authors have also put forward alternative refinement concepts that, in some
signalling games at least, lead to a pooling equilibrium; see, e.g., Overgaard (1990).
Closely related to the refinement of equilibria is the issue of equilibrium
selection,6S recently associated largely with the work of Harsanyi and Selten
(1988). Giith and van Damme (1989) have used their theory to arrive at the Wil-
son outcome, defined in the previous subsection, in a signalling model with
competing principals.
Finally, we should put forward some caution about the effect of refinements
in dynamic games. A widely used notion is that, if P at some time 't' is certain
that A is not of type t, then she continues to be certain of this at all times 't > 't'.
This is an effective restriction on P's beliefs, known as "Support Restriction" or
"Never Dissuaded Once Convinced".66 Some of the results reported in Sec. 6
above make use of this idea. However, its critics have shown that it is in conflict
with other refinement arguments, and that it generally overstates the occurrence
of pooling, relative to these other refinements. More on this is, e.g., in Noldeke
and van Damme (1990b).
63Even "refiners" feel the need to express their doubts once in a while; see, e.g., Kreps (1990b,
Ch.S).
64The name stems from a reference to Joseph Stiglitz in Cho and Kreps (1987, p. 203), where it
is first stated. The critique goes something like this. Consider a pooling equilibrium in which both
types send the same message m, This equilibrium is dismissed by the equilibrium-dominance refine-
ment (see subsection 2.3) because there exists a message m' that the good type may deviate to since,
if P reacts to a deviation to m' as if it was indeed a message sent by the good type, then the bad type
would not want to send m' instead of m. According to the critique, one should not stop here, however.
For if the good type is expected to deviate to m', then P infers that anyone sending m is bad and acts
accordingly when m is sent. Realizing this in the first place, the bad type may find that it pays to
mimic the good at m' rather than being revealed at m. Thus, it may not be possible for the good type
to deviate to any message m' with the desired property, and pooling at m is in equilibrium after all.
See also Kreps (1989, pp. 38-39) and van Damme (1991, p. 39).
65While equilibrium refinement aims at deleting unreasonable equilibria, so that the number
of equilibria that are left after the exercise may vary from case to case, equilibrium selection aims
at picking one equilibrium, thus obtaining uniqueness by definition.
66The latter name is from Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, ch. 5), who count among the propo-
nents.
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7.4. Empirical work on pooling
Models of asymmetric information are inherently difficult to test empirically.
The basic problem for the researcher is that he cannot measure the type of an
agent; if he could, then also the principal could, a case in which there is no asym-
metric information after all. Successful empirical work, therefore, has confined
itself to testing equilibrium outcomes. For example, in testing whether a real-life
situation features a separating equilibrium, one may test whether agents' behavi-
our differs. If it does, even after controlling for all observable effects, then one
may have support for the conclusion that self-selection takes place, which im-
plies that there was asymmetric information in the first place. The problem with
this line of research, for us at least, is that a rejection of a self-selection hypothesis
is unable to distinguish a symmetric-information hypothesis from one of asym-
metric information and pooling. Therefore, while asymmetric information in
itself is hard to ascertain, the occurrence of pooling is harder still.
Thus, while empirical evidence of self-selective signalling at present is quite
substantive, the literature is almost silent on the pooling issue. But there are
some exceptions. Kennan and Wilson (1989) give a nice overview of the empiri-
cal work that has been done to test strike incidents in union-firm negotiations as
outcomes of pooling equilibria in bargaining games with various sorts of private
information. Another interesting study is by Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek
(1991). In a multi-period situation, pooling may be traced by checking whether
agents performing identically in early stages differ in later stages. This late-stage
behaviour is a sign of self-selection and thus of asymmetric information, so that
the early-stage behaviour must be a sign of pooling, rather than symmetric infor-
mation. Their analysis of multi-stage sales of shares on the stock market provides
empirical support for the model of Gale and Stiglitz (1989), cited above in subsec-
tion 6.1 as an instance of recontracting. 67
Since the measurement problems are so serious when doing empirical work
on real-life problems, there seems to be particularly good reasons to do experi-
67Mention should also be made of empirical studies of reputation effects, such as Wolfson
(1985) on oil and gas drilling partnerships.
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mental research on asymmetric-information models in general and the pooling
question in particular. One study of the latter sort is by Cadsby, Frank, and Maksi-
movie (1990). In testing a signalling model of a capital market, they find that, in
cases where the theory predicts multiple Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, including
one that is separating and one that is pooling, and where refinements tend to
select the separating one, the subjects in their experimental tests most often end
up in a pooling equilibrium. King and Wallin (1991) perform a test of a model
with voluntary disclosure when the agent may not have the information (see the
end of subsection 3.3.4).68
In concluding this tour of the literature on pooling equilibria, a retrospect
indicates that we have been too long on theory compared to empirical work - on
the basis of a page count, the ratio is something like 57:2! This suggests that the
marginal social value of the next paper to be published on the subject is higher if
it is empirical than if it is theoretical. There are indeed good reasons to subscribe
to the views expressed by Roth (1991), writing on the future of game theory, that
one should put more emphasis in the future on empirical work, experimental
and otherwise, than on theory - particularly such empirical work that is directed
primarily at testing and informing theory.
There should be ample possibilities on the pages above to find a theoretical
explanation for pooling that so far has not been put to an empirical test. The
empirically inclined out there are hereby invited to help themselves.
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CHAPTER TWO:
CONSUMER LOCK-IN WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMA TIONl
Abstract: A two-period version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance
market model is presented. Its features include: repeat purchase; limited
commitment among both insurers and consumers; and private infor-
mation on a customer's accident history. It is shown that an equilibri-
um may exist exhibiting first-period pooling and second-period lock-in
of consumers.
1.INTRODuenON
Industrial organization is a field with much progress during the last decade.
Applications of its various ideas of strategic behaviour has found their ways to
mfiny different industries. In a somewhat glaring contrast to this development,
sofe industries have not caught the interest of industrial economists, even if
they obviously feature oligopolies. One such industry is insurance.
A reason for this apparent lack of interest may be found in Milgrom and
Roberts (1987).They state, slightly paraphrased, that the play of a game with "in-
formational incompleteness, but no informational asymmetries, [while] useful ...
for studying such issues as insurance, ... would not generate any interesting
forms of strategic behavior" (pp. 184-185). The idea presented in this chapter of
getting around this state of affairs is to introduce a dynamic model of competi-
tion in an insurance market in which informational asymmetries are allowed to
develop over time, thus creating strategic behaviour that is indeed of significant
interest.
This chapter builds on the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
who consider an insurance market with asymmetric information. In a one-
lThe first version of this chapter was completed in August 1989. I would like to thank Geir
Asheim and Terje Lensberg for all their help throughout the work on this chapter; Frøystein Gjes-
dal and Jon Vislie for valuable comments on earlier versions; and Georg Noldeke, Joseph Stiglitz,
and Bent Vale for fruitful conversations. Thanks also to participants at seminars in Bergen, War-
saw, Barcelona and Lisbon, for their many useful reactions.
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period, two-type model, they show that the adverse-selection problem created by
the asymmetric information can be partially alleviated: In equilibrium, high-risk
consumers get full insurance, while low-risk consumers get only partial insur-
ance in order to create disincentives for the high-risks to buy the low-risk in-
surance contract. Each firm earns zero expected profit.
Below is an attempt at extending their model to a multi-period framework.
What makes the present extension interesting, is the combination of two plausi-
ble assumptions: first, that an individual's accident history is known only to him
and his insurer; and, secondly, that neither firms nor consumers are able to com-
mit to long-term (multi-period) insurance contracts.
The first of these assumptions creates asymmetry of information between
firms, in addition to the consumer-firm asymmetry. But whereas accidents are
private information, it is assumed that all contract purchases are publicly obser-
vable. This means that the informational asymmetry among firms will have no
consequences unless consumers pool in the first period, in the sense that consum-
ers of different types buy the same contract in that period. When this happens in
equilibrium, we will denote it a pooling equilibrium. Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) show that such an equilibrium cannot exist in the one-period model. A
similarly strong result is not obtained in the two-period case. On the contrary, it
is proved here that, for some reasonable parameter values, a pooling equilibrium
does exist.
The first-period pooling in this equilibrium creates a possibility for each firm
to take advantage in the second period of its information on its old customers'
accident histories. When this informational advantage can be turned into a posi-
tive profit, we say that consumer lock-in entails in the sense that a consumer's
previous insurer is able to outbid outside firms and still earn a profit. We estab-
lish in here the existence of a pooling equilibrium featuring such consumer lock-
in.
Apart from the existence of a pooling equilibrium with consumer lock-in,
the present work informs the debate on insurance markets in two respects. First,
we find an equilibrium in pure strategies in the two-period model for parameter
values that only allow a mixed-strategy equilibrium in the one-period one. Sec-
ond, we find that, in the first period of our equilibrium, risk averse consumers
may actually be selling insurance to risk neutral firms.
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Readers may want to object to the assumption that accident information is
private. In particular, one may argue that, by regulation, public records of acci-
dents are kept such that any insurer has free access to this information.2 Howev-
er, these systems seldom work perfectly; whenever they don't, there is room for
doubt on a particular consumer's true accident record. Evidence from the U.S.
suggests that such records are indeed of limited value: In one survey, only 47% of
a sample of more than 27,000 car accidents known to insurers and meeting statu-
tory requirements were reported to the public records.å Our assumption, al-
though extreme, catches the essential feature of any imperfectly functioning
public record.
In the present model, the informational asymmetry between firms is endo-
genously determined. In this sense, the present model is unique in the insurance
literature. But in studies of other markets, notably credit and labour markets,
models are found having this feature.s These models can be split into two
groups.
Both Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia (1989) and Sharpe (1990) present
credit market models where the information on a consumer's type is ex ante
symmetric among consumers and firms. Thus, self-selection is not an issue, since
consumers have no superior knowledge. These authors conclude, as we do here,
that consumers get captured because of the informational asymmetry between
firms developing over time.
Greenwald (1986)5 studies a multi-period labour market where the wage
contracts are non-contingent and short-term, and where information about a
worker is completely revealed to his current employer after one period. Thus,
Greenwald's model and the present one differ in two important respects: First,
2The author would like to record his indebtedness to various commentators whose willingness
to describe the various kinds of information they were required to disclose when applying for their
car insurances has prompted this paragraph.
3AIRAC (1984), as quoted by D'Arcy and Doherty (1990, p. 152).
4See also the model in Blume and Easley (1987) of endogenous information acquisition in a two-
period Cournot market.
5Related labour market models are in Waldman (1984, 1990), Lazear (1986), Milgrom and
Oster (1987), Riordan and Staiger (1988), Gibbons and Katz (1989), and Novos (1990a, 1990b). A
credit market model with essentially the same structure is found in Fischer (1990).
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the exclusion of contingent contracts makes separation impossible in Green-
wald's model.s Again, this breaks with one of the key features of the present
model - individuals' choice between pooling and separating contracts. Second, in
the present model, a firm's information on old customers is not perfect." Al-
though its information is superior to that of its rivals, each firm still has to pro-
vide its old customers with incentives for truth-telling. Again, this constitutes an
essential difference. Still, there is one important similarity in the results of the
two models: Both predict that new customers/employees are given better offers,
relative to expected riskiness/ ability, than old ones.
Multi-period insurance models so far have considered either the case of
monopolyor the case of long-term contracts, or both. The only one that is really
connected to the present model, is Cooper and Hayes (1987).8 In their model,
competing firms are allowed to sign long-term contracts. This makes it possible
to separate consumers in the following way: In equilibrium, two contracts are
offered in the first of two periods; one contract covering only period one, and
another contract covering both periods. This latter contract is constructed such
that only low-risks will want to buy it; this is because of the way a first-period
6This holds also for all the papers of the previous footnote. Dewatripont and Maskin (1990)
and Kanemoto and MacLeod (1990), on the other hand, present two-period models with contingent
contracts. But Dewatripont and Maskin also allow for long-term contracts and for renegotiation
after the first period, while Kanemoto and MacLeod assume that the agent's first-period contract
choice is observed by the contract offeror only.
7This feature is also found in labour market papers by Lazear (1986), O'Flaherty and Siow
(1989), and Waldman (1990). Lazear's model is very different from ours with regard to the move
structure. In O'Flaherty and Siow's model, there is no worker-firm asymmetry of information.
Waldman's model focuses on limited, as opposed to no, commitment; he studies up-or-out (tenure)
contracts in which workers agree to quit after one period in case of a bad outcome. All these authors,
like Greenwald, restrict attention to non-contingent contracts.
SIn Berkovitch and Venezia (1986), analyzing the market for life insurance, firms are allowed
to offer long-term contracts, just like in Cooper and Hayes (1987), but contracts are non-contingent. In
Kunreuther and Pauly (1985), consumers are completely myopic and contracts are non-contingent. In
Haneda (1986) and Malueg (1988), only long-term contracts are allowed. In Palfrey and Spatt (1985)
and Cotter and Jensen (1989), there is neither consumer-firm nor firm-firm asymmetry of informa-
tion. The models of Wilson (1977), Myerson (1988), and Winter (1989) are multi-period but without
consumer repurchases. Single-period models with a dynamic structure allowing firms to make
reactions are discussed, e.g., in Cave (1985). Multi-period models of insurance monopoly include
Dionne (1983), Dionne and Lasserre (1987), Gal and Landsberger (1988), and Hosios and Peters
(1989); the model of Hosios and Peters is of particular interest here, since their monopolist is unable
to commit to long-term contracts. For a survey emphasizing adverse selection in multi-period models
of the insurance market, see Dionne and Doherty (1991a).
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accident is punished in the second period.?
Since the Cooper-Hayes model is very close to the present one, except for the
commitment issue, and since the two models give opposite predictions regarding
the timing of firms' profits, it should be possible to perform an empirical test of
whether firms in fact can commit to long-term contracts: According to Cooper
and Hayes, firms' expected profit earned on a consumer is higher in the start of
the relationship than in the end.U' According to the present model, it is the oppo-
site: Firms compete for their customers without the possibility to give credible
promises on future contracts. This and the informational rent earned on old
customers bring down the offer given to new customers. Given the work of
D'Arcy and Doherty (1990) based on data from u.S. insurance firms, it is tempting
to argue that the empirical test has been performed already. Their results reject
the Cooper-Hayes model with regard to the timing of firms' profits, thus lending
support to any model with the opposite prediction.t!
As already mentioned, it is a crucial feature of the present model that in-
surance contracts are assumed to be short-term ones. A rationale for this assump-
tion may be given along the following lines: In reality, there are more than two
periods in a relationship and, most probably, any contract encompasses several
periods. But as long as contracts cannot be sustained for the whole duration of
the relationship, a two-period model without commitment may very well be a
good approximation. With this assumption, the present model is related to the
literature on the principal-agent problem under no commitment; see Roberts
(1984), Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985), Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988), Gib-
bons (1987), Baron and Besanko (1987),Hosios and Peters (1989) (on an insurance
monopoly), and Lewis and Sappington (1990).A general theme of these papers is
that pooling is the likely outcome.
9Note that, without the ability to commit, the firm would not have incentives to carry out
such a punishment.
IDA very recent paper by Dionne and Doherty (1991b) extends the Cooper-Hayes analysis to
the case with renegotiation; they verify the same pattern of profit in this variation.
HIn another paper, D'Arcy and Doherty (1989) discuss practical implications of this pattern
of profits for an insurance company's pricing decisions. It should be noted that the empirical evi-
dence reported in Dionne and Doherty (1991b) is more mixed than is that of D' Arcy and Doherty
(1990).
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One interpretation of the present work is as an extention of the above works
to the case of competing principals. It turns out that pooling can occur in this
case, too. But the possibilities for pooling in a situation of competition is limited
by one firm's incentives to take advantage of other firms' offering a pooling
contract in order to get itself a cheap separation; this is an effect that is not caught
in the usual principal-agent framework. On the other hand, the possibilities for
such a cheap separation are limited by the competing principals' zero-expected-
profit constraints; this is, again, a new aspect relative to the single-principal case.
On balance, pooling occurs in cases where the profit effect makes itself particular-
ly felt relative to the separation effect.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section, the model is present-
ed in detail. In Section 3, we establish the existence of one particularly interesting
equilibrium - a pooling equilibrium with consumer lock-in. In Section 4, other
issues are discussed, in particular the existence of a separating equilibrium in
pure strategies, the reasonableness of firms' beliefs, and the sequential nature of
moves. Section 5 concludes.
2.THE MODEL
An individual will in each of two periods either have an accident or avoid it. De-
note his income without accident and with accident Wl and W2, respectively.
Without insurance, (Wll W2) = (W, W - D), where W is positive and finite and
D e (O,W) is the cost of a damage.12 In Figure 1, a consumer's income is illustrat-
ed by points in (Wl,W2)-space. His income without insurance is thus located at
point E. We define the contract space as follows:
A == {«X1I(X2)e 1R2I (Xl+ (X2S; D, (Xl~ - g, and (X2~ D - W),
where g is finite, positive, and constant, and 1Ris the real line. A one-period in-
surance contract is now (X= «Xl, (X2)e A. One may interpret this as the individual
paying to an insurance company a premium (Xlin return for which he gets (Xl+
12Byassumption, there is neither saving nor borrowing between the two periods. For our
purpose, W is just a lump-sum income received by each individual at the start of each period. The
residual after insurance purchase and possibly an accident is consumed before next period starts.
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(X2if an accident occurs in that period; (X2is the insurer's (net) liability. Thus, with
insurance, the consumer's income is (Wl, W2) = (W - (Xl,W - D + (X2).To simpli-
fy illustration, we let throughout a contract (Xbe depicted in (W1, W2)-space at the
point (W - (Xl,W - D + (X2).In Figure l, the contract space A. is thus delineated by
the triangle OGB.
W-D
O
W
W
W+g 1
Figure 1.
The demand for insurance. There is a continuum of consumers; we assume
they are spread uniformly over the unit line [O, 1] with density 1. A generic con-
sumer is denoted by j e [O,1]. Consumers are identical except for the probability of
an accident. In particular, the set of consumer types is {L,H}. The accident probabi-
lity of an L (low-risk) type is PL, that of an H (high-risk) type is PH; these probabili-
ties satisfy:
O<PL <PH< 1.
The fraction of low-risks in the population is A. e (O, 1). The (one-period) expected
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utility from buying the contract a. for a consumer of type k e {H,L}is:13
(2.1)
where U:[O,oo)~1R is the utility of money income. We make the following stan-
dard assumptions on U: (i) U' > O;and (ii) U" < O(risk aversion).
It follows from PH > PL, (2.1), and our assumptions on U, that a low-risk
consumer's indifference curve is steeper than a high-risk consumer's indiffer-
ence curve everywhere in (W1, W2)-space; see Figure 2. This is the present mod-
el's version of the Spence-Mirrlees sorting condition: Since his accident probabili-
ty is lower, a low-risk consumer requires a less increase in no-accident income
(WI) to compensate for a given decrease in accident income (W2).
L
I
W
I
Figure 2. High-risk and low-risk indifference curves.
Each individual discounts the future with a discount factor o e (O, 1];expect-
ed utility over both periods is denoted overall expected utility. It is assumed that
no consumer comes new to the market in the second period and that consumers
at any time observe all available offers without incurring search costs. No indivi-
13Denote the righthand side of (2.1) expected utility on extensive form.
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dual can by any action affect his accident probability; i.e., there is no moral-hazard
problem. A consumer is restricted to buying insurance from only one firm in
each period.t+
The supply of insurance. The supply side of the market consists of a finite
number of firms, indexed by i e N == (I, ... ,n}.IS Each firm is assumed to be a risk-
neutral maximiser of its total discounted expected profit, with the same discount
factor o as consumers, and to have financial resources sufficient to supply any
number of insurance contracts within the set A..16 The expected profit from
selling the contract a to an individual who is believed to be low-risk with probabi-
lity b, is:
n(a, b) = (1 - b)[(1- PH)aI - pHa2] + b[(l - pdal - PLa21
= [(1- b)(1 - PH)+ b(l - pd]aI - [(1- b)PH + bpL]a2 (2.2)
In analysing the second period of our model, it is useful to distinguish between a
consumer's previous insurer, which we denote the informed firm relative to this
consumer, and all others, which we denote the uninformed firms.
Based on the above descriptions of consumers and firms, we can make the
observation that, along an indifference curve, profit is higher with more insur-
ance. This is stated in Lemma 1 below, complete with a proof; it should be noted,
however, that it is a standard result, related to the first-best effiency of full insur-
ance; see, e.g., Borch (1990). Define first a contract a's coverage as the ratio a2/(D-
al), which varies from zero at no insurance to one at full insurance. Along an
indifference curve, the coverage increases towards full insurance.
14SUppose,e.g., that insurers reimburse consumers only in exchange for a document, such as a
receipt, verifying expenses. This, in effect, makes it impossible to get a damage covered from more
than one firm. This argument may not hold in the presence of non-market institutions providing
insurance; see Amott and Stiglitz (1991), who prove such institutions to be harmful in a moral-
hazard context. However, given the atomistic character of consumers, it seems natural to assume
that no mutual-insurance arrangements exist.
lSBy specifying a finite number of firms and, later on, allowing each firm to offer more than
one contract each period, this paper follows a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model that Das-
gupta and Maskin (1986) attribute to Hahn (1977).
16Theassumption of unlimited insurance capacity is not necessarily an innocuous one; see, e.g.,
Winter (1988, 1989).
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Lemma 1: Consider two different contracts on the same high-risk [resp.,low-
risk] indifference curve. The contract, of the two, with the higher 1t(., O)[resp.,1t(·,
1)] is the one with the higher coverage, Le. the one which is closer to full insur-
ance.
Proof: We do it here for high-risks only; it is identical for low-risks. For any
contract aH which is not a full-insurance one, so that ar + ar < D, a firm's isopro-
fit curve is steeper than a high-risk consumer's indifference curve:
da~ PH PHU'(W - a~) da~
--I H = > =--1 H'
daH d1t(a ,O) = o 1- PH (1 _ P )U'(W - D + aH) dell dV(Pl-Ya) = o
2 H 2 =:
where the inequality follows from U" < O.Thus, the firm improves its expected
profit by moving aH towards full insurance along the high-risk indifference
curve. QED.
The structure of the game. In the present model, there are two periods, but
the number of stages in the game is higher. There are three stages in which firms
make their moves. And inbetween, consumers make their contract choices and
any accident occurs. All in all, the game consists of the following stages:
Period 1:
Stage 1.1: Firms make simultaneous first-period offers to all consumers.
These offers are observed byeverybody.
Stage 1.2: Consumers choose among the offers from stage 1.1. Everybody
observes their choices.
Stage 1.3: Every consumer and his insurer observe whether any accident
occurs. First-period contracts are fulfilled.
Period 2:
Stage 2: Firms make simultaneous second-period offers to consumers on
whom they have no accident information. These offers are observed by
everybody.
Stage 3.1: Firms make simultaneous second-period offers to consumers on
whom they do have accident information, i.e., to old customers.
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Stage 3.2: Consumers choose among the offers from stages 2 and 3.1.
Stage 3.3: Accidents happen and second-period contracts are fulfilled. The
game ends.t?
This move sequence implies that, in the second period, for a given consum-
er, all uninformed firms move before the informed one. Put another way, each
firm gives offers first to all consumers on which it is uninformed and then to
those on which it is informed. Apart from its analytical tractability, this structure
makes precise the notion that a firm's customers don't leave to a rival firm be-
fore they have received a final offer from it.18
Two remarks should be made regarding the content of the stages specified
above. Firstly, the information a firm obtains about whether its customers had an
accident in the first period is, by assumption, not shared with its rivals. Secondly,
it is assumed that any accident is observed by both the consumer having the
accident and his insurer. We abstract thus from the possibility for the consumer
not to report an accident in the first period in order to gain in the second-period
offers.t?
Before proceeding, we emphasize the two sources of asymmetry of informa-
tion in this model. One is the assumption that, before the start of period one,
each individual knows his probability of accident, while firms don't. The other is
the assumption that, in period one, any accident is observed only by the consum-
er having the accident together with his first-period insurer. At the start of the
second period, each firm has learnt something from the first period - viz. the
accident histories of its old customers - so that there is asymmetry of informa-
tion also among firms: Each firm knows more about its old customers than about
those of the other firms, and more than the other firms know; hence the distinc-
tion, for each consumer, between the informed firm and the uninformed ones.
17When we later on use the tenn "stage I", this should be thought of as substages 1.1 through 1.3
taken together. The same holds true for stage 3.
18Referring back to the discussion of related literature in Sec. 1, this is the move sequence used
by Greenwald (1986) and subsequent labour market papers. Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989)
and Sharpe (1990) have the opposite sequence, with the informed firm moving first, while in
Fischer (1990), the parties move simultaneously.
19The effects of allowing this in the monopoly case are discussed by Hosios and Peters (1989).
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Firms' strategies. In order to define the equilibrium, we must define the
firms' strategies. To simplify our analysis, we start with imposing the following
assumption:
Assumption (A): (i) A firm's offers to consumers on whom it has identical
information are identical.
(ii) A firm's offer to a consumer is based on its information on this consum-
er only.
(iii) Accidents are distributed independentlyacross consumers according to
consumer type and the probabilities PH and PL·
(iv) Consumers are independently assigned to being high-risk or low-risk.
Assumption (A)(i) does not imply that consumers on whom a firm has
identical information buy identical contracts from it; rather, it implies that these
consumers are offered the same set of contracts to choose from.20
Note the similarity in spirit between Assumption (A)(ii) here and the "no-
signaling-what-you-don't-know" condition of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). The
present assumption pertains to offers the consumer has received previously, his
choice among these offers, and, if he is an old customer, his accident experience.
In all these respects, the firm does not use information on any other consumer as
basis for its offer to this consumer.
Assumptions (A)(iii) and (iv) are straightforward.
The consequence of Assumption (A) is that the identity of a consumer (i.e.,
his "home" on the unit line [O,1]) is not payoff-relevant information. A firm is
not able to draw any inferences from information on one consumer (or group of
consumers) about other consumers. Therefore, we can save on notation by con-
centrating on a single group of consumers, all of the same type and with the
same contract choice, the same insurer, and the same accident experience.
What we are after in the formal development below, is the following: Con-
sider a firm that, at some point in time, has collected (i) information on the histo-
20Assumption (A)(i) relates to the literature on whether, in a credit market with asymmetric
information, there will be any credit rationing: In the terminology used by Clemenz (1986), the
present assumption eliminates Type II rationing, whereby "[s]ome loan applicants are denied a loan
even though for the bank they are indistinguishable from accepted applicants" (p. 18).
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ry of the game, denoted h, containing firms' previous offers, contractual relation-
ships established in the past between consumers and firms, and what the firm
knows about consumer accidents; and (ii) consumer-specific information, denot-
ed I, containing a consumer's previous contract choice and insurer, as well as his
accident experience if he is an old customer. A firm's strategy is a prescription of
which offers, contingent on I, to make following any history h. Let % be the set of
all histories and 9 the set of all consumer-specific information. A firm's strategy
is then a list of mappings, one for each time the firm makes a move, from %x9 to
the offer space S, which is defined more precisely below; it suffices here to note
that se A\.2U{Ø}.
There are three different stages at which firms are called upon to make their
I
moves in this game. For t e {l, 2,3} and i e N, let %} denote the set of histories for
firm i at stage t, with hl as a typical element in %}; and let 9} denote the set of firm
i's consumer-specific information at stage t, with It as a typical element in 9~.
At stage l, the game has no history, and there is no consumer-specific infor-
mation, so %l = 91 = {Ø}, i e N. Thus, we may write firm i's stage-t strategy as sl e
S.
At stage 2, the history hr e %[ of firm i contains: (i) all firms' offers at stage
1, sl æ (sl, ... , sp e Sn; (ii) contractual relationships established in period 1, de-
scribed by the mapping B:[O,l]~ A\. xN, where B(j) = (al, tI) lists the contract (al)
and supplier (tl) chosen by consumer j in that period; and (iii) the accident histo-
ries observed by the firm, described by a mapping ri:Ci~{O, l}, where C, C [O,1] is
the set of firm i' s first-period customers, and where ri (j) = 1 if consumer j had an
accident in period 1 and ri(j) = Ootherwise. For sl and B to be mutually consistent,
we know that they must satisfy: al e A(s~l)' where we introduce the convention
that, for any vector G, A(G) denotes the set of elements of G.
Since a firm makes offers at stage 2 only to new customers, i.e., consumers it
did not insure in the past, the relevant consumer-specific information that firm i
has at this stage, It e 9[, is the pair (a}, tI), with i:;t:ti- Thus, It = B(j) for all consum-
ers j who receive an offer from firm i at stage 2. Therefore, by Assumption (A),
the only elements of hr on which an offer to consumer j may depend are Sl and
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B(j) = Ir. Thus, given some Ir e ~f' the mapping ar:%fx~f ~S, describing firm i's
stage-2 strategy, is constant over %f' except for variations in Sl and B(j). But B(j)=
Ir; therefore, there exists a function or:SnxA.xN~S such that (;f(hr, Ir) = or(sl, Ir>
whenever sl is the stage-l offers corresponding to hr. We may then, without
further loss of generality, represent the stage-2 part of firm i's strategy by the
function or instead of by ar. Given the "reduced-form" history sl, or(sl, .) details
firm i's offer to consumers at this stage conditioned on the consumer-specific
information Ir. All firms' stage-2 strategies are listed in 0'2 æ (crI, ... , ~).
At stage 3, the history hf e %f of firm i consists of hr and all firms' stage-2 of-
fers, given by a2(sl, B(j», where sl e Sn are stage-l offers and B(j) are consumer j's
choices in period 1. Let r:[O, l]~{O, l} record consumers' first-period experience,
where r = Odenotes no accident and r = 1 denotes an accident. The relevant con-
sumer-specific information at stage 3, If e ~f'equals (all i, r), since now offers are
made to a firm's old customers only, on whom the firm has accident informa-
tion. Thus, If = (B(j), r(j» for all consumers j who receive offers at stage 3. There-
fore, by Assumption (A), the only elements of hf on which an offer to consumer
j may depend are Sl, a:i(Sl, B(j», and (B(j),r(j» = If. Thus, given some If e ~f, the
mapping crr:%fx~r~S, describing firm i's stage-3 strategy, is constant over %f,
except for variations in sl, a:i(sl, B(j», B(j), and r(j). But (B(j), r(j» = If; therefore,
there exists a function cØ:Sn(n-l)xA. xNx{O,l}~S such that ~(h;3, 1;3)= cØ(sl, S~i1al,
I VI I I I
t1, r), where S~i= ~i(Sl, al, t1) e Sn-l, whenever Sl and S~iare the stage-l and stage-
2 offers corresponding to hf. We may then, without further loss of generality,
represent the stage-3 part of firm i's strategy by the function ar instead of by Cf.
Given the "reduced-form" history (sl, S~i),ar (sl ,S~i, .) details firm i's offer to con-
sumers at this stage conditioned on the consumer-specific information (B, r). All
firms' stage-3 strategies are listed in 0'3 æ (crI, ... , ~).
Thus, firm i's strategy in this game is given by ai æ (sl, cif, ar), i e N, and the
collection of all firms' strategies is a æ (Sl, 0'2,0'3). Let Il be the set of all strategy
collections.
With regard to the offer space S, we let each firm in each period offer con-
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sumers a menu of maximum two contracts to choose from - one for each possi-
ble type.21 Inparticular, let S æ S'U{Ø}, where:
S' æ {(aH, aL) e A2 I either: V(PH, aH) > V(PH, aL),
or: V(PH, aH) = V(PH, aL) and V(PL, aL);;::V(pL, aH)}.
That is, a non-empty offer consists of two contracts that we label according to
consumer preferences. Note that this allows also for single-contract offers: When-
ever an offer is a singleton a e A, we represent it as (a, a) e S.
Firms' beliefs. We assume that firms with identical information hold identi-
cal beliefs. Thus, let fl:SnxA ~[o, 1]3 map stage-t offers and consumer contract
choice into firms' subjective probabilities, after period 1 but before period 2, that a
consumer is low-risk. Here, fl(SI,al) = (flu, j..l{), flI), with flu representing the beliefs
of an uninformed firm and flr the beliefs of an informed firm having observed
the accident history r e {a, I}.
Consumer behaviour. Consumers are assumed to be rational and to have
rational expectations. We allow consumers to condition their choices on firms'
strategies and not only on the offers available.22 To be precise, let al :{H, L}x,..6~A
be a mapping from the consumer's type and firms' strategies into his first-period
choice; and let a2:{H, L}xAx{O, l}x,..6~A be a mapping from the consumer's type,
his first-period choice, his accident history, and firms' strategies into his second-
period choice. We impose on these two mappings that, for each (k, ø) e {H, L}x,..6,
al(k, ø) e BI(k, ø) and, for each (k, al, r, ø) e {H, L}xAx{O, l}x,..6, a2(k, al, r, ø) e
B2(k, al, r, ø), where:
B2(k, al, r, ø) æ argmaxa V(plv a),
and:
21An argument for why this is not restrictive is offered by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, note 10)
for the one-period model.
22This is done in order to concentrate on the strategic behaviour among firms. Moreover, each
consumer is one out of uncountably many and thus of measure zero with no possibility to affect firms'
profits or their beliefs.
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Bl (k, O) == argmax., V(plv (l) + 8[PkV2(k, (l, l, o) + (1 - Pk)V2(k, (l, O,øil,
such that: (l e A(Sl),
with: V2(k, (l, r, o) == V(plv (l') with (l' e B2(k, (l, r, O), for each (k, (l, r, o); i.e., V2 is
the expected utility from contracts in B2.
There are problems, though: The sets Bl and B2may not be singletons, mean-
ing that the consumer may be indifferent between contracts offered. This indiffer-
ence creates two kinds of problems.23
First, consumer indifference may lead to situations where, say, a consumer,
if he is a high-risk, mixes between two contracts whereas he, if he is a lowrisk,
buys one of those contracts with certainty.24 In such a case, the probability that a
consumer buying the latter contract is a low-risk, is somewhere in [A., l], depend-
ing on how the high-risks randomize over the two contracts. In this analysis, on
the other hand, we want to concentrate on one particular equilibrium in which
consumers are pooled in the first period, with high-risks and low-risks buying
the same contract without anyone of them randomizing. To clarify matters, we
make the assumption that al and a2 are single-valued selections from Bl and B2,
respectively, thus ensuring that situations other than complete pooling and com-
plete separation are avoided.
Second, we have to make sure that firms' best-reply correspondences exist.
This problem is a standard one, and it can to some extent be solved by assuming
that the consumer choice mappings select contracts that maximise profits.2S We
have, however, a particular problem here because of the model's sequential
structure in period 2. We want to make sure that an informed firm at stage 3,
23A third one would be related to the existence, in our model, of multiple informed agents. It
has been argued - e.g. by Demski and Sappington (1984), Ma, Moore, and Turnbull (1988), and Ma
(1988) within a single-principal multiple-agent framework - that tie-breaking rules maximising
uninformed's payoff subject to informed's indifference may be vulnerable to collusion among the
latter. We abstract safely from this problem here, since we have uncountably many informed
agents, collusion among whom seems unlikely.
24Invoking the continuum of consumers, we do not need to allow a consumer to randomize to
state this argument: We have here a situation where some high-risks buy one contract and the rest
of the high-risks together with all the low-risks buy another contract because high-risks are
indifferent between the two.
25A related tie-breaking rule, stipulating that the consumer go to the firm whose expected
profit will be the greatest, is suggested by Cave (1985).
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when matching offers from uninformed firms, does not attract a high-risk con-
sumer if doing so is unprofitable for it. It follows from Lemma 1 that, absent any
incentive constraints, the best contract for a firm to offer a consumer is the full-
insurance one. Thus, if matching the uninformed firms' offers with a full-
insurance contract earns negative expected profit, then any contract matching
them is unprofitable. This motivates highlighting the contract 13= (131,132),the
full-insurance contract earning zero expected profit when sold to a high-risk
consumer, defined by:
131+ 132= D,
131(1 - PH)= 132PH.
(2.3a)
(2.3b)
Equation (2.3a) says that the contract offers full insurance, while equation (2.3b)
says that it earns zero expected profit when sold to a high-risk. Solving this sys-
tem of equations gives: 13= (PHD, (1 - PH)D). The contract 13is depicted in Figure 1
above.
The above discussion motivates the following assumption on al and a2:
Assumption (B): (a) 'ri (k, ø) e (H, L}xt6, al(k, ø) is a single-valued selection
from Bl (k, ø), maximising 1t(a, b(k», with b(H) = Oand b(L) = 1.
(b) 'ri (k, al, r, ø) e (H, L}xA\x{O,l}xt6, a2(k, al, r, ø) is a single-valued selection
from B2(k, al, r, ø) maximising 1t(a, b(k», with b(H) = Oand b(L) = 1, subject to:
(i) If a consumer is low-risk and B2 contains a contract that is offered by
the informed firm, then he chooses the informed firm as his second-period
insurer.
(ii) If a consumer is high-risk and B2 contains a contract that is offered
by the informed firm, with an expected utility V2(H, al, r, ø) sV(PH, 13),then
he chooses the informed firm as his second-period insurer.
(iii) If a consumer is high-risk and B2 contains a contract that is offered
by an uninformed firm, with an expected utility V2(H, al, r, ø) > V(PH, 13),
then he chooses an uninformed firm as his second-period insurer.
Since these mappings are single-valued, we write, given the consumer type
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k and firms' strategies a, al = al(k, a); and, given consumer type k, first-period
contract choke al, accident history r, and firms' strategies a, a2 = a2(k, al, r, a).
Definition of equilibrium. Equilibrium strategies will be required to satisfy
sequential rationality: For given beliefs, no player wants at any point to change
his strategy. It is furthermore required that, for given strategies, beliefs are given
by subjective probabilities that are defined by Bayes' rule whenever it applies. A
collection of strategies and beliefs constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
if the above requirements on strategies and beliefs are fulfilled; see, e.g., Tirole
(1988, Sec. 11.5) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).To be precise, an assessment (0*,
J.l*) is a PBE for this game under the following conditions:
(i) Sequential rationality:
- Given stage-l offers Sl, stage-2 offers s2, beliefs J.l*and consumer chokes al
and a2, each firm maximises its expected profit on second-period offers to old
customers; thus, we obtain 03*.
- Given stage-t offers sl, other firms' equilibrium stage-2 strategies 0:;, equi-
librium stage-3 strategies 03*, beliefs J.l*,and consumer chokes al and a:u each
firm maximises its expected profit on second-period offers to new customers;
thus, we obtain 02*.
- Given other firms' equilibrium stage-l strategies s~;, equilibrium period-2
strategies (02*, 03*), beliefs J.l*,and consumer chokes al and a:u each firm maximis-
es its total discounted expected profit on first-period offers to consumers; thus, we
obtain Sl*.
(ii) Bayes-consistent beliefs. Beliefs are generated by Bayes' Rule whenever
feasible: Given strategies 0* and consumer chokes al and a2,
- a firm's subjective probability that a new customer is low-risk equals the
actual probability, according to al! of the consumer being low-risk given his first-
period choice among the first-period offers:
J.l~(sl", al) = O,if al = al (H, 0*) ::I: al (L, 0*);
J.l~(sl*,al) = l, if al = al (L, 0*) ::I: al (H, 0*);
J.l~(sl", al) = A, if al = al (H, 0*) = al (L, 0*);
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- a firm's subjective probability that an old customer is low-risk equals the
actual probability, according to al, of the consumer being low-risk given his first-
period choiceamong the first-period offers, adjusted by use of Bayes' Rule for the
firm's accident information:
* ** llu(1 - PL) * lluPL
J..lo = * ; III = *
1 - PH + IlU(PH - PL) PH - IlU(PH - pL>
Since consumer choices are single-valued, by Assumption (B), there are
only three cases to distinguish regarding equilibrium beliefs. These are two cases
of separation - (Ilu, Ilo, Ill) = (O, O,O)and (Ilu, Ilo, Ill) = (l, l, 1) - and a case of pool-
ing:
(2.4)
where we have used the equilibrium definition above. We turn now to the analy-
sis.
3. POOLING AND LOCK-IN
This section contains an exploration of whether, and when, consumers are
locked in with their previous insurers in period two. The main steps are the
following. First, we construct a pooling equilibrium of the game and provide non-
primitive conditions for its existence; to obtain this, we characterise the second-
period equilibria following separation and pooling, respectively, in period one.
We then proceed to verify that there are primitives for which the pooling equilib-
rium exists that we have constructed. This is done through a numerical example.
In this example, firms earn positive expected second-period profits. We thus
have established that consumer lock-in is possible.
The pooling equilibrium we construct and the non-primitive conditions for
its existence are provided in Proposition 1 below. Beforewe are ready to state this
result, however, we need a lot of notation.
A useful reference is the contract pair (13, y). These contracts constitute the
pure-strategy separating equilibrium of the Rothschild-Stiglitz one-period model
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with symmetric information among firms (when such a pure-strategy equilibri-
um exists). The contract ~ is defined in (2.3) above. The contract y is defined by:
U(W - PHD) = (1- PH)U(W - Yl) + PHU(W - D + Y2)
'Yl (1- PL)=Y2PL
(3.1a)
(3.1b)
Equation (3.1a) says that a high-risk consumer is indifferent between the two con-
tracts ~ and y, the lefthand side of (3.1a) equals V(PH, ~) with appropriate substitu-
tions from (2.3). Equation (3.1b) says that the contract yearns zero expected profit
when sold to a low-risk consumer. The contract Yis depicted in Figure 1 above.
Let the contract Tlbe the full-insurance zero-profit contract when sold to low-
risks:
Tll(1- PL)= Tl2PL
(3.2a)
(3.2b)
Tll+ Tl2= D
Equation (3.2a) says that the contract Tloffers full insurance. Equation (3.2b) says
that it yields zero expected profit when sold to a low-risk. Solving the above
system of equations, we get: Tl= (PLD, (1 - pL)D). The contract Tl is depicted in
Figure 1 above.
Let, for re {a, I}, the contract pair tr = (trH, trL) be one that solves:
max (1- J.!r)1t(aH,O) + J.!r1t(aL,l), subject to:
aH,al
(3.3a)
V(PH, aH) = V(PH, aL)
V(PL, aL) = V(PL, y),
(3.3b)
(3.3c)
(3.3d)
where y is defined by (3.1). I.e., the contract pair tr maximises the profit for the in-
formed firm when the consumer has the first-period accident record r, r e {a, I},
subject to the restrictions that the consumer, if he is high-risk, is offered full
insurance and is indifferent between the two contracts, and, if he is low-risk,
obtains the same expected utility as from the contract y. With the help of this
definition, we go on to define the contract pair ur = (urH, urL), re {a, I}, as follows:
1- A. PL2(1 - PL)If -- < K, then: ur = tr;
A. PH(PH-pL) (3.4a)
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(3.4c)
where:
K == V'(W - PHD) _ V'(W - PHD) ,
V'(W - Yl) V'(W - D + Y2)
with Ydefined in (3.1).
Next, we define the contract ~, which is the first-period pooling contract of
(3.5)
the equilibrium we construct below:
~ æ argmaXa e A V(PL, a), subject to: 1t(a, A) + å{(1- A)[PH1t(ulH,O)
+ (1- PH)1t(UOH,O)] + A[PL1t(ulL,1) + (1 - pL)1t(uOL,l)]} ~ o. (3.6)
Thus, ~ maximises the expected utility of a low-risk consumer subject to a non-
negative overall profit constraint.
In order to describe the belief structure of the equilibrium, we define the
subsets A.H and A. L of the contract space A.. For k, h e {H, L}, k '* h,
A.k æ {a e A. I a '*~'
(3.7a)
where ur and ~ are defined in (3.4), and (3.6), respectively, and where aH æ fl,
defined in (2.3), and aL æ Tl, defined in (3.2). For each consumer type, this set is
defined in terms of one restriction regarding the other type's preferences, (3.7a),
and one restriction regarding its own preferences, (3.7b). The meaning of A.H and
A.L is given after Proposition 1 below.
Finally, for each consumer type k e {H, L}, define the contract set ]Pk:
]Pkæ {a e A. I 1t(a, b(k» ~ O}, (3.8)
with b(H) = O and bel) = 1. Thus, ]Pk consists of all contracts yielding a non-
negative expected profit when sold to consumers of type k.
We are now ready to state:
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Proposition 1: Given the above definitions, consider the following collection
of strategies and beliefs:
Strategies:
Period 1: Sl = (~, ~)n.
Period 2: (i) If Ilu = O,then: (s2,stt) = (~, ~)n;
(ii) if Ilu = I, then: (s2,stt)= (Tl, Tl)n;
(iii) if Ilu = A., then: s2= (~, y)n -1and aft(al, r) = 'Of, r e {O,l}.
Beliefs:
(i) IlU(sl, al) = O,if al e AH;
(ii) IlU(sl,al) = l, if al e AL; and
(iii) Ilu (sl, al) = A., otherwise.
This collection of strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium if and only if,
for each k e {H,L}:
AknIPk = 0. (3.9)
Before we prove Proposition I, some amount of explanation is required. In
the equilibrium described in this Proposition, firms offer the contract ~ in period
one. In the (off-the-equilibrium-path) case of separation in period one, firms offer
in period two the contract ~ if a consumer is believed to be high-risk and the
contract Tl if he is believed to be low-risk. In the case of pooling in period one,
uninformed firms offer the contract pair (~, y) in period two. An informed firm
offers the contract pair Ul in period two if the consumer had an accident in period
one and the contract pair '00 if he did not have one.
The beliefs are, given these strategies, that a consumer is high-risk if he buys
a first-period contract only a high-risk would want to buy (i.e., a contract in AH),
and that he is low-risk if he buys a first-period contract only a low-risk would
want to buy (i.e., a contract in A d. If neither of these applies, the firms' prior
beliefs are not updated on the basis of a consumer's purchase of a first-period
contract. The contract sets A H and A L merit some further comments. Let us
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consider A L in detail; corresponding reasoning holds for AH ..
If a high-risk consumer chooses to mimic a low-risk one by choosing a e
AL in period one, then he is believed with certainty to be low-risk and is offered
aL = 11in period two.26 If he chooses ~ instead while low-risks choose a e A u
then he has disclosed his type and is offered aH = fl in period two. Condition
(3.7a) states that a high-risk consumer's benefit of the latter must outweigh that
of the former: Even if he is disclosed as a high-risk this way, the high-risk con-
sumer chooses ~ rather than some contract in A U otherwise, firms could not
rationally attach probability of a low-risk equal to 1 to contracts in AL.
A low-risk consumer must weigh the value of being separated against the
value of being pooled together with the high-risk consumers. The righthand side
of (3.7b) is the overall expected utility for a low-risk consumer of buying the
pooling contract ~ in period one; note that the second-period expected utility is
weighted by the consumer's true accident probability, since his accident history
determines the offer he receives in period two in a pooling equilibrium. The
lefthand side of (3.7b) is his overall expected utility from a choice of a first-period
contract in A L, given that this makes firms certain he is a low-risk so that they
offer him aL = 11in period two. When (3.7b) is satisfied, a low-risk consumer
prefers a contract in A L to ~; otherwise, no consumers would prefer contracts in
AL and they would be chosen by mistake only, implying that firms could not
rationally attach probability of a low-risk equal to 1 to such contracts.
The belief structure of the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is illustrated in
Figure 3. Let, again, k, h e {H, L},k :¢: h. I~ is the k-rype indifference curve through
the first-period pooling contract ~. The set Akis below It by condition (3.7a), and
above It by condition (3.7b).
Proposition 1 states that the collection of strategies and beliefs described
26Any contract in AL is, by construction, able to separate low-risks from high-risks. A single,
high-risk consumer deviating by choosing a contract in this set does not change firms' beliefs that a
consumer choosing such a contract is a low-risk with certainty. This is because there are uncountably
many high-risks, each one being of measure zero and, therefore, unable to affect beliefs. As is usual
in this kind of analysis, concerted deviations are not considered.
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therein constitute an equilibrium of the game if, given the first-period pooling
contract ~, no other contract exists that both serves as a separating contract for a
certain consumer type, relative to ~, and is profitable for a firm when sold to this
consumer type. For each type k, inclusion in IPk is a profitability constraint on a
separating deviation from this pooling equilibrium, while inclusion in A k is a
self-selection constraint on such a separating deviation. In case both these con-
straints cannot be satisfied for any type, a separating deviation is not feasible and
the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 1 exists.27
H
X
W
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Figure 3.
In order to prove Proposition l, we go through a series of Lemmas. We start
with analysing period two in the simplest cases: J.1u= O,and J.1u= 1. If a consum-
er's first-period purchase makes firms certain of his type, then there is effectively
27We concentrate here on single-contract deviations from a pooling contract. This seems to run
counter to firms being allowed to offer two contracts. However, for k, h E (H, L), k '# h, if A. knlPk is
empty, then the cheapest way to separate consumer of type h is clearly to offer a single contract:
the most profitable contract in A. h-
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no asymmetry of information among firms at the start of period two, since the
observation of the consumer's accident experience does not add, in any payoff-
relevant way, to a firm's knowledge. We have:
Lemma 2: Suppose uu e {O,I}. Let ~ and 11be defined by (2.3) and (3.2), respec-
tively. There exists an equilibrium of the second-period game in which each
firm' s action is:
(i) to offer the contract ~ if /Ju = O,
(ii) to offer the contract 11if uu = 1;
and its expected profit equals zero.
Proof: Although we here have a sequential move structure, this result of
existence follows from arguments similar to the discussion of insurance markets
under complete information in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976, Sec. 1.5).QED.
We now turn to the more complicated analysis of the pooling case, i.e.,
when /Ju = A.. Instead of analysing the informed firm's equilibrium behaviour at
stage 3 following any possible history, we delineate considerably the cases to
consider with the help of Lemma 3 below. Define first, for each consumer type,
the expected utility from a particular vector s2 of uninformed firms' offers in
stage 2:
Vk(s2)æ max, V(pk,a) such that a e A(s2),k e {H,L}. (3.10)
Lemma 3: In equilibrium following any vector sl e Sn of stage-l offers, if
such an equilibrium exists, uninformed firms' expected second-period profits
equal zero.
Proof: Suppose the expected second-period profit of an uninformed firm is
negative. Then, it would pay for the firm to change its offer to one that the con-
sumer would not choose, since this would give zero profit. Therefore, its expect-
ed second-period profit cannot be negative in equilibrium.
Suppose next that expected second-period profit of an uninformed firm is
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positive. This implies that the firm earns a positive expected profit on selling to
at least one consumer type.
Suppose first that it offers a contract a that earns a positive expected profit
when sold to a high-risk consumer: 1t(a, O)> O.Suppose also that a is not domi-
nated, in terms of the high-risk consumer's expected utility, by other uninformed
firms' offers at stage 2: V(PH, a) = VH, with VH defined in (3.10). (If this firm's
offer is dominated in this sense, consider instead another uninformed firm
whose offer is undominated.) Consider now the contract ~, defined in (2.3), pro-
viding full insurance such that 1t(~, O) = O. It follows from Lemma 1 that any
contract a' on the same high-risk indifference curve as ~ or higher earns a nega-
tive expected profit: V(PH, a') ~ V(PH, ~) implies 1t(a', O)s O.Equivalently, 1t(a, O)
> Oimplies V(PH, a) < V(PH, ~). Therefore, from Assumption (B)(b)(ii), the in-
formed firm attracts the high-risk consumer if it matches the uninformed firm's
offer. And since 1t(a, O)> O,it is profitable for the informed firm to do so. There-
fore, an uninformed firm cannot attract a high-risk consumer with a profitable
offer.
Suppose next that the uninformed firm offers a contract a that earns a posi-
tive expected profit when sold to a low-risk: 1t(a, 1) > O.Suppose also, again, that
a is undominated among uninformed firms' offers at stage 2: V(PL a) = YL, with
VL defined in (3.10). From Assumption (B)(b)(i), the informed firm attracts a low-
risk consumer if it matches the uninformed firm's offer. If V(PH, a) > V(PH, ~),
then the informed firm can match a without attracting high-risks even if V(PH,
a) = VH, by Assumption (B)(b)(iii). If V(PH, a) s V(PH, ~), then there exists a full-
insurance contract aH such that V(PH, aH) = V(PH, a) and 1t(aH, O)~ O,since 1t(~,
O)= O.Thus, if 1t(a, 1) > O,then it is profitable for the informed firm to match it.
Therefore, an uninformed firm cannot attract a low-risk with a profitable offer.
We have now excluded offers with negative expected profits and those with
positive expected profits. Thus, uninformed firms' profits in equilibrium, if an
equilibrium exists, must equal zero. QED.
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Next, we resolve the existence issue left open in the previous Lemma:
Lemma 4: For any vector Sl e Sn of stage-l offers, there exists an equilibrium
in which each uninformed firm offers the contract pair (~, y) at stage 2.
Proof: By (2.3b) and (3.lb), both ~ and yearn zero expected profit: 1t(~, O)= O,
and 1t(y,1) = O.By Lemma 3, an uninformed firm cannot earn a higher expected
profit with an alternative offer. Moreover, since V(PH, ~) = V(PH, y) by (3.la),
incentive constraints are satisfied. Thus, offering (~, y) at stage 2 is an equilibrium
strategy for an uninformed firm. QED.
We now turn to the details of stage 3, at which the informed firm makes its
second-period offer. We first state a preliminary result:
Lemma 5: Suppose uu = A. Let VL be defined by (3.10). If, at stage 3, the in-
formed firm's optimum offer is such that it attracts both a high-risk consumer
and a low-risk one, then this offer, denoted (aH, aL), has the following properties:
ar +ar =0,
V(PH, aH) = V(PH, aL),
V(PL, aL) = YL.
(3.lla)
(3.llb)
(3.llc)
Proof: In (3.llb), V(PH, aH) ~ V(PH, aL) is necessary for a high-risk consumer
to choose aH. V(PH, aH) > V(PH, aL) would imply that expected profit on the low-
risk consumer could be improved, by Lemma 1. Thus, V(PH, aH) = V(PH, aL).
From Lemma 1, the firm maximises its profit on a high-risk consumer by offer-
ing full insurance subject to (3.11b); thus, we obtain (3.lla). In (3.11c), V(PL, aL) ~
VL is necessary to attract the low-risks, while V(PL, aL) > VL again would imply
that expected profit could be improved; thus, V(PL, aL) = YL. QED.
We can now state more precisely what is the informed firm's equilibrium
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behaviour at stage 3 in the case when uninformed firms offer (~, y) at stage 2. A
useful way of viewing the informed firm's problem is as one of a constrained
monopolist. The uninformed firms' offers of (~, y) serve as outside options more
restrictive than the ones confronting a pure monopolist but otherwise paralle1.28
Lemma 6 below is in fact proved following Stiglitz' (1977) analysis of an insur-
ance monopoly. Define:
A.* = 1
- 1 + PL(1-pr)2 K'
(1 - PH)(PH- PL) (3.12a)
and:
A.** = 1
1 + PL2(1-pr) K
PH(PH-PL)
with K defined in (3.5).We see, since PH > PL, that A.* < A.**.
(3.12b)
Lemma 6: Suppose uu = A.. Let ~, y, ur, A.". and A.** be defined by (2.3), (3.1),
(3.4), (3.12a), and (3.12b), respectively. If uninformed firms offer (~, y) at stage 2,
i.e., S~ll = (~, y)n -1, then the informed firm's optimal offer at stage 3 is given by:
af
1
(aJ, r) = ur, re {O,I}. Furthermore, if A. > A.*, then the informed firm's expected
second-period profit is positive: If A.* < A. < A.**, the informed firm earns positive
expected profit on old customers without first-period accidents only; if A. > A.**,
the informed firm earns positive expected profit on all old customers.
Proof: The contracts ~ and y, offered by uninformed firms, earn zero expected
profit each, by (2.3b) and (3.1b): 1t(~, O)= Oand 1t(y, 1) = O.If the informed firm's
strictly optimum offer differs from (~, y), then this offer attracts both types; a
contract (l attracting high-risks only would earn negative expected profit, while a
contract earning positive profit when sold to low-risks, attracts high-risks also if
it attracts low-risks. Thus, by Lemma 5, the informed firm's optimum offer satis-
28The individual-rationality conditions confronting a monopolist are given by self-insurance,
which is strictly dominated by ~ and 'Y in terms of consumers' expected utility. Thus, our informed
firm faces stricter conditions than a monopolist does.
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fies (3.11). Denote the informed firm's offer ro = (roH, roL) = «ffitH,cor), (ror, mi»; its
average expected profit per contract is, for r e {O,Il:
xr = (1- Ilr)(ffitH(1- pH) - corPH] + Ilrfmt(1 - pL) - coIPL]·
By differentiating this expression subject to the three conditions in (3.11), and
evaluating the differentiation at ro = (~, y) for r = O and r = 1 separately, the condi-
tions defining uO and Ul in (3.4) are obtained. The differentiation and evaluation
are done in the Appendix. The offer (~, y) gives zero expected profit; if this offer is
no longer optimum, then the optimum contract pair gives positive expected
profit. Inspection of (3.4) shows that the condition for this is A. > A.*, with A.* de-
fined in (3.12a), and that the optimum contract pairs differ from (~, y) for both
accident histories if and only if A. > A.**, with A.** defined in (3.12b). QED.
It follows from Lemma 6 and (3.4) that, when A. is sufficiently high, the in-
formed firm's stage-3 offers differ from (~, y) for an old customer both if he had
an accident in period one and if he did not. What this might look like in (WI,
W2)-space is illustrated in Figure 4. For a medium range of A., the consumer is
offered (13, y) by the informed firm if he had an accident in period one and a differ-
ent offer if not; in this case, ulH and UlL in Figure 4 coincide with ~ and y, respec-
tively. Finally, for low values of A., an old customer is offered (~, y), irrespective of
his accident experience; the informed firm can do no better than matching the
uninformed firms' offer.
Note the relation between Lemma 6 and the analysis of the standard one-
period Rothschild-Stiglitz model: In the latter, a pure-strategy equilibrium exists,
with each firm offering (~, y), if and only if:
A. s 1 ,
1+pd1-PUK
PH-PL (3.13)
with K defined by (3.5). This is seen by carrying out the above analysis for the
case f.1O = III = Ilu = A..29
29See also Chapter 3 below: the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix 1.
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Figure 4. Second-period offers.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: Note first that, if all firms offer the contract ~ in peri-
od 1, then the specified second-period strategies are in equilibrium by Lemmas 2,
4, and 6. The task is, therefore, to verify that there exists a strategy prescribing the
stage-l action (~, ~) that is a best reply to itself under the given structure of beliefs.
This is done in two steps: In step I, we show that no other contract giving rise to
second-period beliefs such that Ilu = A. (a pooling deviation) is included in a best
reply to (~, ~). In step IT,we show that no contract giving rise to second-period
beliefs such that Ilu e {O,l} (a separating deviation) is included in a best reply to
(~, ~) if and only if the condition in Proposition 1 is satisfied. Since this is a sym-
metric equilibrium, we maintain throughout the hypothesis that all firms but
one offer the contract ~ in the first period and we consider what is the one firm's
best reply to this.
(I) We first check whether a strategy involving some pooling contract other
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than ~ is a best reply. Consider first a pooling contract a such that V(PL,a) < V(PL,
~). This will not attract the consumer and is therefore not better than offering ~.
Consider next some pooling contract a ::I: ~ such that V(PL, a) ~ V(PL, ~). This
contract, being a pooling one, will attract a low-risk consumer with probability A;
if it would attract one consumer type only, then ~ and a would be a separating
pair of contracts, a case that is treated below. From Lemma 6, we have that the
firm will earn a second-period expected profit on each of these consumers equal
to the term in curly brackets in (3.6), where the contract ~ is defined. Clearly, the
constraint in (3.6) is binding. And since V(PL,a) ~V(PL,~),a ::I: ~, U' > O,and U" <
O,it follows that total expected profit from offering a is negative, which is worse
than offering ~. This concludes the proof that ~ is the best reply to itself among
pooling contracts. It follows also from this that no other pooling contract has this
property.
(IT)Let k e {H, L}.A separating contract in the set Ak, defined in (3.7), is only
attractive for a consumer of type k. There will be complete information among
all firms about the type of a consumer buying a contract in this set, so that second-
period expected profit is zero; thus, total expected profit from a deviating separat-
ing contract is negative, and such a deviation will not payoff, if and only if the
separating contract is not in ]Pk,defined in (3.8).QED.
By Proposition 1, we can replace the question, Does a pooling equilibrium
exist? with the more specific one, Are there conditions simultaneously making
AL disjoint from ]PLand AH disjoint from ]PH?The answer is: Yes. But still, to
prove elegant results at this point turns out to be a difficult problem. Thus, we
resolve the existence question by the construction of a numerical example.
But first, we may increase our understanding of the model by analysing
further the separating sets A H and A L. In particular, since we are interested in
the profitability of contracts in these sets, we define, for each set, the most profita-
ble contract in the set when sold to consumers of its type. I.e., we define, for k e
{H, L},the contract Xk:
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xk æ argmax (1t(a, b(k» I a E Ak}, (3.14)
where b(H) = O and b(L) = 1.With this definition, we can restate the crucial condi-
tion (3.9) as:
1t(xk, b(k» < O,
for k E {H, L},with b(H) = O and b(L) = 1. We have:
Proposition 2: Let 'Y,UT,~, and X k be defined by (3.1), (3.4), (3.6), and (3.14),
respectively.
(i) The contract XH= (Xr, Xr) satisfies:
xr + Xr = D, and
U(W - Xr) =
V(PH, ~) + B[PHU(W - ulH) + (1 - PH)U(W - u~H) - U(W - PHD)]. (3.1Sb)
(3.1Sa)
(ii) The contract XL= (xr, xr) satisfies:
U(W - xl') = U(W - ~l) + B[U(W - 'Yl)- U(W - PLD)], and
U(W - D + xr)=
(3.16a)
I-PH 1
U(W - D + ~2) - B[~U(W - 'Yl)+ U(W - PLD) - pHU(W - PHD)] (3.16b)
Proof: Clearly, for each type, profit from selling to this type can be increased
if the own-type restriction (3.7b) is not binding; therefore, it holds with equality
for the profit-maximising contract.
(i) Since (3.7b) holds with equality, we get (3.1Sb) from inserting in (3.7b) k =
H, aH = 13, and 131 = PHD, and from use of the fact that all the contracts 13, UOH,and
UIH are full-insurance ones: It is easily seen from (2.1) that, if al + a2 = D, then
V(p, a) = U(W - al), 'V p E (O, 1). By Lemma 1, profit increases towards full insur-
ance; thus, we obtain (3.1Sa).)30
(ii) Again, (3.7b) holds with equality. But now, (3.7a) constrains the profit-
maximising contract; this follows from PH > PL, implying that low-risk indiffer-
ence curves are the steeper, and from Lemma 1, implying that iso-profit lines are
30In this case, condition (3.7a) restricts in a direction a firm would not want to go; therefore, it
is not binding here.
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steeper than indifference curves. Thus, XLis the contract satisfying both (3.7a) and
(3.7b) with equality, with k = L and h = H:
V(PH, XL)= V(PH, ~) + O[V(PH,13) - V(PH, 11)] (3.17)
(3.18)
In (3.18), we make use of the fact that, in the equilibrium of Proposition 1, V(PLl
uOL)= V(PL, ulL) =V(PL, "{);to see this, recall, in particular, condition (3.3d) above.
Now, we rewrite the two equations, using V(PH, 13) = U(W - PHD) and V(PH, 11)=
U(W - PLO). We also write the lefthand sides of (3.17) and (3.18) on their exten-
sive forms, using (2.1), and rearrange to get:
U(W - O + X~)=
p~{V(PH' ~) + o[U(W - PHD) - U(W - PLO)] - (1 - PH)U(W - xt)l (3.17')
U(W - O + X~) =
iL{V(PL'~) + O[V(PL,"{)- U(W - PLO)] - (1 - PL)U(W - xt)l (3.18')
Thus, the righthand side of (3.17) equals that of (3.18'). By using this, together
with the extensive forms of V(PH, ~), V(PL, ~), and V(pL, "{)from (2.1), and rear-
ranging, we get (3.16a). By substituting (3.16a) into (3.17') and rearranging, we get
(3.16b). QED.
The content of Proposition 2 can be illustrated by going back to Figure 3,
where we find XH depicted as the full-insurance contract on the 11::1 indifference
curve, while XL is where the Il! and It indifference curves cross. We can now
obtain, in Proposition 3 below, a quite specific condition on the emptiness of
A\HnlPH:
Proposition 3: Let ur, ~ and XHbe defined by (3.4), (3.6), and (3.14), respective-
ly. We have that 1t(XH,O)< Oor, equivalently, A\HnlPH = ø, if and only if:
V(pH,~) + O[PHU(W - ulH) + (1 - pH)U(W - u~H)] > (1 + O)U(W - pHO)(3.19)
Proof: By Proposition 2(i), XH is a full-insurance contract. By (2.3), 1t(f3, O)= O.
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Thus, 7t(XH, O) < O if and only if:U(W - Xr) = V(PH,XH) > V(PH, (3) = U(W - PHD).
Insertion from (3.1Sb)now gives (3.19).QED.
Essentially, condition (3.19) says that a high-risk consumer is better off in our
pooling equilibrium than with twice the fair and full-insurance (3 contract. It is,
thus, a direct extension of equivalent condition in the one-period model: V(PH,
~) > V(PH, (3) = U(W - PHD). However, from the lefthand-side of the condition,
we see clearly the importance of firms' second-period lock-in possibilities. If firms
could not exploit their old customers profitably, then we would have uOH= ulH =
(3, also when A. > A.*. This would reduce condition (3.19) to the one we have in the
one-period model. In Figure 3, this amounts to the two high-risk indifference
curves ltl and lr coinciding. Consumer lock-in, however, is to the benefit of high-
risks, at least in expectation, and strictly so when A. > A.*. Therefore, the self-
selection constraint with regard to high-risks is sharpened as we move from one
to two periods (I" is strictly above lr in Figure 3), thus making room for a pool-
ing equilibrium.
Contrary to the high-risk case, there seems to be no way to verify the empti-
ness of AL(llPL in general terms, without calculating 7t(XL, 1). Some insight may
nevertheless be gained from relating the two contracts ~ and XL to eachother:
Proposition 4: Let ~ and XL be defined by (3.6) and (3.14), respectively. We
have:
(i) xt < ~l; and
(ii) xr < ~2.
Proof: (i) Note, from (3.1b) and (3.2b), that both 'Y and Tl yield zero expected
profit when sold to low-risks. Since Tl is a full-insurance contract and 'Y is not, and
since PL > O,we have that:
'Yl < Tll = PLD. (3.20)
Now, since U' > O and ~ > O, the claim follows from (3.16a).
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(ii) We rewrite (3.16b) as:
U(W - D + X}) = U(W - D + ~2) - ~[U(W - PLD) - U(W - PHD)]
O(l-pW
- PH {U(W- 'Yl)- U(W - PLD)}
Here, the term in square brackets is positive, since PH > PL and U' > O. Since,
again, U' > O, the term in curly brackets is also positive, by (3.20). Now, since U' >
O, O > O, and O < PH < 1, the claim follows. QED.
According to Proposition 4, XL is southeast of ~ in (Wl, W2)-space, and strict-
ly so; this is also seen in the illustration in Figure 3. This contrasts with the one-
period model, in which the two contracts coincide: XL =~. Thus, when we move
from one to two periods, the cheapest contract that separates low-risks moves
down and to the right in (W1,W2)-space. Although not as clear-cut as the high-
risk case, this should make it feasible that 1t(XL, 1) be negative, thus making room
for pooling.
Closer to general principles than this seems hard to get. We, therefore, com-
plete this analysis with proving existence of a pooling equilibrium with lock-in
by way of a numerical example. We have the following main result:
Theorem: There is an open set of primitives of our model such that a sym-
metric equilibrium exists which is characterised by:
(i) in the first period, all firms offering one and the same contract and earn-
ing negative expected profits; and
(ii) in the second period, each firm earning a positive expected profit on its
old customers.
Proof: The proof is by way of a numerical example. Let:
W = ID, D = 9, PH = 0.7, PL = 0.05, A. = 0.97, and O = 1.
Moreover, let the utility function be:
U(y) = ry.
Thus, consumers exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion and constant relative
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risk aversion.31 In this case, we have the following Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts:
(3 = (6.3,2.7), and 'Y = (0.0499, 0.949).
If ~u = A. = 0.97, then:
Jl{J = 0.990 and ~l = 0.698.
Moreover, K = 0.914, so that A.* = 0.825 and A.** = 0.995. Thus, since A.* < A. < A.**, a
firm earns positive average expected profit in period two on an old customer
who did not have an accident in period one, if a pooling equilibrium exists. The
optimum offer to such an old customer is uo = (uOH, uOL), where:
UOH = (2.04, 6.96) and uOL = (0.481, 6.33).
The average expected profit thus earned on this old customer in period two
equals 0.0975. On the other hand, Ul = «(3, 'Y), yielding zero expected profit. The first-
period contract in a pooling equilibrium is:
~= (0.192,3.87).
We now find that:
Thus, recalling (3.19), there is no profitable contract separating high-risks from ~,
since:
(1 + o)U(W - PHD) = 3.85 < 4.68.
Moreover, we find that:
XL = (-0.214, -0.737),
and the profit earned on XL is negative:
1t(XL,1) = -0.166 < O.
Thus, both Å\HnIPH and A\.LnIPL are empty in this case, and the pooling equilibri-
um exists.
We now appeal to continuity considerations: The second-period equilibria
described above are all continuous in the primitives, since the V and 1t functions
are continuous. Therefore, ~ is continuous in the primitives. Thus, for primi-
31To see this, recall that the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is defined as:
PA(y) = -U"(y)/U'(y), while the measure of relative risk aversion is: PR(y) = -yU"(y)/U'(y); see,
e.g., Laffont (1989, Sec 2.1).With U(y) = Vy, we have: U'(y) = 1/(2Vy) > O,and U"(y) = -1/(4yVy)
< O.Thus, PA(y)= 1/(2y), and PA'(y) = -1/(2y2) < O.Furthermore, PR(y)= 1/2, so that PR'(y) = O.
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tives close to the ones used in this example, we will still have 1t(XH,O) and 1t(XL,
1) negative and the existence of a pooling equilibrium. QED.
Our numerical example in the proof above makes use of rather reasonable
parameter values. In particular, we have a low PL and a high A.. Thus, the exam-
ple covers what is perhaps the most prevalent situation - a market in which the
huge majority of consumers constitute very minor risks but which is "infected"
by a small fraction of truly bad risks.
With its high A., the numerical example also shows that a pure-strategy equi-
librium may exist in a multi-period insurance market in a case with so many low-
risks that only a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists in the one-period mode1.32
The equilibrium first-period pooling contract ~ may, in the present model,
be of a perverse kind. To quote one case, put D = 5, instead of 9, in the above
numerical example. Now, a pooling equlibrium exists with ~ = (-0.0143,
-0.0275).33 With both elements of ~ negative, this constitutes a case where, in fact,
consumers sell insurance to firms. But note that there is nothing in the defini-
tion of ~, in (3.6), that excludes such perverse contracts; this is true even if we
restrict ~ to being a zero-profit contract. In the one-period model, such a perverse
pooling contract would be vulnerable to a separation by high-risks. In our two-
period model, however, high-risks buy the perverse first-period contract because
of the benefit they gain from the second-period lock-in. Thus, the present analy-
sis highlights a new aspect of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model: A competitive pool-
ing contract may imply consumers selling insurance to firms.
One may want to object to such perverse equilibrium contracts, with con-
sumers selling insurance to firms, on grounds that they are not expected to be ob-
served in reality. This point is well taken and it can easily be taken into account
in our model by restricting the contract space A.. This, however, implies a restric-
tion also on feasible separating deviations, making pooling easier to sustain. AI-
32In the numerical example above, A. = 0.97, whereas, from (3.13), the critical value in the one-
period model with the same parameters is 0.937.
33Some key figures for this example: P = (3.5, 1.5); Y= (0.0123, 0.234); '\)0 = «1.78,3.22), (0.166,
2.58»; '\)1 = (P, y); XH = (3.21, 1.79), 1t(XH, 1) = -0.289; XL = (-0.233, -2.869), 1t(XL, O)= - 0.0669.
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though strange results may occur, the present specification of the contract space is
chosen to give separating deviations the best possible chance. And still, pooling
equilibria with lock-in are proven to exist.
Another reason for not restricting the contract space is that any such restric-
tion will be somewhat ad hoc: Where should one draw the line, and why? One
restriction that cannot so easily be disputed, though, is that a consumer never be
left with a negative wealth.34 And cases are certainly conceivable where this
restriction helps throwing separating deviations out of the contract space.3S
4. DISCUSSION
All of the previous Section was devoted to establishing the existence of one parti-
cularly interesting equilibrium of the game. The discussion in this Section cen-
tres particulary on the existence, in this model, of other equilibria.
4.1NON-POOLING EQUILIBRIA
A separating equilibrium. Let a separating equilibrium be one in which consum-
ers are separated on the basis of their first-period purchases. Define the contract <p
by:
(1 + o)U(W - PHD) = (1 - pH)U(W - <Pl) + PHU(W - D + <P2) + oU(W - PLD)
(4.1a)
(4.1b)
Equation (4.1a) says that a high-risk consumer is indifferent between receiving
the contract ø in both periods and receiving <P in period one and" in period two.
Equation (4.1b) says that <P yields zero expected profit when sold to a low-risk. We
have:
34Even this restriction would be disputable if we allow for borrowing and saving. But allowing
this would raise a whole series of new questions.
35Try the numerical example above, with D even closer to W = 10.
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Proposition 5: Let (3, Tl, and <p be defined by (2.3), (3.2), and (4.1), respectively.
Consider the following collection of strategies and beliefs:
Strategies:
Period 1: sl = «(3, <p)n;
Period 2: (i) ff Ilu = O, then (s2,s~) = «(3, (3)n;
(ii) if Ilu = 1, then (s2,s~) = (Tl, Tl)n.
Beliefs:
(i) JlU(sl,al) = 1, if:
al e (a. e A. I V(PH, a.) s (1 + o)V(W - PHD) - oV(W - PLD)};
(ii) IlU(sl, al) = O,otherwise.
This collection of strategies and beliefs constitutes an equilibrium if and only if:
A S 1
1 + PL(1- pL> [ V'(W - PHD) V'(W - PHD)
PH - PL V'(W - <Pl) V'(W - D + <P2) (4.2)
Proof: The condition (4.2) is derived the same way as the conditions in Lem-
ma 6 above (see the Appendix for the procedure). The second-period part of the
equilibrium strategies follows from Lemma 2. In this equilibrium, second-period
profits are zero, implying zero first-period profits. Thus, the offer to high-risks is
(3, unaffected by the existence of a second period. The first-period offer to low-
risks is subject to the incentive constraint formalised in the condition defining
the beliefs. And again due to competition, the first-period offer to low-risks must
also satisfy a zero-profit constraint. Thus, low-risks are offered <P in period one.
QED.
According to Proposition 5, there exists a separating equilibrium in pure
strategies if A is sufficiently low. At stage 1 of this equilibrium, firms offer the
contract pair «(3, <p). Following this, high-risks choose (3 and low-risks choose <P,
thus totally disclosing their respective types. Therefore, in period two, firms are
certain of consumers' types and offer (3 to high-risks and Tl to low-risks.
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Proposition 5 is a direct extension of the result of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976): Put O = O in the above, so that we have complete myopia, and we are back
to their theorem, since, with O = O, cp coincides with 'Y. From this Proposition, it
follows that a separating pure-strategy equilibrium exists for a smaller range of
values of A. in the two-period model than in the one-period model, and that
separation is even dearer for low-risk consumers when we move from one to
two periods.
What about the existence of a separating equilibrium for high values of A.?
On one hand, it would be natural to try an extension to this two-period model of
Dasgupta and Maskin's (1986) existence result for a separating mixed-strategy
equilibrium in the one-period case. On the other hand, it is hard to establish,
without having a complete characterization of the mixed-strategy equilibrium,
whether and when such an equilibrium is vulnerable to pooling deviations. We
leave this for future work.36
Hybrid equilibria. A hybrid equilibrium is one in which consumers are
partially separated by type in period 1, e.g. because some contract is bought only by
some of the high-risks and another contract is bought by the low-risks together
with the rest of the high-risks. These equilibria are ruled out of the present analy-
sis by Assumption (B). On the other hand, any such equilibrium would lead to a
potential for information on customers to have a value, since the informed
firm' s posterior belief still would be more precise than the uninformed firms'
ones.
4.2. BELIEFS
There are belief structures, other than the one specified in Proposition 1, that also
would be able to support the same strategies, thereby creating other Perfect Bayes-
ian equilibria with pooling. A general theme in the literature on signaling games
360ne remark is offered, though: A candidate separating equilibrium, like the one in Proposi-
tion 5, will apparently be one with no "pooling beliefs", i.e., an equilibrium where there is no al E
A. such that J.1u = A. However, since pooling deviations are conceivable, it is necessary with a discus-
sion of reasonable beliefs, a theme touched upon in Section 4.2 below.
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is that the set of equilibria can be reduced by imposing reasonable restrictions on
beliefs off the equilibrium path; see Kreps (1989) for a survey. Contrary to signal-
ling games, however, the strategic players of the present game are on the unin-
formed side of the market. When sending a message to the uninformed parties, a
consumer is bound to choose among the contracts offered. But something about
this game can be said which is akin to equilibrium refinements of signalling
games. First, define the following subset of the contract space A:
AHM æ {a e A I
V(PL, a) < V(PL, ~) and (4.3a)
V(PH, a) + oU(W - PHD) ~ V(PH, ~) + O[PHV(PH,ulH) + (1 - PH)V(PH, uOH)]),
(4.3b)
with ur and ~ defined in (3.4) and (3.6), respectively. Here, (4.3b) coincides with
(3.7b), while (4.3a) is stricter than (3.7a), with k = H in (3.7). Therefore, AHM C
AH. Moreover, AHM clearly makes a cut in the unprofitable end of AH, while it
coincides in the profitable end: argmax {1t(a, O) I a e AHM} = argmax {1t(a, O) I a
e AH} = XH.In terms of Figure 3 above, AHM is that part of AH which is below
L
I~. We have:
Proposition 6: Let the contract ~ be defined by (3.6), and let the subsets AL
and AHM of the contract space A be defined by (3.7) and (4.3), respectively. In any
pooling equilibrium where ~ is offered in the first period, A HM is the minimum
set giving rise to beliefs that a consumer is high-risk, and A L is the maximum set
giving rise to beliefs that a consumer is low-risk.
Formally, let (ø, J.1)be a collection of strategies and beliefs, with J.1= (J.1u,Ilo,
J.11).If (ø, J.1)is a (Perfect Bayesian) pooling equilibrium with Sl = (~,~)n, then:
(i) (al e A I J.1U(sl,al) = O}:::> AHM, and
(ii) (al e A I J.1U(sl,al) = I} C AL.
Proof: (i) Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists some ale A HM such that
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JlU(SI, al) e {A., 1}.37 Thus, a high-risk consumer could choose this contract in
period one (if it is offered in that period), instead of ~, without revealing his type;
and this he may want to do, since V(PH, al) ~ V(PH, ~) by (4.3b). Suppose first that
JlU(SI,al) = 1. This belief is not consistent with a high-risk choosing al; thus, JlU(sl,
al) "#1in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Suppose next that JlU(sl, al) = A.. If
this belief is consistent with consumer behaviour, then al is chosen by a low-risk
consumer, too, instead of ~. But V(pr., al) < V(Pl, ~) by (4.3a); thus, JlU(Sl,al)"# A. in
a PBE. This proves the claim.
(ii) Suppose al e A \Al. By (3.7), with k = L, there are two cases to consider:
(a) V(PH, al) + OV(pH, Tl) > V(pH, ~) + OV(PH, ~). In this case, it would pay a
high-risk consumer to choose al in the first period (if it is offered in that period),
instead of ~, if doing so makes firms believe with certainty that he is a low-risk
and thus offers him Tl in the second period. Thus, Jlu (Sl, al) "#1 in a PBE.
(b) V(pl, al) + OV(Pl, Tl) < V(Pl, ~) + OV(Pl, y) (where we have made use of
the condition (3.3d) on UOland Ull). In this case, it would not pay a low-risk con-
sumer to choose al in the first period (if it is offered in that period), instead of ~,
even if doing so makes firms believe with certainty that he is a low-risk. Thus,
JlU(sl, al)"# 1in a PBE. QED.
With the help of Proposition 6, we may eliminate most pooling equilibria,
other than the one of Proposition I, with arguments close in spirit to equilibrium
refinements of the signalling literature, particularly those based on "conscious sig-
nals"; see Kreps (1989, Sec. 6). Since they have the same profit-maximising con-
tract, we could have substituted A HM for A H throughout Section 3 without
changing results. We have chosen to concentrate on A H because of its symmetry
with Al.
37Here, we make use of Assumption (B) and its implication that JlU(sl, al) e (O,A., I}. The proof
would also go through in the general case where JlU(sl, al) e [O,1].
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4.3 SEQUENTIAL MOVES
Due to the sequential-move structure of period two of this game, there is a con-
tinuum of equilibria of a subgame following any first-period history. This is so
because, in period two, an uninformed firm is able to increase the informed
firm's second-period expected profit and decrease the second-period expected
utility of the latter's old customers, or vice versa, by varying its second-period
offer in a way that has no effect on its own expected profit.
Consider first cases where consumers' first-period purchases are separating,
so that all firms know these consumers' types by period two. There is a continu-
um of equilibria at this point, in all of which the "uninformed" firms are outbid
by the "informed" firm and are left with zero profits.38 These equilibria are charac-
terised by all "uninformed" firms offering contracts that are weakly dominated,
in terms of the consumer's expected utility, by the contract ~ in the case of high-
risks and by the contract Tl in the case of low-risks. Whenever the dominance is
strict for all "uninformed" firms' offers, the last-moving "informed" firm earns a
positive expected profit in period two. A rationale for nevertheless concentrating
on the ~ and Tlequilibria is the following:
Suppose there is a small chance that the "informed" firm will not make an
offer. However small the probability for this to happen is, the "uninformed"
firms now have incentives to care about their outcome in this unlikely, but still
possible, case. Competition leads the "uninformed" firms to offering ~, respec-
tively Tl.
Two remarks to this argument are warranted: First, this is similar to tremb-
ling-hand perfection (Selten, 1975); however, the existence of a trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium is not secured in a game with infinite action spaces like the
38The quotation marks are to emphasize that there is no real asymmetry of information among
firms here. But the move sequence prevails, making the distinction necessary.
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present one.39 Second, the above argument requires that there be competition
among "uninformed" firms, i.e., n - 1 ~ 2, or n ~ 3.
Consider next cases where first-period contracts are pooling so that there is a
difference in beliefs between uninformed firms and the informed firm. Again,
we are confronted with a plethora of equilibria due to the fact that an unin-
formed firm is left with zero profit whenever it pays for the informed firm to
outbid it.
Our choice of the contract pair (~, y) as the uninformed firms' equilibrium
offers is consistent with our choice in the case of symmetric information, argued
for above. The two contracts ~ and y also serve, as mentioned above, as bench
marks, constituting the pure-strategy equilibrium in the one-period case, and it
might be argued informally that they have virtues as a focal point in the sense of
Schelling (1960). However, the most important reason for not worrying too
much about the many equilibria of this subgame is that all of them have proper-
ties parallel to those outlined in Lemma 6 for the chosen equilibrium, with the
informed firm earning a positive expected second-period profit if A is sufficiently
high. One should, therefore, believe that also Proposition 1 has parallels. Note,
however, that the argument put forward above in favour of ~ and 11is not applic-
able to ~ and y here.4o
It should be noted that other authors record similar problems of multiplicity
of equilibria in models with sequential moves. See, in particular, the multi-
period model of the labour market by Waldman (1990); the language in his note 9
is very close to the above one. See also the consumer lock-in paper by Banerjee
and Summers (1987) and the "no money-losing offers" restriction discussed by
39Strictly speaking, trembling-hand perfection is not even defined for games with infinite
action spaces. However, the weaker requirement of admissibility is. But even though it is weaker,
it does not secure existence; see, e.g., Harrington (1989).
40For high values of A, uninformed firms will play a mixed-strategy equilibrium if the in-
formed firm stays out with probability one; when the latter probability is strictly between zero and
one, it is not clear what the equilibrium strategy of an uninformed firm is like, since the possibility
of the informed firm making its move influences the support of any mixed-strategy equilibrium.
There may also be other effects. Some effects of restrictions on the support of a mixed-strategy
equilibrium are analysed by Fershtman and Fishman (1991) in the context of a search market with
price dispersion.
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Hart and Tirole (1990, Appendix B) in a sequential Bertrand duopoly.41 An exact
discussion of how it affects the set of equilibrium outcomes to take the indiffer-
ence seriously in a model with sequential moves is provided by Dewatripont
(1987)in a spatial context.
Note also the following paradox: In Section 2, we argue strongly for detailed
tie-breaking rules to resolve consumer indifference, since otherwise we would
have problems with equilibrium existence. Here, we observe that our way of
resolving indifference among consumers causes problems for equilibrium
uniqueness. It thus seems difficult to obtain existence and uniqueness at the
same time.
5. CONCLUSION
With its prediction that today's insurance purchase by a consumer determines a
long-term relation with one insurer, the present model establishes a source of
consumer lock-in, characteristic of markets with asymmetric information, which
is different from other sources of consumer lock-in, such as transaction costs,
learning costs, search costs, or artificially imposed costs.42This chapter introduces
the concept of injormational consumer lock-inAs
Would the results of this chapter be applicable to other markets than insur-
ance? An essential assumption here is that a consumer's accident history is not
verifiable to other parties than his previous insurer. In the insurance context,
this makes sense (in the absence of perfectly functioning public records), since
there is nothing to show before you in case you have gone through without any
accident - the good outcome is a "nothing". In the credit market, on the other
hand, the good outcome is a "something"; if an entrepreneur has had success
410ne may even wish to consult Appendix B to Chapter 4 below.
42The recent literature on consumer lock-in in oligopolies counts a large number of contributions.
The one which is closest in spirit to the present model is Klemperer (1987). See Farrell (1987) for a
review of the issues involved. Chapter 4 below is a contribution to this literature.
43A similar effect has already been noted by Kunreuther and Pauly (1985), but under assump-
tions that seem much too restrictive. The models of Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989) and
Sharpe (1990), producing the same effect, are without any consumer-firm asymmetry of information.
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with his latest project, this success is verifiable (auditable sales figures, etc.). Thus,
it does not seem appropriate to predict informational lock-in in a credit market.44
In labour markets, the verifiability of an employee's work will depend on the
type of work. While the good outcome of an executive's efforts is substantiallya
"something" (just like an entrepreneur's success), it is more like a "nothing" in
the case of a factory worker.
Something can be said about the need for further work. First of all, it is neces-
sary to develop a multi-period insurance market without any informational
asymmetry among firms, i.e., where accidents are observed by all insurers. This
way, one would be able to analyse the occurrence of pooling in a context where
consumer lock-in is not an issue. Preferably, such a model should have simul-
taneous moves in period two.
Second, note that, in the particular equilibrium we have discussed here,
firms keep all their old customers. It can be argued that it is more sensible with a
situation where firms keep old customers with a good accident history, earning
postive expected profits on them, while terminating their relations to old custom-
ers with a bad accident history. It is conjectured, based on work in progress, that
outcomes like this are obtained with alternative move structures, i.e., in cases
where the informed firm is not the last to move.
Third, it would be of interest to see how things change as we increase the
number of periods. It is conjectured that such an increase will strengthen the
presence of a pooling equilibrium and of consumer lock-in. It is, however, not
clear how strong the effect will be.
Finally, it may be argued that consumers incur regular switching costs also
in the insurance market. How will this affect the result of this chapter? Clearly,
the consumer lock-in gets aggravated in a direct way. An unsettled question,
however, is how the chances of getting a pooling equilibrium are affected by the
44The view expressed here seems to contrast with views expressed elsewhere to the effect
that a bank does have better information on its own customers than its rivals have; see, e.g., Fama
(1985).However, in the credit market, there exists information that one more naturally think of as
private to the bank than one does with the borrower's success, such as information on the customer's
deposit account and on his efforts in making his project a success. Thus, there may be informational
asymmetries among banks, but it is of a kind which is perhaps best modelled by differences in
monitoring costs. One attempt at analysing lock-in in a credit market based on private information
on customers' deposit accounts is in Vale (1991).Vale argues that such lock-in possibilities may
serve as a basis for economies of scope in banking: A bank's deposit activities lower the costs of its
credit activities.
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introduction of such costs.
In view of these remarks, the work reported in this chapter should be consid-
ered a first step in the analysis of multi-period competition in insurance markets.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we complete the proof of Lemma 6. The contract pair (~, y) is a
pure-strategy best response for the informed firm to the uninformed firms' offers
of (~, y) if and only if it is unable to increase its profits by choosing otherwise. li
the offer ro = (roH, roL)= «~H, cor), (cor, ror» is a best response, it fulfils three re-
quirements, by Lemma 5. First, from (3.11a):
~H=D-cor, (A.l)
implying:
V(PH, roH)= U(W - ~H).
Second, from (3.11b), using (A.2) and (2.1):
U(W - CO:tH)= PHU(W - D + mi) + (1- PH)U(W - cor),
Third, from (3.llc), with VL = V(PL, y) from (3.10):
PLU(W - D + ror) + (1- pL)U(W - cor) = PLU(W - D + Y2) + (1- pL)U(W - Yl)
(AA)
(A.2)
(A.3)
Average expected profit per contract is given by:
1V = (l-llr)[~H(l - PH) - corPH] + Ilrkot(1- PL) - rorPLL (A.5)
where r e {O, l}. We want to find the effect on the profit (A.5) of changing the
contract offers subject to constraints (A.1)-(AA). The procedure is the same as one
used by Stiglitz (1977). Note first that, by total differentiation in (AA):
dot = pLU'(W - D + ro!')
dror (1 - pL)U'(W - ro}) (A.6)
Note also that, from (A.l):
d~H
-=-l.dC# (A.7)
12B
Next, by total differentiation in (A.3), using (A.6) to substitute for (dror /door) and
(A.7) to substitute for (dCOtH/dror):
door = (1 - PL)U'(W - ror)
dcor (PH - pdU'(W - D + ro}) (A.B)
Total differentiation of the profit function (A.S) gives, using first (A.7) and then
(A.6) and (A.B):
r dror door
~ = - (1 - Ilr) + Ilr[(1 - pd-L - PL~dIDi dOli dIDi
_ (1 ) IlrpL(1- PL)[U'(W - ror) U'(W - ror)- - - Ilr + - l.
PH - PL U'(W - ro}) U'(W - D + ro}> (A.9)
In order to derive conclusions from local properties of the profit function, we
must check that it is globally well-behaved, in particular that d2w /(dcor)2 < ° for
all relevant values of cor. We have that:
d2xr = IlrPL(1- pL){U"(W _ ror)[ 1 _ 1 l
(dcor)2 PH - PL U'(W - ro}) U'(W - D + ro}>
PL(U'(W - ror»2U"(W - ro}) (1- pL)(U'(W - ror»2U"(W - D + ror)
+ + }.
(PH - pd(U'(W - ro}»3 (PH - PL)(U'(W - D + ror»3
Since U' > ° and U" < 0, d2w/(dror)2 < ° if the term in square brackets is non-nega-
tive. And, since U" < 0, this holds if and only if ror + oor S D, which is one of the
inequalities that define the contract space A. Thus, the profit function is well-
behaved with regard to the contract parameters. Therefore, we can state that (~, y)
is a best response if and only if marginal profit (A.9) is non-positive at (roH= ~,roL
= y). The conditions in (3.4) are obtained by substituting (~, y) for (roH,roL)in (A.9);
using that V(PH, 13) = U(W - pHD) by (2.3); and substituting for Ilr from (2.4), first
IlO and then Ill.
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CHAP1'ER 1'HREE:
RENEGOTIATION IN AN INSURANCE MARKED
(Co-author: Geir B. Asheim)
Abstract: Renegotiation is the act of replacing an existing contract with
new ones that are beneficial for the contracting parties in light of new
information. In the present work, we extend the theory of markets with
asymmetric information to the case where a firm is allowed to renegoti-
ate with consumers the terms of a contract once it is signed. In a simpli-
fied version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of an insurance market,
we characterize equilibrium when renegotiation is allowed and com-
pare it with equilibrium in the case without renegotiation. We find
that, with renegotiation, the equilibrium is never fully separating, and
it is pooling when the fraction of low-risk consumers is high. Also, for a
high fraction of low-risk consumers, both types of consumers are strictly
better off compared to the case without renegotiation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Renegotiation is the act of replacing an existing contract with new ones that are
beneficial for the contracting parties in light of new information. The present
analysis is about such renegotiation and it has a double motivation.
On one hand, some authors suggest that the optimum renegotiation-proof
contract signed between a principal and an agent tends to revealless information
about the agent than the optimum contract when renegotiation is not feasible;
see, e.g., Dewatripont (1989), Hart and Tirole (1988),Laffont and Tirole (1990), and
the survey by Dewatripont and Maskin (1990a). Here, we extend this kind of
analysis to a simple situation in which several competing principals are present,
so that a renegotiation-proof contract must also be an equilibrium contract on a
lThe first version of this chapter was completed in November 1990. I am, of course, indebted to
Geir Asheim for his generous collaboration on this chapter. Thanks to Georg Noldeke for discus-
sions; and to participants at seminars in Oslo, Bergen, Helsinki, and Tilburg for comments.
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competitive market with asymmetric information.2 In particular, we find that a
result valid in the case when the principal is a monopolist, viz. that allowing for
renegotiation cannot lead to a Pareto improvement, does not generally hold in
the case with competing principals.
On the other hand, several authors have analysed competition in markets
with asymmetric information, Le. where consumers are better informed than
firms on some payoff-relevant parameter. A typical example is the Rothschild-
Stiglitz study of the insurance market. In that model, firms offer insurance and
the asymmetry of information concerns consumers' accident probabilities. Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976) show that, in equilibrium, high-risk consumers are
offered fair (Le. zero-profit), full-insurance contracts while low-risk consumers
are offered fair contracts with partial insurance, the latter being due to a binding
truth-telling constraint on the high-risks. When allowing for mixed strategies,
the basic feature of the equilibrium of separating consumers by type holds in all
circumstances, as shown by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). In this chapter, we pose
the following question: How is this analysis affected by allowing a consumer and
a firm to renegotiate after a contract is signed? The firm can infer information on
the consumer based on the signing of the contract. For example, if consumers are
completely separated on the basis of the signing of contracts, any partial-
insurance contract between a firm and a low-risk consumer can be profitably
renegotiated to a full-insurance one. However, this implies in turn that any high-
risk consumer who anticipates such renegotiation prefers to disguise by purchas-
ing the partial-insurance contract.s We find, as one would expect, that allowing
for renegotiation reduces the possibilities for separation.
Accepting the idea of renegotiation, there is still the question of how the
notion should be incorporated into a formal model. We will argue that renegotia-
tion should be allowed to go on indefinitely; otherwise, there would be a last
2The idea of competition with renegotiation is also present elsewhere in the literature. The
analysis of Caillaud, Jullien, and Picard (1990) differs from ours in that they study competing
agencies, i.e., principals that compete through the actions of their respective agents. The analyses
of Mori (1989), Dewatripont and Maskin (1990b), and Dionne and Doherty (1991) differ from ours in
that they study two-period models where renegotiation is not allowed to occur immediately after
the signing of contract but only after one period has elapsed.
30ne readable discussion of this, cast within an insurance monopoly, is found in the recent
textbook by Kreps (1990), on pp. 677-679.
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stage of renegotiation at which no further renegotiation could take place, the
existence of which would greatly influence the play of the whole game. We mod-
el this indefinite renegotiation atemporally. Thus contrasting with the recent
literature on non-cooperative, sequential bargaining, our approach relates closer
with cooperative game theory. Invoking Occam's Razor, our view is that renegoti-
ation should be introduced into the insurance market model in the simplest
possible manner. In particular, duplicating our results as an equilibrium of an
extensive-form game will be left for future research. The main tool of our analy-
sis of renegotiation is the theory of social situations developed by Greenberg
(1990). The application of this theory to a problem of asymmetric information
seems to be a novelty.
Like Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and most of the papers that followed, we
maintain the assumption that a consumer is unable to sign an insurance contract
with more than one firm. To us, this is a reasonable assumption.s And it makes
it possible to dichotomize competition and renegotiation. In our analysis, we first
characterise contracts that are renegotiation-proof, independent of the market
structure. Thereafter, we study competition with firms restricted to offering such
renegotiation-proof contracts.f
This chapter has a predecessor in Hillas (1987), who presents major steps
towards the present analysis. However, his analysis of renegotiation in a competi-
tive insurance market shows that the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, as it stands, is
intractable for this kind of study. The problem is that no renegotiation-proof
contracts exist; see Hillas (1987, Sec. 5.5). Here we resolve the problem by simplify-
ing the original model in one respect that Hillas did not try, viz. with regard to
consumer preferences. In the present chapter, consumers' indifference curves are
piecewise linear. On one hand, this linearization of the model ensures the exist-
4 Such behaviour can at any rate be imposed by including clauses in the contracts to the effect
that an insurer has no obligations to cover a damage unless it is the single coverer. The firm may
enforce such a clause simply by requiring verification in the form of a receipt in original in tum for
paying out liabilities.
5Note the distinction between renegotiation and recontracting. The latter term covers in-
stances where a consumer, after signing a contract with one firm, is allowed to sign additional
contracts with other firms. Clearly, if later insurers are informed about the contracts that are
already signed, problems arise about truthful revelation similar to those, outlined above, arising
under renegotiation. A recent and important analysis of recontracting in this sense is by Beaudry and
Poitevin (1990). There are earlier, related analyses by Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988).
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ence of renegotiation-proof contracts. On the other hand, preferences are no
longer founded on expected utility theory. At present, we feel that the benefit of
the former outweighs the costs of the latter.
Our specification of consumer preferences resembles the one suggested in an
unpublished paper by Rosenthal and Weiss (1982).6 As they show, this kind of
specification also makes it possible to obtain a complete characterisation of a
mixed-strategy equilibrium for parameter values for which no pure-strategy
equilibrium exists.
In Section 2, we introduce some notation and terminology. In Section 3, we
solve for a mixed-strategy equilibrium in the case without renegotiation, which
serves as a bench-mark case for the subsequent analysis. Next, we allow for rene-
gotiation by imposing the restriction that firms can only offer renegotiation-proof
contracts. Therefore, in Section 4, we define the concept of renegotiation and
characterise the set of renegotiation-proof contracts. Then, in Section 5, we charac-
terise the market equilibrium when contracts are restricted to be renegotiation-
proof. Section 6 sums up the conclusions of the analysis by making a comparison
with the bench-mark case.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed on the unit line [O, 1]
with density 1. Each individual faces two possible states in the future: In state 1,
no accident is experienced and his terminal wealth is WI. In state 2, an accident is
experienced and his terminal wealth is W2. Without insurance, (WI, W2) = (W,
W - D), where W is positive and finite and D e (O,W] is the cost of a damage. A
typical insurance contract is c = (cl, C2),where Cl denotes the premium and C2
denotes the benefit, net of premium, in the case of an accident. With the insur-
ance contract c, the individual's state-contingent wealth becomes (WI, W2) = (W
- ct, W - D + C2).
Throughout this chapter, we will focus on the polar case where D = W, so
6The unpublished work of Rosenthal and Weiss (1982) consists of two parts, one on the insur-
ance market and one on the labour market. A version of the latter was published as Rosenthal and
Weiss (1984).
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that, without insurance, we write (WI, W2) = (D, O),and with insurance, we write
(WI, W2) = (D - Cl, cV.
The individuals are identical except for the probability of an accident. There
are two types of individuals: The low-risk (L) type has probability pL, the high-
risk (H) type probability pH, O < pL < pH < 1. No individual can by any action affect
his accident probability. The fraction of the L type in the population is A e (O, 1).
The ratio of low-risks to high-risks is defined as:
r æ__j,_
l-A
An individual of type K, K e {H, L}, has preferences over WI and W2repre-
sentable by a homothetic utility function UK(W}, W2) with piecewise linear
indifference curves. In a representation homogeneous of degree 1,7 indifference
curves are linear with slope -(1 - pK)/(a + pK) for WI ~ W2 ~ bWl, and linear
with slope -(a + 1 - pK)/pK for bW2 S WI S W2. Here, a > O is a risk aversion
parameter: The higher a is, the more risk averse are individuals. For later pur-
poses, we define a criticallevel of risk aversion, a*:
PH_pLa* = =----=--,
-l-pH'
For WI < bW2, indifference curves are parallel with the W2-axis. For W2 < bWl,
indifference curves are parallel with the WI-axis. A pair of indifference curves,
one for each consumer type, is depicted in Figure 1. The parameter b is assumed
to be strictly positive but not so high that its value directly influences the equilib-
ria of the model; in particular, we assume:
O< b S a(1 - pH)(l - pL) .
(a + pH)(l - pL) - pL(l - pH)(a + 1)
A feasible contract is one where Cl, C2~ Oand Cl + C2S D. We introduce two
different partitions of the set of feasible contracts. First, a feasible contract is a full-
insurance one if Cl + C2= D (i.e., WI = D - Cl = C2= W2); otherwise, it is a partial-
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insurance contract. Second, a feasible contract is adequate if Cl + c2/b ~ D (i.e., bW I
= b(D - Cl) ~ C2= W2); otherwise, it is inadequate.
Figure 1
Readers may feel that our restriction to the case D = W is strong and that the
introduction of the parameter b is somewhat arbitrary; a comment may therefore
be warranted. These assumptions together ensure the convenient feature that
consumers always (weakly) prefer any feasible contract to being self-insured. The
former assumption can, however, be relaxed somewhat without changing the
subsequent analysis.
For K e {H, L}, define uK(c) as the expected utility for consumers of type K
from buying the contract c:
uK(c) æ UK(D - c}, cv.
Thus, consumers have piecewise linear indifference curves in contract space, or
(el, c2)-space, with slopes as follows: When c is adequate, they have slopes (1 -
pK)/ (a + pK); when c is inadequate, they are parallel with the cl-axis.
Note that, since pH > pL, indifference curves have the so-called single-
crossing property; in particular, on the set of adequate contracts, we have:
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l-pH l-pL
--=--- < .
a + pH a +pL
On the supply side of the market, there are two firmsf Each ofithem is a risk-
neutral profit-maximiser with financial resources sufficient to supply any num-
ber of insurance contracts. The expected profit from selling contract c to con-
sumers of type Kis:
1tK(c)= (1- pK)cl - pKC2.
Thus, firms' isoprofit curves in (cl, c2)-space, when selling to type-K consumers,
K e {H,L},have a slope such that the feasible contract preferred by type-K consum-
ers at a fixed expected profit provides full insurance:
l-pK l-pK---"-- > .
pK a + pK
In Figure 1, EH and EL are iso-profit - in fact, zero-profit - curves, drawn in (Wt,
W2)-space, for contracts sold to high-risks and low-risks, respectively.
In order to analyse renegotiation in this model, we need some more nota-
tion and terminology. The terminology employed here concurs with Greenberg
(1990). Let, for K e {H, L}, ilK measure consumers of type K, with O S IlH S 1 - A.
and O S ilL S A.. A type profile Il is a pair Il æ (IlH, ilL). We define a population F as a
combination of a type profile and a fall-back contract: F æ (Il, c). The terminology
reflects the fact that F contains all relevant information on a set of consumers.
The fall-back contract c of the population F is the contract these consumers al-
ready are signed up with; throughout, we assume that c is a feasible contract. A
position G for a firm is a pair G æ (F, 1t) of a population F and profits 1t earned on
customers outside F. Let r be the set of positions.
A feasible outcome for a firm in position G = (F, x) = (Il, c, x) is a pair of
(sub)populations (Fh, Fl) æ «Ilh, Ch),(~, ~» such that:
(i) (Exhaustiveness) Fh and Fl exhaust F; i.e., their type profiles sum to the
type profile of F:
8Extending the analysis to the general case of n firms would imply (i) a minor change in the
equilibrium strategies of Proposition 2 below for the case without renegotiation, and (ii) a more
cumbersome notation than the one in Appendix 2 below in order to achieve the desired game formula-
tion for the case with renegotiation. Since no new insights would be gained this way, we limit our
analysis to the two-firm case.
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Ilh + ~ æ (Ill!, Ilk) + (Ilr, Il}) = (IlH, ilL) æ u.
(ii) (No Dominance) Chdoes not dominate Cl or vice versa; i.e., Chand ~ may
be ordered such that:
UH(Ch);;::uH(~), and
uL(~) ;;::uL(Ch).
(iii) (Incentive Compatibility) High-risk consumers choose Cl, and low-risk
consumers Ch,only if indifferent between Chand Cl, Le.:
Ill! = IlH, if UH(Ch)> UH(Cl),and
Il} = ilL, if UL(Cl)> UL(Ch)·
(iv) (Individual Rationality) The contracts of Fh and Fl are at least as good for
consumers as the fall-back contract of G:
UH(Ch);;::uH(c), and
uL(~);;:: uL(c).
A feasible outcome (Fh, Fl) = «Ilh, Ch),(~, Cl» is degenerate if: Ilh = O, or III = O,
or Ch= cz. A degenerate outcome is simply written Fd æ (Ild,Cd),where Ild = Ilh +
~,and where Cd= Chif Ilh> O, and Cd = ~ if ~ > O.
The set of all feasible outcomes in a position G is denoted X(G). The profit a
firm earns from a feasible outcome (Fh, Fl) in position G = (F, 1t) is defined as:
II(G)(Fht Fl) æ L L Ilf1tK(Ck) + 1t
k=h,l K=H,L
This concludes the preliminaries. We now turn to the case without renegotia-
tion.
3. AN INSURANCE MARKET WITHOUT RENEGOTIATION
Throughout, market competition is modelled by firms offering consumers a pair
of utility levels, as opposed to a pair of contracts, which is standard in previous
literature. We do this because it simplifies the analysis of renegotiation. Below,
we show that this has no effect on the analysis of the case without renegotiation.
Let (uH, uL) be a pair of utility levels. Provided that a firm's offer to the one type
does not dominate the firm's offer to the other type, it follows from the single-
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crossing property of indifference curves that there is a unique' adequate contract
at which high-risks have utility uH and low-risks have utility uL. This implies
that we unambiguously can represent an offer of (gH, gL) by the adequate contract
c such that uH(c) = uH and uL(c) = gL.
Let the two offers from firms 1 and 2 be c and c'. In the case without renegoti-
ation, we impose the following tie-breaking rule: If some consumers are indiffer-
ent between c and c', then they split evenly among the two firms. Now, let GO æ
(Il, O, O) be the initial position of a firm; c = O = (O, O) - self-insurance - is the initi-
al fall-back "contract", and 1t = O, since the firm has no customers outside the
population (Il, O). The tie-breaking rule above implies that there are nine possible
initial positions, because the initial type profile has JlH e {O, (1 - A)/2, (1- A)} and
ilL e {O, A/2, A}, depending on whether the firm's offer dominates, matches, or is
dominated by the other firm's offer, in terms of the expected utility for each con-
sumer type.
Lemma 1: Given an adequate offer c (i.e., Cl ~ O, Cl + C2 :$; D, cl + C2/b ~ D), a
firm maximises its profit over X(GO),GO= (Jl, O, O), subject to the constraint that
(UH(Ch),uL(~» = (uH(c), uL(c», by choosing the outcome (Fh, Ft) = «Ilht Ch),(Ilt, ~»,
with: Ilh = (IlH,O); Ilt = (O, ilL); ~ = c; ChI+ Ch2= D; and UH(Ch)= uH(c).
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Lemma 1 says that, with an offer c, the firm maximises its profit by giving
the contract c to all the low-risks and the full-insurance contract on the same
high-risk indifference curve as c, to all the high-risks. This result makes clear that
our framework corresponds exactly to the more standard framework of Rosen-
thal and Weiss (1982) and others. It also highlights the fact that, without renegoti-
ation, there will always be separation unless all consumers are offered full insur-
ance.
By means of the tie-breaking rule and Lemma 1 above, a mapping from a
pair of offers from the firms to a feasible outcome in an initial position for each
firm has been constructed. By the definition of TI in Section 2, we have, for each
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A, determined firms' profits as a function of their offers in the case where renego-
tiation is not allowed, and thus, for each A, constructed a simultaneous-move
game with each firm's strategy set being the set of adequate offers. Proposition 1
and 2 characterise, for each A, a Nash equilibrium of this game. First, define:
r" E pH - pL = a*(1- pH)
a(l - pL) a(1- pL)
The merit of this definition becomes clear immediately. We have:
Proposition 1: There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strate-
gies where each firm's offer, c = cO, is given by:
(Q, Q)E( pL(1_pH) D,l-pHD),
Cj S (1 - pL)(1 + r") 1 + r*
if and only if r S r",
Proof: See Appendix 1.
This Proposition parallels the result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976): When
the fraction A of low-risks is low, there exists a separating equilibrium in pure
strategies. But when Agets high enough, it is profitable to deviate from the strate-
gy of Proposition 1. This happens when there are so many low-risks relative to
high-risks that it pays to subsidize the latter in order to earn a profit on the for-
mer. The offer cQ of Proposition 1 is depicted in Figure 1.
When no pure-strategy equilibrium exists, i.e., when r > r", there exists a
symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies, as shown by Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986). The characterisation of this equilibrium is provided in Proposition 2. Let
the contract cP be given by:
(cf, cn æ ([(1- A)pH+ ApL]D, [(1- A)(1- pH) + A(1- pL)]D);
i.e., cP is the full-insurance contract earning zero profit when sold to all consum-
ers of both types. In Figure l, cP is depicted for a case where r > r". Given the lin-
earity of this model, the locus of offers earning zero profit is the set of convex
combinations of cP and cQ, i.e., the straight dotted line between cP and cQ in Fig-
ure 1. Let PQ denote this locus:
PQæ {c I c=acP +(l-a)cQ,OSaSl).
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This set is the support of each firm's equilibrium mixed strategy. We describe this
strategy by the cumulative distribution function <I>(C2)of the liability part C2of the
contract as it traces out values between J{ and ~.
Proposition 2: If r > r*, then there exists a symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies where each firm makes its offer on the support PQ according to the
cumulative distribution function <I>(C2)given by:
<I>(C2)= o, for C2< Ji;
(
Q )L-l~=~
1,
for J{ S C2< ~;
for C2~~.
We are not in a position to claim that this is the unique symmetric equilibri-
um, nor are we able to come up with another one. With the caveat that unique-
ness is still an open question for r > r*, we will use the above equilibrium, de-
scribed in Propositions 1 and 2 for various parameter values, for comparative
studies in Section 6. Note that Proposition 2 holds for the general case of n firms
if <1>(.) is replaced by <l>n-l(.).
The proof of Proposition 2 goes as follows: Any offer in the support of the
equilibrium strategy earns zero profit. We thus have to show that a firm, when
playing against <1>(.), will earn a non-positive profit by choosing any offer outside
this support. To this end, let X2be a reparameterization of C2as follows:
C2-CQ
X2= 2 ,
~-c~
and let
<I>*(X2)== <I>(C2)= xy -1.
Instead of offering a contract c e PQ, the firm considers offering the contract cT
with the properties that it attracts <I>*(X2+ t) of the low-risks and <I>*(X2)of the
high-risks; c and cT are thus on the same high-risk indifference curve. Let the
profit earned on the low-risks from the offer cT be denoted H(t); the (negative)
profit earned on high-risks is irrelevant, since the fraction of high-risks attracted
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by this offer is independent of t. Thus, H(t) == A<P*(X2+ t)7tL(cT).We have:
Lemma 2: The profit earned on low-risks from a deviating offer as described
above can be written:
H(t) = A(l - A)D(pH- pL)(X2+ tF 1[X2- (L-l)t]
r*
Proof: See Appendix 1.
With Lemma 2 at hand, we can prove Proposition 2. The point is that, if any
deviation off PQ yields less profit than the contract in PQ having the same high-
risk expected utility, then any deviation off PQ yields negative profit. By differen-
tiation in the expression in Lemma 2, it is easily verified that H'(O) = O,H'(t) > O
for t E (- X2,O),and H'(t) < Ofor t E (O,1- X2),if r > r". Thus, it does not pay to
deviate from. the equilibrium strategy of Proposition 2, so the Proposition is
proved.
4. RENEGOTIATION-PROOF CONTRACTS
The purpose of this section is to define renegotiation-proofness and characterize
the set of renegotiation-proof contracts for an insurance firm. The intuition is
summarized as follows: A contract is renegotiation-proof if and only if the firm
cannot profit by offering the consumers who were signed up for this contract a
new pair of renegotiation-proof contracts which are at least as good for the con-
sumers and strictly better for the firm.
Readers may notice that our definition of renegotiation-proofness is in
terms of stability in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). This
notion is the unifying solution concept in Greenberg's (1990) theory of social
situations. The definitions and subsequent analysis will be cast within the frame-
work of this theory.
In Section 2, the concepts of a position and a feasible outcome in a position
have already been introduced. A position characterizes a population by its type
profile and fall-back utility levels, and gives the outside profit opportunities of
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the firm. Formally, G = (F, 7t)is a position, F = (Il, c) is a population, 7tis outside
profit, Il = (IlH, JlL) is a type profile, and c is a contract defining fall-back utility
levels. A feasible outcome in a position is a pair of contracts with associated type
profiles satisfying incentive and individual rationality constraints. As explained
in Section 2, this implies that a feasible outcome is a pair of subpopulations (Fhr
Fl).
Renegotiation involves offering one of these subpopulations Fk = (Ilk,Ck),k
e {h, tI, a new pair of contracts which are at least as good as its existing contract c.
We assume that the firm has the power to distribute the existing type-profile
among the new pair of contracts only constrained by incentive constraints. Rene-
gotiation is profitable for the firm if its profit increases by replacing the subpopula-
tion's existing contract (with associated type profile) with the new pair of con-
tracts (with associated type profiles).
Formally, renegotiation is captured by the inducement of a new position
given the outcome in the existing position, and the selection of a new feasible
outcome in the new position. What can be induced is given by the inducement
correspondence, 'Y, which determines what new positions can be induced from
the outcome in the existing position. The following inducement correspondence
states that the firm can enter into renegotiation with one of its subpopulations.
Let G = (F, x). li(Fh, Fl) e X(G) is nondegenerate, then:
y(G, (Fh,Fl» = {Gh,Gl} = {(Fh,7th),(Fl, 7tl)},
where 7th= ~K =H,LJlf7tK(Q) + 7t,and 7tl= ~K = H,L1l~7tK(Ch)+ 7t;if (Fh, Fl) e X(G) is
degenerate, then we write (Fh,Fl) = Fd, and:
By this notation, it follows that, if (Fj, Fl) e X(G),G' e y(G, (Fh,Fl», and (Fh',Fl') e
X(G'), then such renegotiation is profitable for the firm if and only if I1(G')(Fh',
Fl') > I1(G)(Fh,Fl). Recall that r denotes the set of positions; we call the pair ('Y, r)
a situation.
Given the outcome (Fh, Fl) in position G, the firm would like to induce a
position G' if the outcome that results from the renegotiation, (Fh" Fl) e X(G'),
146
yields the firm a higher profit, i.e. TI(G')(Fh', Fi) > TI(G)(Fh, F4!).Renegotiation
will, however, only lead to an outcome from which no further renegotiation will
take place, since otherwise, we can replace the originaloutcome with one that
includes the subsequent renegotiation.9 It is thus natural to argue that an out-
come is renegotiation-proof if it is not profitable for the firm to renegotiate to any
renegotiation-proof outcome in a position that the firm can induce, while an
outcome is not renegotiation-proof if it is profitable for the firm to renegotiate to
some renegotiation-proof outcome in a position that the firm can induce.
This line of thought leads to the following: For each G, let a(G) c X(G) de-
note the set of renegotiation-proof outcomes in the position G. We call a a stan-
dard of behaviour (SB). Require (in accordance with the argument above) that
such an SB is optimistic internally stable in the sense that
IS (Fh, F4!)E a(G) ~ there do not exist G' E "((G,(Fh,F4!»and (Fh', F4!') E a(G')
such that: TI(G')(Fh',Fi) > TI(G)(Fh,Ft),
and that such an SB is optimistic externally stable in the sense that
ES (Fh, Ft) E X(G)\a(G) ~ there exist G' E y(G, (Fh, r,» and (Fh', Ft') E a(G')
such that: TI(G')(Fh',Ft') > TI(G)(Fh,Ft).
We say that a is an optimistic stable standard of behaviour (OSSB) if it is satisfies
both IS and ES.10Note that the internal stability explains why an outcome is
renegotiation-proof by the property that it cannot be profitably renegotiated to
another renegotiation-proof outcome, while the external stability explains why
an outcome is not renegotiation-proof by the property that it can be renegotiated
90ur model is an atemporal one. But as the language in the text suggests, an interpretation is
that it allows for indefinite renegotiation.
lOGreenberg (1990) distinguishes between optimistic and conservative SSBs. In our context, the
SSB is optimistic if the firm is able to choose among the elements of (J. In a conservative SSB, the
firm would expect the worst element of (J to be realized. The OSSB seems the more suitable concept
here and we do not explore the properties of conservative SSBs.
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to another renegotiation-proof outcome.
Defining renegotiation-proofness by the imposition of internal and external
stability may appear circular. Still, the problem has a hierarchical structure which
allows us to uniquely determine the set of renegotiation-proof outcomes. In fact,
the main result of this section establishes the existence and uniqueness of an
OSSB a for the situation (y, I'). Furthermore, this OSSB is fully characterized.
Define:
r** == pH - pL - a(l - pH) = r* _ 1 - pH = (a* _ 1)1 - pH.
a(1-pL) l-pL a l-pL
Notice that r** > O if and only if a < a*.
Proposition 3: There exists a unique OSSB a for the situation (y, F). This
OSSB is characterized as follows: (Fh, Ft) e a(G) if and only if (Fh, Ft) e X(G) and
one of the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) (Fh, Ft) is a degenerate full-insurance outcome.
(ii) (Fh, Ft) = «Jlh, Ch),(J.14!, G!» satisfies: Jlh= (Jl~' O), Jlt = (Jlr, r**Jlr), ChI+ Ch2= D,
G!I+ G!2/b ~ D, and uH(Ch)= uH(Ct), with r** > O.
In order to establish this result, the following Lemma is useful. Informally,
it states that, in a nondegenerate renegotiation-proof outcome, both the offered
contracts are renegotiation-proof.
Lemma 3: Consider a nondegenerate outcome (Fh, Ft) e X(G), with y(G, (Fh,
Ft» = {Gh,Gt}. Then, (Fh,Ft) e a(G) if and only if (the degenerate outcomes) Fh
and Ft satisfy Fh e a(Gh) and Ft e a(Gt).
Proof: Suppose Fk. a(Gk), k = h or t.By ES, there exist G' e "«Gk, Fk) and (Fh',
Ft') e a(G') such that I1(G')(Fh', Ft') > I1(Gk)(Fk). However, since G' = Gk e "«G, (Fh!
Ft» and I1(Gk)(Fk)= I1(G)(Fh, Ft), it follows by IS that (Fh, Ft) • a(G). Conversely, if
(Fh, Ft) • a(G), there exist, by ES, G' e "«G, (Fh, Ft», and (Fh', Ft ') e a(G') such that
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k = h or~, it follows by IS that Fk ~ CJ(Gk),k = h or e. QED.
The proof of Proposition 3 is based on the observation that a degenerate full
insurance outcome cannot be profitably renegotiated to any feasible (and, hence,
not to any renegotiation-proof) outcome. By ES, such an outcome is renegotia-
tion-proof. This allows for an inductive argument on a hierarchical structure.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let G = (F, 1t) and let CJbe any OSSB for the situation
(y,ri
(a) If Fd = (Jld, Cd)e X(G) is a degenerate full insurance outcome (i.e., Cdl + Cd2
= D), then, by ES, Fd e CJ(G).
(b) Let Fd = (Jld, Cd) e X(G) be a degenerate outcome with Jlk > max{O, r**Jl:tl
and Cdl+ Cd2< D. Consider Fd' = (Jld', Cd')with Jld' = Jld, UL(Cd')= UL(Cd),and Cdl' +
Cd2'= D. By (a), we have that Gd = (Fd,1t) e ')'(G,Fd), Fd' e CJ(Gd),and TI(Gd)(Fd') >
TI(G)(Fd). By IS, Fd ~ CJ(G).
(c') Let Fd = (Jld,Cd)e X(G) be a degenerate outcome with Jlk = r**Jl:t > O,Cdl +
Cd2< D, and cai + Cd2/b ;;:::D. The firm's profit can only be increased by separating
out some high-risks. By (b), the rest must then move along the low-risk indiffer-
ence curve and be given full insurance. But this means that no high-risks would
be willing to be separated out. By ES, Fd e CJ(G).
(c") Let Fd = (Jld,Cd) e X(G) be a degenerate outcome with Jlk = r**Jl:t > Oand
Cdl+ Cd2/b < D. Consider Fd' = (Jld', Cd'), with Jld' = Jld, uL(Cd') = UL(Cd),and car' +
Cd2'lb = D. By (c'), we have that Gd = (Fd,1td) e ')'(G,Fd), Fd' e CJ(Gd),and TI(G)(Fd') >
TI(G)(Fd). By IS, Fd ~ CJ(G).
(d') Let Fd = (Jld,Cd)e X(G) be a degenerate outcome with Os Jlk < r**Jl:t, Cdl+
Cd2< D, and CdI + Cd2/b;;::: D. Consider (Fh, Fl) = «Jlh, Ch), (Jll, Cl» with Jlh = (Jl~' O),
Jl.l = (Jl}i, r**Jl}i),Jlh+ Jll = Jld, ChI+ Ch2= D, UH(Ch)= UH(Cl),and Ct = Cd·By Lemma
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3, (a), and (Cl),we have that Gd = (Fd, x) e "G, Fd), (Fh, Ft) e cr(Gd), and II(Gd)(Fh,
Ft) > II(G)(Fd). By IS, Fd .. cr(G).
(dit) Let Fd = (Jld,Cd)e X(G) be a degenerate outcome with O s ~ < r**~ and
Cdl+ Cd2/b < D. Consider (Fh, Fl) = «Jlh, Ch),(Jlt, Ct» with Jlh = (Jl~, O), Jlt = (Jlr,
r**Jlr), Jlh + Ilt = Jld, Chl + Ch2= D, etl + ct2/b = D, uH(Ch) = uH(ct), and uL(et) =
UL(Cd).By Lemma 3, (a), and (Cl),we have that Gd = (Fd, n) e y(G, Fd), (Fh, Fl) e
cr(Gd),and II(Gd)(Fh, Ft) > II(G)(Fd). By IS, Fd" cr(G).
By Lemma 3 and (a)-(d) above, (Fh, Ft) e cr(G) for any (Fh, Ft) e X(G) satisfy-
ing condition (ii) of Proposition 3. Conversely, it can be checked that there is no
nondegenerate outcome (Fh!Ft) e X(G), with "G, (Fh, Fl» = {Gh,Gt} and where Fh
e cr(Gh)and Fl e cr(Gl) (according to (a)-(d», that does not satisfy condition (ii) of
Proposition 3. Hence, (Ph, Ft) .. cr(G) for any nondegenerate (Fh, Ft) e X(G) not
satisfying condition (ii) of Proposition 3.
This establishes that, if there exists an OSSB for the situation (y, T), it is char-
acterized by (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3. To establish that the SB characterized by
(i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 satisfies IS and ES, invoke Lemma 3 and repeat the
inductive argument above. QED.
Note that a contract offering partial but adequate insurance is renegotiation-
proof if the type profile is such that the firm's iso-profit curves are parallel to the
low-risk indifference curves. One can argue that renegotiation would take place
even in this case since, if some high-risks accepted a full-insurance contract yield-
ing them a slightly higher utility level, then the remaining insurees would get
their original contract renegotiated along the low-risk indifference curve, yield-
ing the rest of the high-risk an even higher utility level. Hence, such renegotia-
tion brings all the high-risks onto higher utility levels, keeps the low-risks on
their original utility level, and can be constructed so that the firm profits. The
reason why such renegotiation would not take place in the present framework is
that it involves a pair of contracts where the one dominates the other. Hence,
having any insurees choose the poorer contract would violate incentive con-
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straints.
Our definition of renegotiation-proofness is valid also in the case of nonlin-
ear indifference curves. Establishing the existence of an OSSB in this case would,
however, be a complex task, partly for reasons discussed by Hillas (1987, Secs. 5.4-
5.6).
5. AN INSURANCE MARKET WITH RENEGOTIATION
Again, the two firms are modelled as offering the consumers a pair of utility
levels (uH, uL) which can be unambiguously represented by the adequate contract
c, with uH(c) = uH and uL(c) = uL. However, in this section we will impose that
each firm's outcome from the competition in the insurance market be renegotia-
tion-proof; else, renegotiation between the firm and its insurees would take
place.
Formally, we need to construct, for each r, a simultaneous-move game with
each firm's strategy set being the set of adequate offers. This is achieved by con-
structing a mapping from a pair of offers from the firms to a renegotiation-proof
outcome in an initial position for each firm. Such a mapping is presented in
Appendix 2. Here, it is more instructive to prove the following main result.
Proposition 4: For r * r"'''', any (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of the game
defined in Appendix 2 yields a unique outcome for each firm.
(a) If O < r < r=, then each firm's (nondegenerate) outcome is given by:
(Filt Ft) = «i<} - r~"" O), Cit), (i<r~"" A), cR»,
where Cit satisfies: Citl + Ch2= D and 7tH(Cit) = O, and cR satisfies: UH(Ch)= uH(cR) and
(A/r"'''')7tH(CR) + A7tL(cR) = O, i.e.:
R = (R R) = «a + pL)(1 - pH)D 1- pHD)
C Cl' c2 - ,.
(1 - pL)(l + r"'''') 1 + r"''''
(b) If r > max {O, r"'''}, then each firm's (degenerate) outcome is given by:
Fd = (i<t-, A), cP),
where cP is the full-insurance zero-profit pooling contract defined in Section 3.
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Remark: The contract cR is depicted in Figure 2. This contract has the charac-
teristic that it is situated on the zero-profit curve for a contract that is sold to a set
of consumers with a type profile such that JlL/JlH = r**.By construction, this zero-
profit curve is parallel with low-risk indifference curves for adequate contracts,
l.e., its slope is -(1 - pL)/(a + pL).
Proof: (a) For r < r**, it is sufficient to show the existence of a unique pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium in which each firm offers cR, since symmetry and
Proposition 3 then imply that each firm's nondegenerate outcome is as stated in
Proposition 4, yielding each firm zero profit.
Existence. Assume firm 2 offers cR. If firm 1 also offers cR, then it obtains
zero profit. We need to establish that firm 1 cannot obtain a positive profit by any
alternative feasible offer. Consider Figure 2.
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Figure2
If firm 1 offers c in area I such that uL(c) < uL(cR) and uH(c) < uH(cR), then
firm 1 attracts no customers and obtains zero profit.
If firm 1 offers c in area TIsuch that ul-Ic) < uL(cR) and uH(c) = uH(cR), then
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firm 1 attracts half the high-risks not needed to make cR renegotiation-proof for
firm 2, Le., firm l's type profile becomes (AIr - A/r**, 0)/2. Only c', defined by Cl' +
(2' = D and uH(c') = UH(c), is renegotiation-proof, and the resulting degenerate
outcome yields firm 1 zero profit.
If firm 1 offers c (;;::O) in area ill such that uL(c) = uL(cR) and uH(c) < uH(cR),
then firm 1 attracts half the low-risks. Suppose insurees are actually signed up
with c. If the proportion of low-risks to high-risks exceeds r**, renegotiation
along the low-risk indifference curve would occur, making the resulting contract
attractive to all high-risks. If the proportion of low-risks to high-risks does not
exceed r**, then, even with renegotiation (if any), the resulting contract would be
unattractable to any high-risk. Hence, signing insurees up with c is not compati-
ble with equilibrium beliefs for high-risks. The same argument goes for any c'
with uL(c') = uL(cR) and uH(c') < uH(cR), while c' with ul-Ic') = uL(cR) and uH(c') >
uH(cR) is not compatible with the firm's profit-maximizing behaviour. Therefore,
we follow the convention that insurees are signed up with cR, with firm 1 attract-
ing the type profile (A/r**, A)/2. Again, the resulting degenerate outcome yields
firm 1 zero profit.
If firm 1 offers c in area IV such that uL(c) < uL(cR) and uH(c) > uH(cR), then
firm 2 (by the argument above for area Ill) signs up insurees with the contract c'
defined by uL(c') = uL(cR) and UH(c') = UH(c). Firm 1 attracts the high-risks not
needed to make c' renegotiation-proof for firm 2, and it attracts no low-risks; i.e.,
firm l's type profile becomes (AIr - A/r**, O). Only c", defined by Cl" + C2" = D and
UH(c") = uH(c), is renegotitation-proof, and the resulting degenerate outcome
yields firm 1 a negative profit.
If firm 1 offers c (;;::O) in area V such that ul-Ic) > uL(cR) and uH(c) < uH(cR),
then firm 1 attracts all low-risks, who (by the argument above for area Ill) must
be signed up with the contract c', defined by uL(c') = ul-Ic) and uH(c') = uH(cR).
Symmetry with area IV implies that firm l's type profile becomes (A/r**, A).
Again, the resulting degenerate outcome yields firm 1 a negative profit.
If firm 1 offers c in area VI such that ut-te) = uL(cR) and uH(c) > uH(cR), then
symmetry with area III implies that firm 1 attracts the type profile (AIr - A/2r**,
A/2). Again, the resulting outcome (degenerate if and only if Cl + C2 = D) yields
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firm 1 a negative profit.
If firm 1 offers c (;;::O) in area VII such that uL(c) > uL(cR) and uH(c) = uH(cR),
then symmetry with area II implies that firm I attracts the type profile «Air +
A/r**)/2, A). Again, the resulting nondegenerate outcome yields firm 1 a negative
profit.
If firm 1 offers c in area VIII such that uL(c) > uL(cR) and uH(c) > uH(cR), then
firm 1 attracts all customers and the resulting outcome (degenerate if and only if
Cl+ C2= D) yields firm 1 a negative profit.
Uniqueness. Again, consider Figure 2. If firm 2 offers c' in area I, then firm 1
would want to offer c such that uL(c) > uL(c') and uH(c) > uH(c'). However, no best
response exists. If firm 2 offers c' in area II, then firm 1 would want to offer c such
that uL(c) > uL(c') and uH(c) ~ uH(c'). Again, no best response exists. If firm 2
offers c' in area m, then firm 1 would want to offer c such that uL(c) ~ uL(c') and
uH(c) > uH(c'). Again, no best response exists. If firm 2 offers c' in area IV, then
firm 1 would want to offer c such that uL(c) > uL(c') and uH(c) < uH(c'). Again, no
best response exists. If firm 2 offers c' in area V, then firm 1 would want to offer c
such that uL(c) < UL(c') and uH(c) > uH(c'). Again, no best response exists. If firm 2
offers c' in areas VI, VIT, or vm, then any best response for firm 1 yields firm 1
zero profit. For any best response c for firm l, c' is not a best response to c for firm
2. This establishes that each firm offering cR is the unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.
(b) For r > max {O,r**}, it is sufficient to show that (c, c') is a Nash equilibri-
um if and only if the firms' offers c and c' are in area II of Figure 3, i.e., uL(c) =
uL(c') = uL(cP). This is because, by symmetry and Proposition 3, through renegotia-
tion, each firm's degenerate outcome is as stated in Proposition 4, yielding each
firm zero profit.
Sufficiency. Consider Figure 3. Assume firm 2 offers c' in area IT. If firm 1
also makes an offer c in area IT, then it obtains zero profit. We need to establish
that firm 1 cannot obtain a positive profit by any offer in areas I and III of Figure
3.
If firm 1 offers c in area I such that ul-Ic) < ul-Ic') = uL(cP), then firm 1 attracts
no customers and obtains zero profit. (The reason why high-risks are not attract-
ed even if (uH(cP) » uH(c} > UH(c'), is that they realize that alllow-risks will sign
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up with firm 2 and will through renegotiation obtain cp.)
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If firm 1 offers c in area In such that uL(c) > uL(c') = uL(cP), then firm 1 at-
tracts all low-risks, who through renegotiation obtain cit, defined by Cl It + C2" = D
and UL(c") = uL(c). Since uH(clt) > uH(cP), firm 1 will attract all high-risks as well.
The resulting degenerate outcome yields firm 1 a negative profit.
Necessity. Again, consider Figure 3. If firm 2 offers c' in area I, then firm 1
would want to offer c such that uL(c)> uL(c'). However, no best response exists. If
firm 2 offers c' in area TIl, then any best response for firm 1 yields firm 1 zero
profit. For any best response c for firm 1, c' is not a best response to c for firm 2.
This establishes that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with one or
both firms making offers in areas I or Ill. QED.
The task to show, for each r, that no mixed-strategy equilibrium exists is left
for future research.
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6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
We are now in a position to compare market equilibria with and without renego-
tiation. From the analysis above, we have:
Proposition 5: Compared to the case without renegotiation, allowing for
renegotiation has the following effect on consumers' expected utility:
(i) ff O< r < r**, then high-risks are equally well off, and low-risks are worse off.
(ii) ff max{O,r**}< r < r", then high-risks are better off, and low-risks are worse
off.
(iii) ff r > r*, then all consumers are better off.
Proof: Follows from Propositions 1, 2, and 4. Notice that: (i) uH(cR) = uH(cQ)
and uL(cR) < uL(cQ); (ii) uH(cP) > uH(cQ) and uL(cP) < uL(cQ), if r < r*; and (iii)
uK(cP) > uK(c),C e PQ, C -:1= cP,K e {H, L}, if r > r". QED.
Note that firms always earn zero profits in equilibrium; thus, the above
Proposition sums up the comparative welfare analysis. Also note that a necessary
and sufficient condition for the first part of Proposition 5 to be non-vacuous, is
that a < a".
Proposition 5 implies that high-risks are always (weakly) better off in the
market equilibrium with renegotiation. The reason is that renegotiation makes it
harder for low-risks to be separated out (see Proposition 6(b) below), and high-
risks gain from being pooled with low-risks. The more interesting part of Proposi-
tion 5, though, is part (c), which states that, with few high-risks, allowing for
renegotiation leads to a strict Pareto improvement for the insurees, while keep-
ing the firms at the zero-profit level.tt This contrasts results on renegotiation-
proof contracts in a monopoly setting, where allowing for renegotation limits the
set of available contracts and, hence, cannot lead to a Pareto improvement.
The reason why allowing for renegotiation leads to a Pareto improvement
in the present context is the competition between the duopolists. Without renego-
11A similar result is obtained by Beaudry and Poitevin (1990) in their analysis of a credit
market with recontracting, and by Mori (1989) in his analysis of a labour market with renegotiable
seniori ty rules.
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tiation, pooling is vulnerable to "cream skimming" whereby the one firm offers
a deviating contract in order to attract the profitable low-risks only. In the case
with few high-risks, this leads to a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which any
point in the support, but the full-insurance pooling one, makes both types of
insurees worse off; in particular, with few high-risks, low-risks do not mind full-
insurance pooling. With renegotiation, such cream skimming cannot occur,
making full-insurance pooling viable.
Regarding the features of the equilibrium, we note differences in the cases
without and with renegotiation along two dimensions: whether the equilibrium
is in pure or mixed strategies, and to what extent the consumers are separated by
type in equilibrium.
Proposition 6: (a) Without renegotiation, equilibrium is in pure strategies if
and only if r ~ r*; otherwise, it is in mixed strategies. With renegotiation, there
always exists an equilibrium in pure strategies.
(b) Without renegotiation, consumers are always fully separated. With rene-
gotiation, consumers are partially separated if O< r < r**; they are pooled if r >
max {O,r**}.
Proof: Follows from Propositions 1, 2, and 4. QED.
Thus, our analysis has bearing on two important discussions in the litera-
ture. First, there is the debate on whether equilibria in mixed strategies are appro-
priate; for differences in view, see Binmore and Dasgupta (1986), who are in
favour, and Rubinstein (1991), who is skeptical. Although our inclination is in
favour of mixed-strategy equilibria, the present analysis clearly shows that one
can get around the controversy - at least as far as (our linear version of) the insur-
ance market goes - by allowing renegotiation.
Second, there is an extensive literature discussing whether, in a competitive
insurance market, consumers will be separated or not. Essentially, the disagree-
ment concerns how one should model in what sequence the agents move. Some
specifications, such as those of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Riley (1979),
lead to full separation, while others, such as those of Wilson (1977) and Gross-
man (1979), lead to pooling when the fraction of low-risks is high (a condition
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equivalent to our r > r", since it coincides with the non-existence of a pure-
strategy equilibrium in the Rothschild-Stiglitz specification). Our model can also
be interpreted as a particular specification of moves, with renegotiation between
a firm and its insurees being allowed indefinitely. We find that this modelleads
to pooling not only when the fraction of low-risks is high, but that pooling occurs
for an even broader range of parameter values, since r** < r". Table 1 sums up
Propositions 5 and 6.
Table 1.
Ratio of low-risks
to high-risks
Without
renegotiation
(n)
With
renegotiation
(r)
O<r<r**
Equilibrium in ...
Typesare .,.
High-risks' utility
Low-risks' utility
pure strategies
fully separated
U!!
uk
r**< r < r*
Equilibrium in ...
Typesare ...
High-risks' utility
Low-risks' utility
pure strategies
fully separated
U!!
uk
r*<r<oo
Equilibrium in ...
Typesare ...
High-risks' utility
Low-risks' utility
mixed strategies
fully separated
U!!
uk
pure strategies
partially separated
U~=U~
u}<uk
pure strategies
pooled
u~>U~
u}<uk
pure strategies
pooled
u~>U~
u}>uk
Among the various specifications of competitive insurance markets suggest-
ed in the previous literature, the present study has a particular relation to Gross-
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man (1979) that we would like to stress.12 After firms offering contracts and con-
sumers selecting among contracts offered, Grossman suggests that a firm be al-
lowed to accept or reject any consumer selecting one of this firm's contracts. Like
renegotiation, this feature captures the idea of firms taking advantage of the
information created by consumers' selection of contracts. And both specifications
lead to pooling for high values of r. On the other hand, when r < r*, such that the
pure-strategy Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium exists, the Grossman equilibrium
coincides with the latter, while the equilibrium with renegotiation still differs
from, and may even be Pareto inferior to, the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium.
Lastly, we note the effects on our results of changes in consumers' risk aver-
sion. We have the following, which has a straightforward proof:
Proposition 7: The critical values of r, r* and r**, decrease when the risk
aversion parameter, a, increases:
dr* = dr** = _ r* < O.
da da a
Thus, increasing consumers' risk aversion broadens the range where the
equilibrium without renegotiation is in mixed strategies; it broadens the ranges
where consumers benefit from the existence of an insurance market with renego-
tiation; and it broadens the range where the equilibrium with renegotiation is
pooling.
APPENDIX l
Proof of Lemma 1: By construction of preferences, consumers prefer c to being
self-insured. Hence, (Fj,; F4!) e X(GO), since both incentive and individual-
rationality constraints are satisfied. The Lemma follows from the incentive con-
straint of the high-risks as well as the fact that, for each type, iso-profit curves are
steeper than indifference curves. QED.
12Game-theoretic foundations for the Grossman formulation are found in Hellwig (1987) and
Desruelle (1989).
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Proof of Proposition 1: By Lemma I, the profit-maximising outcome consist-
ent with cQ has Ch = (pHD, (1 - pH)D) and Cl = cQ. Thus, Ch is the full-insurance
contract yielding zero expected profit when sold to high-risks, while cQ is given
by high-risk indifference between Ch and cQ and zero expected profit when sold to
a low-risk. From Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we know that (Ch, cQ) is the only
possible symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of this model. The condition for its
existence, r S r*, is proved as follows.
The optimum deviation from cQ for a firm whose rivaloffers cQ, is an offer
ex with the property that uL(cx) = uL(cQ); this is because uL(cx) < uL(cQ) implies no
low-risk customers, while uL(cx) > uL(cQ) implies that profit can be increased
without losing low-risk customers. This and Lemma 1 imply that the two con-
tracts, (~, q) = (eS, c=), given to high-risks and low-risks, respectively, by an opti-
mally deviating firm, have three properties. First, ~ provides full insurance:
~1 =D- <:&2. (Al)
Second, high-risks are indifferent between ~ and cx:
cXh2- c~ 1- pH= ,
~l-cf a + pH
which, when using (AI), we may write:
~ = a + 1 ~2 _ 1- pH (D- cV.
a+pH a+pH (A2)
Third, low-risks are indifferent between CX and cQ:
~-cQ l-pL2 __ ---=-_,- ,
q-c? a+pL
which we write as:
q = SQ + a + pL(c~- c~).
l-pL (A3)
Let 1t*be the deviating firm's average expected profit per contract. By deviating, a
firm attracts all consumers, so that GO = «1 - A), A, O, O) for the deviating firm.
Thus:
1t*æ (1 - A)1tH(~) + A1tL(cx)= (1- A)[(1- pH)~l - pH~2] + A[(1- pL)q - pL~].
(A4)
We want to find the effect on 1t*of changing the contracts (~, cx) subject to the
constraints (AI-A3). The same procedure as below is used by Stiglitz (1977) for
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similar purposes. From (AI) and (A3), respectively, we have:
dcftl=_l
dc"h2 ' (AS)
and
dq =a+pL
dq l-pL
By totally differentiating (A2) and using (A6), we get:
dq = l-pL
dc"h2 pH _ pL
(A6)
(A7)
We now totally differentiate the profit function (A4), using first (AS), and then
(A6) and (A7):
d7t* = _ (1 _ A)+ A[(1- pL)dq _ pL] dq = _ (1- A)+ Aa(1 - pL).
dc"h2 dq dc"h2 pH - pL
A deviation pays if and only if (dx" / dcft2)> O.By applying the definitions of rand
r* to the above expression, we find that this happens if and only if r > r", QED.
Proof of Lemma 2: Note first that the profit from selling the contract cT to
low-risks is:
7tL(CT)= (1 - pL)cT- pLcJ = (1 - pL)c1- pLC2- [(1 - pL)(Cl- cT) - pL(C2- CP] =
7tL(c)- [(1 _ pL)a + pH - pL](C2- cD,
l-pH
since uH(c) = uH(cT), with c e PQ. From the definition of cT, we know that it satis-
fies:
UH(CT)= UH(c), and:
uL(cT}= ul-Ic'),
where c' is given by:
c' e PQ, and: C2'= C2+ t(~ - (i).
These two conditions can be shown to be equivalent to:
C2- cI = t(c~ - cQ) 1 [a + pL - (1- pL)dc1 IPQ].
2 a*(a + 1) dC2
Note that:
~ - c2
Q= [(1- A)(1- PH) + A(l - pL)]D _ 1- PHD =
1+ r"
r*D [(1 - A)(l - PH) + A(1- pL)(a + 1)].
1+ r*
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In order to get any further, we need more knowledge about the set PQ. Offers in
this set are characterised as follows: There is a contract Ch such that the contract
pair (Ch,c), c e PQ has the following properties:
- Ch yields full insurance:
ChI+ Ch2= D;
- high-risks are indifferent between Chand c: UH(Ch)= UH(c), or:
Ch2-C2 l-pH---= ;
ChI-Cl a + pH
- (Ch,c) yields zero profit when all high-risks buy Chand alllow-risks buy c:
(1 - A)[(l - pH)Chl- pHCh2]+ A[(1- pL)cl - pLC2]= o.
These three conditions are equivalent to the following one, which thus charac-
terises a generic member c = (cl, CVof PQ:
[A(1- pL) + (1 - A)l - pH]Cl _ [ApL+ (1- A)a + pH]ez + a(1 - A)(1 - pH)D = O.
a+l a+l a+l
From this, we get what we need. First, the profit from a contract c e PQ when sold
to low-risks is:
7[L(C)= (1-pL)Cl- pLc2 = (1- A)(pH- pL)Dx2.
Second, the inverse slope of PQ is:
dCl IPQ = A(a + l)pL + (1- A)(a + pH) = r*(a + l)D -1.
dez A(a + 1)(1 - pL) + (1 - A)(1- pH) (1 + r*)(cf - c~)
Thus, we can write:
[(1- pL)a + pH pL](ez- cI> =
l-pH
[(1- pL)a + pH pL]t(~ - c~) [a + pl- _ (1- pL)( r*(a + l)D 1)] =
1- pH a*(a + 1) (1 + r*)(cf - c~)
t(~ - cf) 1 + r* [a + 1- (1- pL)( r*(a + l)D ]= t[(cf - cf)l + r* - (1- pL)D]=
r*(a + 1) (1+ r*)(cf - cf) r*
tD[(l - A)(1- pH) + A(l - pL)(a + 1) - (1 - pL)] =
tD(1- A)[ra(l - pL) - (pH - pL)] =
tD(1 - A)(pH- pL)(L - 1).
r*
Inserting this and our expression for 7[L(c)into the expression for 7[L(cT),we ob-
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tain:
7tL(CT) = (1- A)(pH- pL)D[X2- t(L-1)].
r*
Inserting this expression in the definition of H(t) proves the Lemma. QED.
APPENDIX2
Below, a mapping from a pair of offers from the firms (c from the one firm, c'
from the other firm) to a renegotiation-proof outcome in an initial position for
each firm is constructed.
If O< r = A/(1-A) ~ r**, low risks are split between the firms according to the
expected utilities they are offered. However, a partial-insurance renegotiation-
proof contract Ck requires that ~~/~r= r**, by Proposition 3; thus, A/r** of the
high-risks are needed in order to offer renegotiation-proof contracts to low-risk
insurees. The competition for high-risk insurees determines the split for only the
remaining (1 - A) - A/r** = Air - A/r** high-risks, who are split between the
firms according to the expected utilities they are offered. The following table
summarizes the above discussion, giving the type profile of a firm that offers c
when the other firm offers c'.
uL(c) > uL(c'), uH(c) > uH(c')
uL(c) > uL(c'), uH(c) = uH(c')
ul-Ic) > uL(c'), uH(c) < uH(c')
uL(c) = uL(c'), uH(c) > uH(c')
uL(c) = uL(c'), uH(c) = uH(c')
uL(c) = uL(c'), uH(c) < uH(c')
uL(c) < ul-Ic'), uH(c) > uH(c')
uL(c) < uL(c'), uH(c) = uH(c')
ul-Ic) < uL(c'), uH(c) < uH(c')
~(c, c', r) = (Air, A)
~(c, c', r) = «Air + A/r**)/2, A)
~(c, c', r) = (Air"'''', A)
~(c, c', r) = (Air - A/2r"'''', A/2)
~(c,c', r) = (A/2r, A/2)
~(c, c', r) = (A/2r*"', A/2)
~(c, C', r) = (Air - Air"'''', O)
~(c, c', r) = «Air - A/r"'*)/2, O)
~(c, c', r) = (O, O)
This determines the initial position for each firm as a function of its own
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offer c and the offer c' of the other firm, G = (~(c, c', r), O,O), given that O< r S; r**.
Lemma 4 below establishes what renegotiation-proof outcome in the position G
is realized given a firm's own offer c and the offer c' of the other firm.
Lemma 4: Let O< r S; r**. If c and c' are adequate offers such that ~(c, c', r) *"
(O,O), then there exists a unique outcome (Fh,Fl) e cr(G),G = (~(c, c', r), O,O),satisfy-
ing: UH(Ch)= max{uH(c), uH(c')} and UL(Cl) = uL(c). (Fh,F4!)= «~h, Ch), (~4!,C4!»is
characterized by: ~h = (~~, O);~ = (~r, r**~r); ~h + ~l = ~(c, c', r); C4!= c; Chl+ Ch2=
D; and UH(Ch)= uH(C4!).
Proof: Follows from Proposition 3 by considering each of the first eight cases
above. QED.
The rationale behind requiring UH(Ch)= max{uH(c), uH(c')} is that the high-
risks needed in order to make Cl renegotiation-proof can only be attracted in the
competition with the other firm, if the other firm's offer to high-risks is
matched.
This completes the description of the mapping from a pair of offers from the
two firms to a renegotiation-proof outcome in an initial position for each of the
firms in the case where O< r S; r**.
Now turn to the case with r = A/(1 - A) > max {O,r**}. Again, low risks are
split between the firms according to the expected utility that they are offered, and
again a partial-insurance renegotiation-proof contract Ckrequires that ~~/~r= **.
Since this cannot be satisfied with r > max{O, r**},we adopt the convention that
high-risk insurees are split between the firms in proportion to the split of the low-
risks. The following table summarizes the above discussion, giving the type
profile of a firm that offers c when the other firm offers c'.
uL(c) > uL(c')
ul-Ic) = uL(c')
ul-Ic) < uL(c')
~(c, c', r) = (A/r, A)
~(c, c', r) = (A/2r, A/2)
~(c,c', r) = (O, O)
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This determines the initial position for each firm as a function of its own
offer c and the offer c' of the other firm, G = (ute, c', r), 0, O), given that r > max {O,
r**}. Lemma 5 below establishes what renegotiation-proof outcome in the posi-
tion G is realized given a firm's own offer c and the offer c' of the other firm.
Lemma 5: Let r > max {O, r**}.If c and c' are adequate offers such that Jl(c, c', r)
'¢ (0, O), then there exists a unique degenerate outcome Fd e a(G), G = (Jl(c, c', r), 0,
O), satisfying: UL(Cd)= uL(c). Fd = (Ild, Cd)is characterized by: Jld= Jl(c, c', r) and CdI +
Cd2= D.
Proof: Follows from Proposition 3 by considering each of the first two cases
above. QED.
This completes the description of the mapping from a pair of offers from the
two firms to a renegotiation-proof outcome in an initial position for each of the
firms also in the case where r > max {O, r**}.
We have now, for each r, determined firms' profits as functions of their
offers in the case where renegotiation is allowed: If the firms' offers are c and c',
then the profit of the firm offering c is given by I1(G)(Fh,Ft), with G = (Jl(c, c', r), 0,
O), and where (Fh, Fl) e a(G) satisfies Lemma 4 or 5 (depending on r). Thereby, we
have, for each r, constructed a simultaneous-move game with each firm's strate-
gy set being the set of adequate offers.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
TWO KINDS OF CONSUMER SWITCHING COSTSl
Abstract: In this chapter, a distinction is introduced between two kinds
of consumer switching costs - "transaction costs" and "learning costs".
While transaction costs are incurred by a consumer at every switch
between suppliers, learning costs are incurred only at a switch to a
supplier that is new to him. In a multi-period duopoly model, it is
shown that both the introductory price and welfare decrease as the
fraction of transaction costs out of total consumer switching costs de-
creases.
1. INTRODUCTION
Some industries have the characteristic that, even though products are function-
ally identical, consumers incur costs when switching from one producer to anoth-
er. In this way, ex-ante homogeneous products become ex-post heterogeneous for
a consumer after he has purchased one of them. The study of markets with con-
sumer switching costs has been extensive in recent years. Perhaps the most im-
portant contributions have come from Paul Klemperer.2
Klemperer points out three sources of switching costs.å (i) Transaction costs.
Examples are costs incurred when switching from one bank to another, involv-
ing the closing of one set of accounts and the opening of another set in the other
bank, and costs incurred when switching from one supplier of rented equipment
lThe first version of this chapter was completed in June 1990. I would like to thank Geir
Asheim, Tertit Hammer, Paul Klemperer, Terje Lensberg, Kjell Erik Lommerud, Garth Saloner, Jon
Vislie, and a journal's referee for helpful comments on earlier versions. I am particularly indebted
to Geir Asheim and the referee for suggesting generalisations of my results. Thanks also to seminar
participants at the University of Bergen and at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration.
2Klemperer (1987a-c,1988,1989);Beggs and KIemperer (1990).Interesting contributions have
also come from other authors, such as Farrell and Shapiro (1988).
3See, e.g., KIemperer (1987a,Sec. I), on which this paragraph is more or less based.
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to another, involving returning the equipment to the old supplier and getting
equipment at the other one. (ii) Learning costs. An example is the costs incurred
when getting to know a new word processing system that has the same functions
as others on the market but also has the functions spread differently around on
the keyboard and has a manual written in a different style. (iii) Artificial switch-
ing costs. These costs arise as results of firms' actions. Examples of such actions
include "frequent-flyer programmes" and other coupon systems, but also deci-
sions on whether or not to make products compatible with others+
There is another distinction to be drawn, that between exogenous and endo-
genous switching costs. In their nature, artificial switching costs are endogenous.
The two other kinds can be seen as either exogenous or endogenous or both. Uke
Klemperer in his work, we concentrate in this chapter on exogenous switching
costs and thus on transaction and learning costs.
Contrary to Klemperer, however, we will argue that there is an important
difference between these two kinds of consumer switching costs. Transaction
costs are incurred every time a consumer switches between suppliers, whereas
learning costs are incurred only when the consumer turns to a supplier for the
first time.s
To understand how this distinction works, a multi-period model is present-
ed below. The model is, apart from the number of periods, kept as simple as
possible, with identical consumers each having a per-period individual demand
curve. Each consumer is confronted with two kinds of switching costs, one that is
incurred at every switch, and one that is incurred only when switching to a
supplier that is new to the consumer. On the supply side, there is a price-setting
duopoly.
We find that an increase in transaction costs' share of total consumer switch-
ing costs entails a decrease in welfare as well as a decrease in firms' introductory
4An analysis of coupon systems like "frequent-flyer programmes" is found in Banerjee and
Summers (1987).Issues related to compatibility and its companion, standardisation, are surveyed by
Farrell and Saloner (1987).
SKlemperer (1987a, note 22) mentions in passing another possible difference, though. He
argues that, while increases in transaction costs will affect first-period demand, this is not necessa-
rily true for learning costs, since learning costs may not imply start-up costs for the consumers. In the
present analysis, we abstract from this particular difference to consider the more far-reaching
consequences of differences in the costs of reswitching.
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price. These results are driven by the interaction of two key assumptions of our
model. Firstly, firms are allowed to price discriminate according to consumers'
purchase histories. Secondly, consumers are explicitly assumed to have rational
expecta tions.
The price discrimination in the present model is so-called third-degree.e A
consumer' s actual switching costs will differ according to whether he has
switched in the past or not. Accordingly, we assume that a firm is able to distin-
guish consumers with a single supplier in the past (the loyal consumers) from
the others (the disloyal consumers). With this assumption, the present work is
related to the literature on third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly; see
Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989).7 These authors provide theoretical evi-
dence that such discrimination may occur in a competitive market if products are
heterogeneous and if there exists a way to categorize consumers which is correlat-
ed with consumer preferences across brands.
The present efforts may be seen as applying this theory to a market with
consumer switching costs. Here, products are ex-ante homogeneous but become
heterogeneous in the eyes of a consumer once he has made a purchase. We focus
on the case where the categorization is perfectly correlated with preferences: A
consumer has a high preference for (a high cost of switching away from) his old
supplier if and only if he has been loyal to this supplier throughout the past; and
firms are assumed to know a consumer's loyalty. Ours is a case where, in the
terminology of Holmes (1989), the two groups of consumers, loyal and disloyal
ones, are identical with regard to "industry elasticity" of demand but differ with
regard to the "cross-elasticity" of demand among firms.
Empirical evidence that firms price discriminate according to differences in
cross-elasticity is provided by Borenstein and Rose (1991) on the U.S. airline
industry. More to the point is the empirical study by Borenstein (1989), showing
that firms price discriminate on the basis of differences in consumer switching
costs. His analysis of petrol retailing in the U.S. points in the direction that leaded
6For an introduction to price discrimination, see Varian (1989).
70n the other hand, by assuming price discrimination, we pose ourselves in stark contrast to
other papers in the switching-costs literature, where firms' inability to discriminate between old
and new customers is the driving force; see, e.g., Farrell and Shapiro (1988)and Beggs and Klemper-
er (1990).
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petrol is priced higher than unleaded because, since there are fewer stations
selling it, buyers of leaded petrol face higher costs of switching from one station
to another. Empirical support for the present assumption of price discrimination
based on past switching is, regrettably, not available.f But it seems likely, at least
in markets with individual treatment of customers, that firms possess informa-
tion that correlates with consumer loyalty.?
The other key ingredient of our model is rational consumer expectations.
Although a common assumption, the present analysis distinguishes itself by
highlighting it as a crucial feature; if, instead, consumers were completely myop-
ic, our main results would not go through. With rational expectations, consum-
ers realize that switching now means a reduction in future switching costs,
which again, because of the price discrimination, implies a reduction in future
prices. This gives rise to the notion of net consumer switching costs, Le., switch-
ing costs net of the future benefit of switching.
To see how our two key assumptions interact, consider a loyal consumer,
i.e., one who has not switched in the past. Price discrimination implies that he is
offered prices by the two firms that may differ from those offered a disloyal con-
sumer. His previous supplier, denoted the incumbent, matches the rival's price
such that the difference in consumer surplus from the two prices exactly equals
the consumer's net switching costs.
An increase in transaction costs' share of (gross) consumer switching costs
now has two effects. One effect comes from the consumer realizing that higher
transaction costs imply a reduction in the future benefit from switching now,
since reswitching later becomes more expensive. This effect drives the incum-
bent's price upwards, and we call it the consumer effect since it derives from the
consumer' s deliberations on whether to switch or not. Another effect comes
from the rival firm realizing that higher transaction costs entail higher future
SNor does the present analysis predict that such discrimination should be observed, since we
find that consumers do not switch in equilibrium.
9In his management textbook, Nagle (1987) observes that "[t]he retail price of an automobile
is typically set by the salesperson who evaluates the buyer's willingness to pay .... [T]he sales-
person takes a personal interest in the customer, asking ... what kinds of cars he has bought before ...
and whether he has looked at, or is planning to look at, other cars" (p. 158). In such a case, which
Nagle calls "Segmenting by Salespeople", the firm seems able to distinguish loyal consumers from
disloyal ones.
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earnings if it manages to attract this loyal consumer, making him a disloyal,
since, again, reswitching has become more expensive for the consumer. Higher
future earnings imply that the rival can stand a lower price today. Therefore, this
effect drives the incumbent's price downwards, and we call it the rival effect since
it derives from the rival's deliberations on which price to set.
The strength of consumer rationality in this model is seen from the fact that
the consumer effect described above dominates the rival effect. Therefore, an
increase in transaction costs' share of consumer switching costs leads to an in-
crease in the prices set by incumbents to loyal consumers.tv This is so in all peri-
ods, except the last, when there is no future so that neither of the two effects is at
work, and the first, when there is no incumbent. We find, moreover, that incum-
bents' prices are always positive in equilibrium. Thus, since the first-period price
is determined by cut-throat competition in the usual Bertrand fashion, an in-
crease in transaction costs' share implies a lower introductory price. And there-
fore, such an increase also leads all prices to move away from their efficient level
at marginal costs, thus decreasing welfare.
The basic intuition behind the relative strength of the consumer effect can
be seen from noting that a downward-sloping demand curve affects profit and
consumer surplus asymmetrically. When price is above marginal costs, as is the
case for the incumbents' prices in this model, a price change has a stronger effect
on consumer surplus than on profit. On the other hand, when price is below
marginal costs, as is the case with rivals' prices, a price change has a stronger
effect on profit than on consumer surplus; this is so because profit is negative
and, say, a price increase reduces both the loss-inducing demand and the loss on
the demand left.
To be specific, let there be three periods with both consumers and firms
using a discount factor equal to 1. Suppose that transaction costs' share of consum-
er switching costs increases such that transaction costs are increased, and learning
costs decreased, with an amount equal to the area A + B in Figure 1. This implies
10Actually, any rival effect may itself be decomposed into a consumer effect and a rival
effect, but this time with regard to a disloyal consumer. This decomposition may be done recursive-
ly. The consumer effect is always the stronger in any period, thus reinforcing the rival effect of the
previous period. Eventually, this also reinforces the rival effect on an incumbent's price to a loyal
consumer. However, subject to a restriction on the shape of the demand curve at prices below costs, it
is still dominated by the consumer effect.
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that an incumbent's profit in period 3, the last one, increases with an amount
equal to A - C. Thus, in period two, a rival firm can afford to incur an extra loss
equal to this. Let the area D + E in Figure 1 be this extra loss, i.e., D + E = A - C.
This is the rival effect, but since it works through consumer surplus, it reduces to
the area D = A - C - E. The consumer effect, on the other hand, amounts to the
extra transaction costs A + B, without reductions. Thus, the total effect on the
incumbent' s price in period 2 is: (A + B) - D = (A + B) - (A - C - E) = B + C + E >
O.
p
c
A is--------------~---
I C
I
D
D(p)
q
Figure 1
The chapter is organised as follows. In Sec. 2, the model is presented. In Sec.
3, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is described and characterised. In Sec.
4, this equilibrium is analysed with regard to the effects, discussed above, of a
change in transaction costs' share of consumer switching costs. Sec. 5 concludes
with a short discussion.
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2. THEMODEL
Suppose all consumers are identical at the outset. As the market develops, they
will differ with regard to their historical purchase patterns. But on this characte-
ristic firms are assumed to be able to price discriminate. This means that we can
keep the whole analysis on a per-capita basis, so that any consumer surpluses and
profits mentioned in the sequel are measured per capita.
The market is open for T periods, with 3 ~ T < 00. The periods are identical in
the sense that each of them starts with firms setting this period's prices simul-
taneously followed by consumers choosing which firm to buy from.
On the supply side, the market consists of two firms. Each of them produces
a homogeneous product and is endowed with a technology exhibiting constant
average costs c > O, so that total costs of producing a quantity q are: C(q) = cq.
Each consumer in the economy is endowed with preferences over q and a
composite of other goods, m, which also is the numeraire. Assuming that saving
and borrowing is infeasible and that goods are non-storable, we represent these
preferences with a periodical utility function U defined as:
U = V(q) + m (2.1)
i.e., the composite good m is assumed to be a transferable utility. We make the
following assumption on V:
Assumption 1: (i) V is twice differentiable; (ii) V' > O; (iii) V" < O.
Define p as the price of the product q and Y as periodical income; then, the
budget constraint for a consumer is: pq + m = Y. Let p = V' (O). When maximising
U, in (2.1), subject to the budget constraint and to the non-negativity constraint q
;:=:O, we obtain the individual periodical demand for q as a continuous function of
the price p, D(p):
D(p) = (V')-l (p), for O sP < p, (2.2)
O, for p;:=:p.
From Assumptions l(ll) and (iii), we have that D(p) approaches infinity as p goes
to O, and that, for p < p:
D'(p) = l/[V"(D(p»] < O. (2.3)
Consumers are assumed to have rational expectations in the sense that they
foresee at any time the equilibrium of the rest of the game and behave according-
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ly. The one-period consumer surplus at a price p is defined as:
S(p) == V(D(p» - V(O)- pD(p) = LP D(x)dx
(2.4)
Consumers incur costs, s > O, when switching between suppliers.tt These
costs are of two kinds. The first kind of switching costs is incurred by a consumer
at every switch; these costs make up a fraction a e (O, 1) of total switching costs.
The second kind is incurred by a consumer only when switching to a supplier
who has not supplied him before; these costs make up the residual fraction (1 -
a).
Common to both firms and consumers is the discount rate 8 e (O, 1].
Firms offer prices in each period from the feasible price range [O,PI. If a firm
offers a consumer a price p, then either the consumer buys from the other firm,
or the firm earns a one-period profit on this consumer equal to:
7t(p) æ (p - c)D(p). (2.5)
The limit property of D(p) implies that 7t(p) becomes arbitrarily lowas p goes to O;
thus, the lower bound on feasible prices, O,will never be binding.
A very useful concept is the following:
R( ) == 7t'(p) = 1+ (p - c)D'(p)
P S'(p) D(p)' (2.6)
where the equality follows from noting that, by differentiation in (2.5) and (2.4),
respectively, we get: 7t'(p) = D(p) + (p - c)D'(p), and S'(p) = - D(p). A price change
has clearly opposite effects on profit and consumer surplus; R(p) measures the
relative strength of these effects.
We now make three useful observations:
Observation 1: S(p) + 7t(p) S; S(c), "il p.
Proof: Clearly, social welfare is maximised when price equals marginal costs:
S(c) + 7t(c)~ S(p) + 7t(p), 'V p. Since 7t(c)= O,the claim follows. QED.
Observation 2: lip ; C, then R(p) ~ 1.
llConsumers' start-up costs in period 1 are, without loss of generality, set to zero.
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Proof: Follows from (2.6), since D'(p) < O. QED.
Observation 3: R'(p) < O, 'if P e (O, c), if the following Condition (C) holds,
O"() (O'(p»2 _ D'(p) 'if (O)
p > D(p) P - c' pe, C • (C)
Proof: Differentiating (2.6), we have:
R'( ) = ( _ cIO"(p) _ (O'(p»)2]+ O'(p).
P P 1.D(p) D(p) D(p)
By applying Condition (C), we find that this expression is negative for p e (O, c).
QED.
Observation 1 is elementary welfare theory; we state it here, because it is the
key to Proposition 2 below. Observation 2 states the asymmetry, discussed in the
Introduction, in the effect of a price change on profit and consumer surplus at
prices above and below costs. This Observation would do in the proofs of our
comparative-statics Theorems for the case of T = 3. However, in the general T-
period case, we need not only that R(p) > 1 for p < c, but also that this ratio increas-
es as p falls further below c. Because of this, and based on Observation 3, we
impose:
Assumption 2: Condition (C) holds.
Condition (C), given in Observation 3 above, always holds as p approaches c
or O; this follows from inspection of (C), using the limit property of the demand
function in the latter case. Thus, the bite of Assumption 2 is at intermediate
prices. Condition (C) is a restriction on the curvature of the demand function; it
requires that, for prices below costs, the demand curve be sufficiently convex or,
at least, not too concave. The Condition is satisfied, e.g., if the demand function
features a constant elasticity at prices below cost: D(p) = ape, a > O, b < O, 'if P ~ c.
Let pm be the (lowest) price that maximizes a monopolist' s one-period profit:
pm æ min argmaxp 1t(p).Clearly, p < Pm implies Rlp) > O. For the sake of conveni-
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ence, we assume that demand is sufficiently large, relative to switching costs and
production costs, that any equilibrium price is strictly below pm:
Assumption 3:
lpmS(c) - S(Pm)= c D(x)dx > s.
Finally, we make assumptions, standard in models of price-setting, asymmet-
ric oligopoly, to ensure equilibrium existence and uniqueness. To ensure exist-
ence, we restrict an indifferent consumer to stay with the incumbent firm. To
ensure uniqueness, we do not allow the rival firm to set a price that would incur
a loss were the incumbent firm to set no price at all at the same time. (See Appen-
dix B.)
3. THE EQUILIBRIUM
The two firms are allowed to set their prices according to a consumer's purchase
history. There are two pieces of payoff-relevant information in such a purchase
history in any period. One is which firm supplied the consumer in the previous
period; denote this firm the incumbent, labeled i, and the other firm the rival,
labeled r. The other payoff-relevant information is whether the consumer has
been with the same firm throughout the past or whether he has been switching
supplier one or more times previously; denote the consumer loyal in the former
case, labeled l, and disloyal in the latter case, labeled d.
Now, let pihtdenote the price offered, in equilibrium, by firm j to an h-type
consumer in period t, with j e {i,r}, h e {l, d}, and t e {2, ... , T}. It turns out that a
rival firm always offers the same price independent of a consumer's loyalty; thus,
define pr == P~t= Pav for t e {2, ... , T}. In period 1, there is no purchase history to
condition the price on; thus, define PI as the period-l price offered by firms in
equilibrium. The equilibrium is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. We have:
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Proposition 1: The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game has the
following prices:
T
pr = min (p I 1t(p) + L ~"C-t1t(p~"C)= O}, t E {2, ... T};
"C=t+l (3.1)
(3.2)
(3.3)
pidt = (p I S(p) = S(pP - as}, te {2, , T};
~t = (p I S(p) = S(pf) - St}, te {2, , T},
with ST = s and St = s[l - ~(1- a)], t e {2, ... T - l}; and
T
"" "C-l .Pl =min (p I 1t(p) + .LJ ~ 7t(p~"C)= O}.
"C=2 (3.4)
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A. This equilibrium has several
interesting features. First, as already mentioned, a rival firm's offer is the same to
both consumer categories. This is because, independent of a consumer's purchase
history so far, the rival's profit prospects are the same: If the consumer switches
today, then he will be a disloyal in the future.
Second, a loyal consumer, in considering whether to switch and thus be-
come disloyal, takes into account his benefit from reduced switching costs in the
future. However, his net switching costs, i.e., his switching costs net of the dis-
counted value of this future benefit, denoted Sti is constant across time except for
the last period, in which there is no future to consider. A disloyal consumer, on
the other hand, can not reduce his future switching costs by switching further.
Third, Proposition 1, together with Observation 1, make it possible for us to
establish how the equilibrium prices relate to eachother. We have:
Proposition 2:
(i) ~ < ... < pt = c;
(ii) c < P~2< < P~T;
(iii) c < ph < < ~T;
(iv) c < P~t~ ~t, te {2, ... , T},with the second inequality strict if and only if ~
< 1or t = T;
(v) Pl < p5 < c.
In the Proof, which is found in Appendix A, we apply Observation 1 to (3.1)
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and (3.2) to prove the first inequality in (iv); the rest, then, follows easily. A direct
consequence of parts (iii) and (v) of Proposition 2 is that price increases along the
equilibrium path and is above costs, except in period 1: PI < c < ph < ... < ph·
Thus, being an incumbent is profitable right from the start.
We have so far considered the case of a finite T. We conclude this Section by
reporting on the extensions of the two Propositions above to the case of an in-
finite horizon. In this case, prices are stationary and, with the obvious notation,
we state the following Corollary, without proof:
Corollary: Suppose o < 1. In case of an infinite horizon, T = 00, there exists an
equilibrium of the model in which:
(i) prices are given by the following set of equations:
1t(pr)+ _a_ 1t(p~)= O,
1-0
S(p~)= S(pr) - as,
S(pk)= S(pr) - s[l - 0(1 - a)], and
1t(Pl)+_a_ 1t(p})= O;
1-0
(ii) the prices are related in the following way: PI < pr < C < p~ < p1.
As is usual with an infinite horizon, this equilibrium is not unique; howev-
er, it has the virtue of being the limit of the unique finite-horizon equilibrium.
The comparative-statics results in the next Section are proved for the case of 3 S; T
< 00 only. However, they are true also for the equilibrium we have outlined for
the case of T = 00; in fact, the proofs are simpler, and the results, like for the case
of T = 3, do not hinge on Assumption 2. For more details on the T = 00 case, see
AppendixC.
4. ANALYSIS
In this section, we explore the consequences on prices and welfare of changes in
the composition of consumer switching costs. With regard to prices, we find that
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the introductory price PI is lower, the higher is transaction costs' share of con-
sumer switching costs:
Theorem 1: If the fraction of transaction costs out of total consumer switch-
ing costs increases, then the first-period price decreases; Le., dpj / da < O.
With regard to welfare, we find that society is better off the smaller is transac-
tion costs' share of consumer switching costs. Define total consumer surplus, TS,
as the discounted sum of the surpluses arising from each of the T prices con-
sumers are subject to in equilibrium:
T
TS == S(Pl) + L ot-lS(pkt)
t=2
Since firms' profits equal zero, welfare equals total consumer surplus. We state
(4.1)
our welfare result as:
Theorem 2: If the fraction of transaction costs out of total consumer switch-
ing costs increases, then social welfare is reduced; Le. dTS/ da < o.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are in Appendix A. But we record here the
key step, also proved in Appendix A:
Proposition 3:
dp~t { }-- > O, t E 2, ... , T - 1 .
da
In the introductory Section above, we argued that the positive effect on pktof
an increase in a is the sum of a negative rival effect and a positive consumer
effect. We can, at this stage, be more specific and write, after differentiating (3.3):
dp~t = 1. [D(~ + os].
da D(ph) t da
Here, the first term in square brackets is the rival effect, which is negative because
dpl/ da is [see Lemma 1(i) in Appendix Al. The second term is the consumer
effect, which is clearly positive. Proving that the latter dominates the former
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involves, therefore, verifying a lower bound on dpl/ da.. This is done in two
steps. First, we establish that dP~,t +l/da. > O and use this to get a lower bound on
dpf+l/da. [see Lemma 1(ii) in Appendix A]. Second, by using Assumption 2 and
Observation 3 [see (A.7) in Appendix A], we can apply this lower bound on
dpf+l/da. in an expression for dp~/da. [(A.S)in Appendix A] to get a lower bound
on dpf/da. which is stricter than the one already obtained on dpf+l/da. and
which, moreover, is the desired one.
Let us conclude this Section with some discussion of Assumption 2. Its
importance is not in the price dimension but rather in the time dimension. To
see this, note that the rival effect may be decomposed into a further pair of con-
sumer and rival effects [see (A.4) in Appendix A]. The latter effect, which derives
from dpf+l/da., is strengthened by an increase in 7t'(pf+l) and weakened by an
increase in 7t'(pf).Thus, we would like to have some lower bound on 7t'(pf)/
7t'(pf+l) at any time. On the other hand, any effect is stronger, the higher is D(p),
since it ultimately works through S'(p) = - D(p). From Proposition 2(i), we know
that pr increases over time and, thus, D(pf+l) > D(pp. This strengthens the effect
from dpf+dda.. To counterbalance this strengthening, we must set the required
lower bound on 7t'(pP/7t'(pf+l) accordingly: 7t'(pP/7t'(pf+l) > D(pP/D(pf+l), or: R(pP
> R(pr+l)' By Proposition 2(i) and Observation 3, this is exactly what we obtain
from Assumption 2.
5. DISCUSSION
We conclude this chapter with commenting on a couple of aspects of our analysis
not touched upon earlier.
If learning costs are to be disregarded whenever a consumer switches back to
a past supplier, independent of the time gone since he was last with this firm,
then there can be no decay of learning. It can, however, be argued that such decay
of learning takes place in reality. In the terminology of our model, this is tanta-
mount to consumer switching costs not only depending on whether the consum-
er has switched or not but on the complete purchase history. This would make
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the model more complex. It is also difficult to argue in favour of such an increas-
ingly fine-tuned price discrimination. However, if we suppose that a part of the
supplier-specific knowledge never decays, we may interpret learning costs in the
present model as pertaining to this part.
We have assumed here that firms are perfectly able to distinguish loyal
consumers from disloyal ones. It is, however, conceivable that this ability is not
always perfect and, in particular, that it correlates with the fraction Cl of transac-
tion costs.12 The reason for the latter might be that firms' information on con-
sumers is more encompassing in markets such as markets for rentals, where also
the fraction of transaction costs is high, whereas firms know less about con-
sumers, including their past loyalty, in markets such as the market for word
processors, where the fraction of learning costs is high. But note that, even put-
ting this argument at one side for the moment, increasing the fraction Cl increas-
es the scope for price discrimination by strengthening a consumer' s preferences
for his incumbent supplier, whether the consumer is loyal or disloyal. Thus,
differences in the ability to price discriminate will, if they are correlated with Cl as
indicated above, only strengthen the results of our model.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1: A consumer of type h, h e {~,dl, that is offered the two
prices Pht and pht in period t will switch from firm i to firm r if and only if the
difference in consumer surplus between the two prices, S(Pht) - S(pht), is strictly
greater than the (net) costs of switching. In equilibrium, the rival firm offers the
lowest price it can afford without making (overall) losses, while the incumbent
matches the rival's price so that the difference in consumer surplus exactly equals
the consumer's costs of switching. The procedure for finding the unique equi-
librium in each subgame is given in Appendix B.
As noted, the consumer stays with the incumbent in every subgame. If, how-
ever, a rival were to attract a consumer away from an incumbent in period t, the
12Thanks to Garth Saloner for raising this issue.
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rival will earn 1t(p~t) in every period 't thereafter, since after a switch the firm will
be an incumbent with a disloyal consumer. This is true whether the consumer is
loyal or not before this switch; thus, P~t = P~t= pr. The non-negative profit con-
straint will be binding on the rival's offer. Thus, we get (3.1). Since a disloyal
consumer has switching costs equal to as at any time, (3.2) follows.
Consider, next, the net switching costs St of a loyal consumer in period t.
Clearly, ST= s. We find St, for t e {2, ... , T - l}, by calculating the benefit, in terms of
future increases in consumer surpluses, of switching:
T T
s - St= L o't-t[S(p~'t) - S(p~'t)]= L o't-tns(pP - as] - [S(pP - S1;]}
't=t+1 't=t+l
T T
"'" 't-t 5: 5:[ "'" 5:'t-t-1= L. o (S-r - as) = u(St + 1 - as) + u . L. U (s, - us)]
't=t+1 't=t+2
= o(St+1 - as) + o(s - St+1)= 0(1 - a)s.
Thus, St = s[1 - 0(1 - a)], t e {2, ... , T - l}, and we get (3.3). Finally, (3.4) follows
from price competition in the standard way. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: We start with part (iv). The second inequality here
follows from a comparison of (3.2) and (3.3), noting that 5' < O, and that St> as if o
< 1or t = T, with St = as otherwise. For the first inequality in part (iv), we have,
for t e {2, ... , T}:
S(p~t) = S(pP - as, by (3.2) in Proposition 1;
~ S(c) - 1t(pP - as, by Observation 1;
T
= S(c) + [L o't-t1t(p~'t)] - as, by (3.1) in Proposition 1;
't=t+1
T
~ S(c) + (L o't-t[S(c) - S(p~'t)]}- as, by Observation 1.
't=t+1
Thus, by rearranging:
T TL o't-tS(p~'t) s [L o't-t]S(c) - as.
't=t 't=t
For this to be true for every t e {2, ... , T}, we must have that:
S(p~t) < S(c), 'ri t e {2, ... , T},
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where the inequality is strict because as > O. Now, since 5' < O,' we have that P~t>
c, t e {2,... , T},as claimed inpart (iv).
In turn, this implies that x(p~t) > o. Thus, the summation in (3.1) is positive
and decreases with t until it is zero at t = T. This implies that pr increases with t
until it equals c at t = T; we have part (i). The first inequalities in parts (ii) and (iii)
are already established. The rest of these inequalities follow from (3.2) and (3.3).
(3.2) implies that P~t is obtained from pI through a time-invariant shift, for t E {2,
... , T}. (3.3) implies that the same is true for p~t' for t e {2,... , T - l}. Since ST-1 < ST,
we also have the last inequality in part (iii). Finally, the second inequality in part
(v) follows from part (i). The first inequality in part (v) is obtained by a compari-
son of (3.1) and (3.4). Since, by part (iv), every term in the summation in (3.1),
with t = 2, is positive but less than or equal to every term in (3.4) and, in addition,
the summation in (3.4) has one extra positive term, x(p~~, the summation in
(3.4) is greater than the one in (3.1). Thus, PI <~, as claimed. QED.
Before proving Proposition 3, we state and prove Lemma 1. Note that, in the
proofs that follow, we make extensive use of R(p) as shorthand for x'(p)/D(p).
Lemma 1:
(i dp] { } dpt1) - < O, t E 2, ... , T - 1 , - = O;
da da
(..) dp] s {3 T}
II da > - D(pP' tE, ... , .
Proof: (i) From differentiation in (3.2), using S'(p) = - Dtp), we have:
dp~t 1 dp]
da = D(p~t)[D(~ + s], t E {2,... , T}.
From differentiation in (3.1), we have, for t e {2, ... , T - I}, using (A.3):
dpf = __ 1_( ± o't- t R(p~'t)[D(p~)d~ + s]}
da 1t'(pP 't= t+1 da
= __ O_{R(pi )[D(pf )dpf+l +S]-1t'(pf )dpf+l}
x' (pP d, t+1 t+1 da t+1 da
(A.3)
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(A.4)
By Assumption 3 and Proposition 2(i) and (ii), Pf+1 ~ c < P~,t+l < pm' By Observa-
tion 2, R(pf+1) 2:: 1 > R(P~,t+1) > O. Thus, the square-bracketed expression in (A.4)
is positive and the second term in curly brackets is negative. This implies that:
dpIlda < O, if dpf+1/da ~ O. The claim follows recursively by noting, from differ-
entiation in (3.1) with t = T, that dpt/da = O.
(ii) Since dpIl da < O by part (i), we have, from differentiation in (3.1):
T ..L o't-t 7t'(Pa't)dpa't > o, t E {2,... T -l}.
't=t +1 1t'(pP da
Since this holds for every te {2, ... , T - l}, we have that:
dp~'t/da > O, te {3,... T}.
We now have the claim by inserting from (A.3) and rearranging. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3: Differentiation in (3.3), using S'(p) = - D(p), gives, for
te {2, ... T - l}:
dp1t = 1. [D(~ + os].
da D(p~t) t da
Insertion from (A.4) implies:
ddP1t= O. (_(1 n [D(Pf+1)d~f+1(R(p[+ 1)- R(pj t+ 1» - sR(pj t +1)]+ s}
a D(p~t) 'R Pt a ' ,
= . o ([1t'(pr )dpf+1 + sR(pr» _ R(pi )[D(pr )dp{+l + s]}.
D(ph)R(pf) t+1 da t d,t+1 t+1 da (A.S)
The fraction outside curly brackets in (A.5) is positive. Moreover, R(P~,t+ 1)< l, by
Observation 2, since pkt+1 > c by Proposition 2(iv). Thus, the expression inside
curly brackets in (A.S) is positive - and, therefore, dp1t/ da is positive - if the first
square-bracketed expression in (A.S) is greater than the second one, or if:
7t'(pr )dpf+ 1 + sR(pn >D(pr )dpf+ 1 + s. (A.6)t +1 da t t+1 da
By Proposition 2(i), pt = c, implying dpt/ da = O. Thus, for t = T - l, (A.6) reduces
to: R(pf -1) > l, which is true by Proposition 2(i) and Observation 2. For t < T - l,
R(p[ +1) > 1 by Proposition 2(i) and Observation 2; thus, we may rewrite (A.6) as:
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(A.7)
Since, for t + 1 ST-l, pr < Pf+l < c, by Proposition 2(i), the second fraction on the
righthand side of (A.6) is greater than 1, by Observations 2 and 3 and Assumption
2. Thus, by Lemma l(ii), the inequality in (A.6) holds for t + 1 E {3, ... , T - 1}, i.e.,
for t E {2, ... , T - 2}.13 Since the case of t = T - 1was done above, we are through.
QED.
Proof of Theorem 1: Differentiation in (3.4) gives:
T i
dPl = _ 1 [L B't-I1t'(p1't)dp~'t].
da 1t'(pI) 't=2 da (A.8)
Since the summation is positive by Proposition 3, this expression is negative.
QED.
Proof of Theorem 2: We differentiate in (4.1), using that S'(p) = - D(p), to get:
T i
dTS = _ D(PI)dPI _ '" B't-l D(pi )dp~'t.
da da £.J l't da't=2
Insertion from (A.8) gives:
T i i
dIS. = '" B't-l D( i ) dp~'t ~(p~'t) -1].
da £.J P~'t da R(p)'t= 2 I (A.9)
By Proposition 2(iii) and (v), PI < c < p1't' 't E {2, ... , T}. Thus, by Observation 2,
R(PI) > 1 > R(p1't)''t E {2, , T}.Therefore, the bracketed term in (A.9) is negative.
Since dp1't/ da > O, 't E {2, , T - l}, by Proposition 3, and dph/ da = O, the claim
follows. QED.
APPENDIXB
The following two assumptions, one resolving consumer indifference, the other
restricting firms' strategies, are necessary to ensure existence and uniqueness,
respectively, of the equilibrium.
13This is the sole place where we make use of Assumption 2. As is clear form the text here, the
argument making use of this Assumption is neither applicable nor neæssary in the case of T = 3.
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Assumption 4: If a consumer is indifferentt+ among the two offers in period
t, then: (i) if t = 1, he chooses each firm with probability}; (ii) if t e {2, ... , Tl, he
chooses with probability 1 the same firm that he chose in period t - 1.
Assumption 5: A firm will not offer a consumer a price that would induce a
losstf if the other firm were to fail to offer the consumer a price at the same time.
Part (i) of Assumption 4 is straightforward. Part (ii) is needed in order for
firms to maximise profit over a closed set. Without this, existence of an equilibri-
um would not be guaranteed. Assumption 5 excludes some, but not all, weakly
dominated strategies. A similar formulation is found in Hart and Tirole (1990,
Appendix B) in a model of price-setting duopolists with different marginal
costs.16
To establish existence of a unique equilibrium for this game, one must
establish existence and uniqueness in every subgame. It suffices, though, to look
in detail at a single subgame, since the arguments are the same. Therefore, let h =
l and t = T; i.e., we consider last-period offers to loyal consumers. Since t = T,
there is no future benefit from switching, and net switching costs are clearly ST =
s. Thus, the consumer switches if and only if:
S(ph) - S(ph) > s. (B.l)
There is, furthermore, no future profit for the rival accruing from attracting the
consumer. We have:
Claim: The unique equilibrium prices offered in period T to loyal consumers
are: (i) ph = c; and (ii) ph = (p I S(p) = S(c)- sl.
14Indifferent, in the sense that both offers give him the same total discounted surplus
provided equilibrium strategies are played in the rest of the game.
15Loss, in the sense that total discounted profit is negative provided equilibrium strategies
are played in the rest of the game.
16It should be noted that, although Assumption 5 may seem sound, it is not completely satis-
factory, since it leaves us with a unique equilibrium which itself includes weakly dominated
strategies. A way around the problem, not explored here, would be to discretize the action space.
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Proof: Existence. First, we show that p = ph is the incumbent's best response
to ph = c. By (B.l), a price p > P1T would imply the consumer switching, so that
the incumbent earns zero profit. A price p < ph would imply that the incumbent
could increase its profit by increasing its price towards ph. Second, we show that
p = c is the rival's best response to ph = (p I S(p) = S(c) - sl. If the rival sets a price
p > c, it would earn zero profit, since the consumer does not switch; this is the
same profit as with p = c. A price p < c would entail a negative profit.
Uniqueness. Note first that, if the rivaloffers some p < c and the incumbent
does not offer any price, then the rival incurs a negative profit. Thus, the rival
offering p < c is excluded by Assumption 5. Let, therefore, ph ;::::c. With:
p > S-l (S(ph) - s), or p S c,
the incumbent earns a non-positive profit. For:
p e (c, S-l (S(ph) - s)],
the incumbent's profit increases in p. Similar reasoning for the rival implies that,
in equilibrium, the two prices must satisfy:
S(ph) - S(ph) = s. (B.2)
Suppose that ph > c and that (B.2) holds. Then, the rival earns zero profit and
could earn positive profit by decreasing its price slightly, so this cannot be an
equilibrium price. Thus, ph = c. The unique equilibrium strategies are verified.
QED.
APPENDIX C
We discuss here the infinite horizon case, i.e., T = 00. Consider, first, net consum-
er switching costs for this case. It is clearly stationary, as are the equilibrium
prices; thus, denote it s'. We determine s' from the following equation:
s - s' = _B_ (s' - as),
l-B
where the righthand side is the discounted value of the future benefit from
switching. Solving the equation, we find: s' = s[l - B(1 - a)]. From this, part (i) of
the Corollary is straightforward. Part (ii), like Proposition 2, follows easily if we
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can show that p~ > c. By repeated use of part (i) and of Observation l, we get:
S(p~) = S(pr) - as S; S(c) -n:(pr) - as = S(c) + [0/(1 - o)]1t(p~)- as
S; S(c) + [0/(1- o)][S(c) - S(p~)] - as
= [1/(1- o)]S(c) - [0/(1- o)]S(p~) - as.
By rearranging, we find that:
S(p~) S; S(c) - (1 - o)as,
which, since the second term on the righthand side is strictly negative when 0<
l, verifies that p~ > c. The steps to show the rest of part (ii) are the same as in the
proof of Proposition 2, in Appendix A.
The equivalent to Lemma l, in Appendix A, for the case of T = 00, is:
dpr
- ___5__< - < o.
D(pr) da «;»
To see that this is true, we differentiate the first two equations in the Corollary to
get, after some labour (which recapitulates the proof of Lemma 1):
dp" s R(p~)
- = - -- ------='-'=----,
da D(pr) (1 - o)R(pr) + R(p~) (C.2)
Here, both fractions are positive; thus, dpr / do. < O. Moreover, the second fraction
is less than 1 (when o < 1); thus, dpr /da > - s/Dtpr), This verifies (C.1).
Along the lines of the proof of Proposition 3, in Appendix A, we obtain,
from the third equation in the Corollary and from (C.2):
dp1 _ so(l - o) R(pr) - R(p~)
da D(p1) (1 - o)R(pr) + oR(p~) (C.3)
From part (ii) of the Corollary, pr < C < p~. Thus, from Observation 2, Rlpr) > 1 >
R(p~). Applying this to (C.3) establishes that dpV do. > 0.17
From the fourth equation in the Corollary, we get:
dPl = _ __o_ n:'(p1) dp1
da 1 - o n:'(Pl) de (C.4)
This is negative, since dpV da > o. Thus, Theorem 1holds for T = 00.
The expression for total consumer surplus becomes, in this case:
TS = S(Pl) + [0/(1- o)]S(pp.
17Notice that proving this result, in the present case, makes no use of Assumption 2.
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When differentiating this, making use of (C.4), we obtain:
dIS. =_L D( i) dp~ r~(p~) -1].
da 1- o p~ da "R(Pl)
Like in the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A, this expression is negative. Thus,
also Theorem 2 holds for T = 00.
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